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EDITOR'S PREFACE 
The South during most of its long career has been a predominantly 
rural area, so much so that historians have found it difficult to focus 
on the cities of the region. Yet the cities have been here all along; 
Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans were thriving communities 
long before Chicago or Kansas City came into existence. Throughout 
the twentieth century, southern cities have been growing at a rate 
faster than the national urban average. But the most spectacular 
southern growth has come since World War II as a part of the cele-
brated "Sunbelt" phenomenon; this is what has finally awakened 
scholars to the need for studies on southern urban affairs. Today 
there is a substantial and growing body of work on the topic. 
The author of this able volume is a veteran historian of the urban 
South, and he has drawn upon his broad knowledge of the subject 
to provide a functional explanation of the role of the region's cities. 
He shows that their historical development was long different in 
certain respects from that of cities elsewhere because the primary 
purpose of the southern cities was to provide service for the dis-
tinctive and expansive agricultural economy of the region. He shows 
also that in recent times southern cities, while retaining many fea-
tures that are peculiarly southern, have grown more like other 
American cities as the entire southern economy and society have 
grown more like those of the rest of the nation. 
The Urban South is an essential contribution to "New Perspec-
tives on the South," a series designed to provide a fresh and com-
prehensive view of the region's history as seen in the light of the 
far-reaching changes of the period since World War II. Each volume 
is expected to be a discrete essay representing an interpretive syn-
thesis of the best research on the subject. Twenty or more volumes 
are planned. 
Charles P. Roland 
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PREFACE 
The 1980 census indicated that many of the South's large cities were 
among the fastest growing in the nation. Urban boosters all across 
Dixie took heart from the statistics. Cultural and economic progress 
accompanied the population increases. Baltimore had supposedly 
experienced an "urban renaissance," Atlanta had become a "world 
class city," and Washington had emerged as the "capital of the free 
world." Still another New South seemed at hand and one with con-
siderable substance. While only the most enthusiastic promoters 
accepted the premise that urbanization had become a controlling 
factor in southern life, it had certainly assumed a much more im-
portant role than ever before in the region. Indeed, the rapid advance 
of cities in the years after World War II had served to blur sectional 
lines. A new term, "the Sunbelt," denoted not only the South but, 
according to some experts, cities that extended in a great arc from 
Baltimore around through New Orleans and on to the Pacific Coast 
from San Diego to Portland. 
The rapid urban changes in the South require study, as do, among 
other things, the roots of southern urbanization, the impact of racial 
factors on city building, the influence of outside forces, the impulse 
to continue building towns, and the relationship of urban activities 
in the South to those in the rest of the United States. 
The urban thrust of the South is plainly not new. Throughout 
American history, the South has sought to construct a system of 
cities to meet the region's needs and almost always to do so with 
limited financial resources. The story of southern city building has 
not on all occasions been a glorious one, of course; it has involved 
frequent false starts and numerous setbacks. Nevertheless, and de-
spite Jeffersonian protests against cities, the town builders of Dixie 
have historically forged ahead. By the end of the 1980s they had 
given the region urban equality with the rest of the nation. 
Trillions of individual decisions made by countless men and 
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women contributed to the construction of cities in the American 
South. The historian must probe beneath the surface clutter of his-
tory, research pertinent primary and secondary evidence, identify 
trends, and through the use of examples and case studies create a 
historical synthesis. Much interesting and valuable information 
must inevitably be omitted, so that it becomes easy to fault the 
author's judgment. I should therefore emphasize that this book deals 
less with the question of how cities fit into the southern experience 
(less, for example, with the reasons why towns in the South differ 
from those in the North) than with the history of southern cities. 
I view such great epochs as the Civil War and Reconstruction in the 
context of their impact on urbanization. Not all occurrences in a 
city qualify for treatment as urban history; events do so only when 
they are related to the process of urbanization. 
The crux of urbanization, for better or worse, is growth. A suc-
cessful city, just like a person, starts as an infant, passes through 
adolescence, and at some point emerges as an adult. The process is 
sometimes compressed; the San Francisco of Gold Rush days ad-
vanced from about 800 people to more than 50,000 people within 
the span of a couple years. At other times matters move more slowly: 
the gradual rise of Washington from a hamlet to a world class me-
tropolis is a case in point. To be regarded as cities, communities 
have had to cross arbitrary, bureaucratically imposed population 
categories evident in census definitions, which have changed over 
the years. The addition of certain necessary city services, such as 
sewerages and organized fire departments, however, helps us iden-
tify the stages of urban progress in a historical context. Urbanization 
is an "independent variable" without an ideological foundation. All 
of the places that have emerged as cities, from Moscow to New York 
and from Rome to New Orleans, exhibit some common experience. 
Because this study is analytical, it contains, unlike old fashioned 
descriptive urban histories, no long lists of mayors, agonizing dis-
cussions of politics, or detailed financial statements. It also lacks a 
controlling theory or unique "public culture" synthesis, whether 
Marxist or Neo-Marxist or one associated with the New Left, the 
New Right, or some other function. I have tried, using traditional 
research methods and approaches, to draw conclusions based on evi-
dence about the southern urban experience. 
So many people helped me on this project that it is impossible to 
acknowledge all of them. Fredrick Marcel Spletstoser and Barbara J. 
Cottrell commented with great care on various aspects of the manu-
script. Spletstoser's observations on southern urban history were 
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especially valuable. I had help in a variety of forms from several of 
my colleagues at the University of Missouri-Kansas City, including 
W. Robert Brazelton, Jesse V. Clardy, Richard B. Elrod, James Stephen 
Falls, George D. Gale, Herman M. Hattaway, Richard D. McKinzie, 
and Stanley B. Parsons. Roger T. Johnson of the International Grains 
Program at Kansas State University discussed southern agricultural 
economics with me on a number of fishing trips. Other contributors 
included Garin Burbank, Lawrence Christensen, Patrick McLear, 
William Petrowski, William Pratt, and R. Christopher Schnell. James 
and Marian Cottrell gave me sanctuary on an island in Canada. 
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1 
THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF COLONIAL CITIES 
The urbanization of the South has been not dramatic but generally 
mundane and rather bland. Dramatic moments involve destructive 
epidemics, conflagrations in wartime, and racial confrontations, 
none exalted or exalting. The building of the urban South saw no 
major battles between economic titans, no frenzied activities by 
thousands of land sharks and speculators racing to found towns, no 
great national projects involving the rapid spread of rails across the 
continent, no mineral rushes that created whole towns overnight, 
and no technological or organizational triumphs leading to industrial 
power on the world scene. Events of importance sometimes took 
decades to unfold. The history of the urban South from colonial days 
to the late twentieth century is basically a conventional story of 
development in a slow and painstaking process. Doggedly moving 
ahead, southern city builders, plagued by limited resources and fre-
quently unappreciated, labored to achieve incremental growth, 
helped by a spurt here and there. They sought to construct an urban 
society compatible with their section's agrarian traditions. 
It could be argued that prior to the twentieth century the South 
had no urban dimension. To prove such a contention we need only 
draw upon and manipulate traditional truisms and rationales. We 
might say, for example, that Baltimore, guided by the avarice of its 
business community, adopted and maintained Yankee values start-
ing early in the nineteenth century. Louisville, in actuality a mid-
western town unable to compete against Cincinnati and Pittsburgh 
for control of Ohio River trade, turned south only to further its 
greedy search for new markets. St. Louis, originally a southern com-
munity, switched sections. The Lion of the Valley abandoned its 
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historic roots in order to exploit the commerce and natural resources 
of the upper Mississippi River valley. Washington, an aberrant city 
despite its southern location, found its role in the urban mosaic 
dictated by national considerations rather than sectional ones. 
Charleston, Savannah, Richmond, Norfolk, and other old colo-
nial towns were so closely tied to the plantation system in their 
formative years as to have developed without crass urban charac-
teristics. New Orleans and Mobile, because of their French and Span-
ish heritages, represented special cases and were hardly places that 
under other circumstances would have flourished inside the Cotton 
Kingdom. Transportation needs, which transcended cultural values, 
made it necessary to create interior shipping points to help move 
cotton-Augusta, Columbia, Memphis, and Vicksburg, to name a 
few. The rising commercial and industrial metropolises of the New 
South, including Atlanta, Birmingham, and Chattanooga, were 
really "northern cities" superimposed upon Dixie by outsiders. Jack-
sonville, Pensacola, and other towns that prospered in Florida failed 
to belong at all. Indeed, the new cities of the Sunshine State resem-
bled the Northeast more than the South in thought and spirit and 
starkly reflected the extent of northern penetration into the South 
of the Gilded Age. In short, cities in the South were out of step with 
the cherished agrarian concepts that shaped the region. 
Unreconstructed Confederate sympathizers who denied that an 
urban network existed in the South did not do so from a fear of 
outside forces, xenophobia. Rather, such denial served a useful pur-
pose in a section that had fallen behind the rest of the United States 
in the construction of cities and hence in economic, political, and 
social power. On the one hand, a lack of towns tended to buttress 
claims that the Confederacy had lost to a murderous military jug-
gernaut created by a dominant northern urban and industrial society. 
On the other, urban places supposedly promoted indulgences and 
vices that ran counter to the pristine and much-touted values of 
southern agrarianism. After all, Thomas Jefferson of Virginia, one 
of the greatest of southern statesmen, had said, "I think our gov-
ernments will remain virtuous for many centuries as long as they 
are chiefly agricultural; and this will be as long as there shall be 
vacant lands in any part of America. When they get piled upon one 
another in large cities, as in Europe, they will become corrupt as in 
Europe."1 
Generations of southern leaders had extolled the rural character 
of their land, with its plantations and small farms. Of course, no 
one denied that cities existed in the nineteenth-century South. In-
deed, the cities were there for all to see. But the view remained 
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widely accepted that the region had little in the way of urban foun-
dations and that the existing cities bore only a slight relationship 
or relevance to a nascent southern agrarian civilization that would 
serve as the foundation of the Confederate States of America. Cer-
tainly, the South, both antebellum and postbellum, was predomi-
nantly rural. Nevertheless, from the earliest days of settlement, 
southern development bore an urban physiognomy. 
More than 150 years of urbanization occurred in the South before 
the Declaration of Independence was signed. Although the organized 
English settlement of the southern seaboard colonies reflected 
mixed motives, in the initial stages the selection of potential urban 
sites was of primary concern. Theoretical and practical circum-
stances dictated the course of action. Religious denominations 
stressed the need to create ordered communities. Prevailing utopian 
beliefs incorporated the notion that people should live in organized 
and compact localities. Other observers saw new colonial com-
munities as offering the chance to reclaim a world lost by the 
breakup of European tribes and the decline of village life. Military 
considerations made it necessary to select a defensible location, pref-
erably one on high ground. According to the conventional wisdom 
of some clerics, the Indians were "children of nature" placed on earth 
for missionaries to convert to Christianity, but others held that the 
aborigines were "children of the devil." There was, however, general 
agreement that the Spanish in Florida constituted an ever-present 
threat. 
The first settlers needed wharves and warehouses to store and 
receive supplies. In addition, the crown, hoping to control trade, 
initially believed that centralized shipping points would facilitate 
the enforcement of trade regulations. Furthermore, health consid-
erations made it desirable to select a location away from swampy 
ground. Finally, any progress meant expanding from an initial point: 
the colonists needed a base from which to explore, and eventually 
to settle, districts away from the coast. When the first pioneers chose 
a place, at the very least, they wanted a good harbor, a defensible 
post, a spot easily reached, and a location with ready access to the 
interior. The first builders of colonies gave little thought to creating 
communities with an urban or rural character. According to pre-
vailing theories, rural and urban areas were "normal" and comple-
mented each other. In fact, plans called for importing foodstuffs from 
England on the assumption that the colonists would be too busy 
with other endeavors, such as panning for gold, to cultivate crops. 
British town building in the Virginia tidewater made a bad be-
ginning. In 1585 Sir Walter Raleigh started Roanoke Colony on a 
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sea island off the Carolina coast. The costly venture ended in total 
disaster; the 108 settlers, who disappeared without a trace, left be-
hind one of the great mysteries of history. Not until early in the 
next century did the Virginia Company of London, a joint-stock 
company (an early form of corporation) operating under a royal 
charter, mount another major effort. In April 1607 an expedition of 
a hundred men sent out by the company made a landfall at Cape 
Henry in Chesapeake Bay. After a search that lasted a couple of 
weeks, the colonists selected a site for a garrison town twenty miles 
up the navigable James River. The spot, named Jamestown, had ex-
cellent defensive features; it was a circularly shaped piece of flat 
land slightly above sea level and was connected to the mainland by 
a narrow isthmus. The situation appeared so good that the settlers 
took a calculated risk, ignoring a warning in the company's instruc-
tions that they should avoid "a low or moist place because it will 
prove unhealthful."2 Disaster followed; the surrounding swamps 
proved malarial and the drinking water brackish. Disease, coupled 
with Indian attacks and other misfortunes, decimated the original 
settlers. Furthermore, attempts to bring in adequate supplies from 
England or to buy food from the Indians failed miserably. During 
Jamestown's "starving time/' numerous newcomers died shortly 
after arriving. 
Between 1609 and 1610 the population dropped from 500 to only 
60. The arrival of 150 new colonists then brought renewed hope. 
Governor John Smith ruled with an iron hand and put slackers to 
work planting corn, so that Jamestown survived. Even though it 
remained little more than a semimilitary trading post, overly op-
timistic officials, overlooking inauspicious auguries, decided to 
undertake an expansion program. The new settlements in the in-
terior of Jamestown Colony included Martin's Hundred, Henrico, 
and Elizabeth City. In 1617 the discovery that tobacco could be 
grown in the colony raised hopes for future agricultural progress. 
Then in 1622 the Indians carried out a devastating surprise attack 
and destroyed or decimated most of the outlying settlements, killing 
the entire population of Martin's Hundred. The calamity contributed 
to the economic ruin of the Virginia Company of London, which 
had expended more than 200,000 pounds in the colony, with no 
return on its investment. In 1624 the British government assumed 
control of Jamestown and converted it into a royal colony owned 
entirely by the Crown. The new colony was called Virginia. 
The English had little to show for their early colonization and 
town-building efforts. Counting the Roanoke tragedy, only 1,275 of 
6,000 adventurers who went to Virginia over the years remained in 
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the colony when the Crown took jurisdiction. At the time of the 
1624 census, the two largest centers in Virginia hardly qualified as 
even glorified villages. Elizabeth City had 257 inhabitants and 69 
houses; Jamestown had only 175 people living in 33 dwellings. The 
course of events was all the more frustrating in view of the efforts 
made by the Virginia Company of London to promote towns. The 
decision to found additional settlements before Jamestown had been 
firmly established had especially unfortunate consequences. In par-
ticular, the placement of the new towns along Virginia's main rivers 
at considerable distances from each other in the wilderness made a 
coordinated defense against the Indians virtually impossible. In the 
retrenchment that followed the devastation by the Indians, regula-
tions issued in 1623 required the shipping of all exports from the 
colony through Jamestown. Other directives had the purpose of 
stimulating residential construction in Jamestown and enlarging its 
role as a legislative center. In a major blunder not recognized at the 
time, the measures failed to take into account the fact that the 
presence of navigable streams near the new plantations made a cen-
tral shipping point unnecessary. The rise of tobacco as a profitable 
crop-and the basis for Virginia's eventual prosperity as a flourishing 
colony-contributed to the construction in the South of a rural so-
ciety rather than an urban one. 
Efforts continued to create towns in Virginia.3 In 1655 the House 
of Burgesses, the colony's general assembly, enacted legislation call-
ing for more communities, but nothing came of the measure, much 
to the frustration of Crown authorities. Because it proved impracti-
cal to ship all tobacco and other items through Jamestown, planners 
decided to establish additional official ports of entry on the York, 
Rappahannock, Potomac, and Accomac rivers. Following instruc-
tions from London, the House of Burgesses passed a town act in 1662 
that provided for a tobacco levy to raise funds to build new com-
munities at the rate of one a year. From a practical standpoint, the 
legislation failed. An official admitted that over a three-year period 
the tax netted enough money to construct only four to five dwell-
ings. Jamestown actually experienced a further decline. In 1676 the 
village had only about a hundred freedmen when insurgents burned 
most of it to the ground during Bacon's Rebellion. The place never 
recovered from the blow. 
Subsequent general town acts in Virginia in 1680, 1684, and 1691 
provided for the creation of a number of new towns, set land prices, 
and gave promoters economic incentives. While the 1691 act led 
Williamsburg to be founded as the new colonial capital, Virginia 
remained almost entirely rural territory. As a contemporary ob-
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server noted, "This (i.e.) the number of Rivers, is one of the chief 
Reasons why they have no Townsi for every one being more solici-
tous for the Private Interest and Conveniency, than for a publick, 
they will either be for making forty towns at once, that is, two in 
every County, or none at all, which is the Countries Ruin."4 Small 
and promising settlements did blossom at Norfolk, Portsmouth, and 
a few other places. Unwarranted optimism and dogged attempts to 
build cities persisted despite the poor record of success. 
A port act passed by the House of Burgesses in 1 706 supposedly 
offered so many benefits and privileges to town dwellers that some 
Crown officials, discounting all the past problems, unreasonably 
feared it would prove "detrimental by drawing the inhabitants off 
from their planting tobacco in the country to the cohabiting and 
setting up handicraft trades."5 In 1710 the governor of Virginia, ac-
cepting this line of reasoning, repealed the measure by proclamation. 
The following year a new port bill that represented the last major 
legislative effort in colonial Virginia to influence town building 
failed in the House of Burgesses. Even though plans foundered or 
worked imperfectly, the attempts by Virginia leaders, mostly plant-
ers, to construct towns demonstrated their strong belief that the 
colony needed an urban dimension to strengthen its agrarian 
economy. Marketing and geographical considerations-rather than 
any doctrine of antiurbanism-precluded the construction of cities 
in colonial Virginia. The same situation prevailed in neighboring 
parts of the Tidewater. 
The band of settlers whom Lord Baltimore had dispatched from 
England in 1634 to found Maryland had been ordered to establish a 
town. In issuing instructions, he admonished "all the Planters to 
build their houses in as decent and uniforme a manner as their 
abilities and the place will afford, and neere adjoying one to an other, 
and for that purpose to cause streetes to be marked out where they 
intend to place the towne and to oblige every man to buyld one by 
an other according to that rule."6 The pioneers started a small set-
tlement named St. Mary's on a "safe harbor" on the Potomac River 
near its egress into Chesapeake Bay. Maryland never experienced a 
"starving time," but for several years depressed tobacco prices on 
the world market hurt the economy. As in Virginia, most planters 
shipped from their own docks, and little commerce of any kind 
flowed through St. Mary's, which functioned only as a seat of gov-
ernment. In 1678 the hamlet had only thirty houses and a few small 
buildings. The place remained off the beaten path, and in 1695 au-
thorities moved the capital to Annapolis. St. Mary's underwent a 
steady decline from its already lowly status. It served briefly as a 
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temporary county seat and as an Anglican chapel before it disap-
peared entirely. There was no need for even a village in what had 
quickly become an out-of-the-way part of Maryland. 
Over the years, Maryland officials had vigorously and overtly 
tried to promote urbanization. In 1668 the governor issued a pro-
clamation designating thirteen town sites. Nothing came of the 
scheme because funds to build towns were unavailable from either 
public or private sources. The Maryland legislature, responding to 
pressure from the British government, which wanted to improve 
regulation of the tobacco trade, passed comprehensive town acts on 
four occasions, in 1683, in 1684, in 1686, and again in 1706. These 
laws, in addition to dealing with numerous housekeeping matters, 
specified methods of land acquisition, distribution of town lots, and 
town locations. The especially ambitious 1683 measure designated 
forty-seven town sites of 100 acres each. In keeping with Crown 
policy, the various towns, all on rivers or harbors, were to serve as 
ports of entry. 
As a matter of course, plantation interests opposed city building 
on economic grounds, from a fear, probably with reason, that closer 
supervision of the tobacco trade would cost them money. Their 
lobbying efforts resulted in repeal or nullification of all the town 
acts. Only a few places founded under the various measures ever 
passed beyond the planning stage. Annapolis, created in 1689 under 
special legislation, became within five years the largest incorporated 
community in the colony, although it had only about forty struc-
tures. The mere passage of bills calling for towns did not mean that 
they were automatically created. Attempts by government planners 
to designate sites, especially ones that did not favor the economic 
desires and needs of the inhabitants, failed miserably. Even so, be-
tween 1728 and 1751, the Maryland legislature persisted in trying 
to promote urbanization. It passed no fewer than twenty-three spe-
cial interest acts calling for towns that in the end were never built_? 
At midcentury, the Maryland and Virginia Tidewaters remained al-
most entirely agricultural. As long as almost all the plantations stood 
along the water line, there was no need for major municipalities. 
The eight proprietors who in 1663 received a royal charter for a 
Carolina colony included cities in their grandiose plans to plant 
semifeudal institutions in the American wilderness. Their schemes 
gave them vast estates and provided for an economy based on the 
production of silks, wines, fruits, and oils. The political philosopher 
John Locke wrote part of the Carolina Fundamental Constitution of 
1669, which contained provisions for a local nobility and for both 
white and black slavery. In planning cities, the proprietors hoped to 
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avoid the mistakes that in their view had been made in Virginia and 
Maryland. Their designs called for a network of widely scattered 
agricultural villages, in keeping with desires for an integrated and 
smooth-functioning mercantile system in which they would regu-
late and direct economic activities. 
Plans that seemed promising on paper failed in practice. People 
already living in the northern part of the grant welcomed and ac-
tually did business with pirates, refused to obey the proprietors' 
representatives, and conducted most trade through Virginia. Navi-
gation problems caused by shoals, fog, sandbars, banks, and shallow 
channels made it hard for large craft to reach the tiny northern 
Carolina river ports. In the southern regions of Carolina, new settlers 
opposed the proprietors' designs almost from the moment they ar-
rived in the colony. Political and civil strife hampered progress, 
economic plans failed, white slavery proved impractical, and neigh-
boring Indians were hostile. Eventually the proprietors gave up. 
South Carolina became a royal colony in 1719, and North Carolina 
did so in 1 729. North Carolina emerged as a land of small tobacco 
farmers served by a few tiny trading centers. Wilmington (first called 
Newton) on the Fear River functioned as the chief port of entry.8 
Large rice and indigo plantations subsidized by the Crown served 
as the mainsprings of South Carolina's economy, while steady 
growth characterized the lumber, slave, naval stores, and provision 
trades. Commercial ties with the Caribbean and with Africa sup-
plemented business relations with England. Coastal commerce in-
creased in importance, and the need arose to distribute and receive 
goods from throughout the colony. Such conditions called for a city, 
and so it was no accident that South Carolina's major port, Charles 
Town, a small village during its adolescent years, emerged as the 
first magnificent jewel in the South's urban crown. 
Charles Town's relatively gradual rise to prominence reflected 
the experience of the colony as a whole, which had a much slower 
rate of growth than might have been expected. The city, enjoying 
an excellent location on a great navigable bay seven miles from the 
open sea, stood on a low and flat neck of land formed by the junctures 
of the Ashley and Cooper rivers, both of which afforded excellent 
access into the interior. South Carolinians considered the tidal har-
bor, flanked on two sides by sea islands, among the best along the 
Atlantic Coast. The old Carolina proprietors, after two false starts 
at selecting an administrative center-nothing ever seemed to go 
right for them-had in 1679 designed Charles Town as the seat of 
government. The decision had helped touch off a building boom that 
saw a hundred houses constructed within a year. Thereafter the 
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colony's numerous problems retarded progress, and Charles Town 
had only about a thousand residents in 1700. On top of other dif-
ficulties, Indian wars decimated the population of the interior. Un-
daunted, authorities predicted future progress. "The trade of this 
province is certainly increased of late years, there being a greater 
consumption yearly of most commodities imported," Governor Na-
thaniel Johnson reported in 1708. 11 And the inhabitants by a yearly 
addition of slaves are made the more capable of improving the pro-
duce of the colony."9 
Charles Town advanced slowly. Its progress was vexed by a se-
vere hurricane in 1728 and a bad fire in 17 40. The storm wrecked 
or damaged twenty-three ships in the harbor, and the fire burned 
about half the town's 600 houses. The rise of South Carolina rice 
and indigo plantations helped Charles Town recover from both up-
heavals. Rice exports amounted to slightly more than 911,000 barrels 
in 1740, and more than 200,000 pounds of indigo crossed Charles 
Town docks in 1747 on the way to England. These statistics rep-
resented impressive totals. Moreover, business obtained during vari-
ous wars between England and France stimulated commerce and 
placed Charles Town on firm financial foundations. With South 
Carolina's rice and indigo firmly shored up by British price supports, 
Charles Town's future as a trading center seemed virtually unlim-
ited. 
Even as the American Revolution drew near, Charles Town ex-
perienced its Golden Age. In 1765 the city had an estimated popu-
lation of 6,000 whites and between 7,000 and 8,000 black slaves. 
Charles Town merchants made fortunes marketing their wares 
within the British Empire. Many of the elegant planters, who divided 
their time between their plantations and their town residences, 
owned hundreds of slaves and thousands of acres of land. The white 
population of Charles Town, a mix of English, Irish, Scots, French 
Huguenots, and other Europeans, was cosmopolitan and formed a 
society based more on wealth than on ancestry. By the time of the 
Revolution, Charles Town had a reputation for culture and energy. 
"Many will bear me witness when I say that travelers could scarcely 
go into any city where they could meet with a society of people more 
agreeable, intelligent, and hospitable than at Charles-town," an au-
thority contended. 11In point of industry the town is like a beehive, 
and there are none that reap not advantage more or less from the 
flourishing trade and commerce."10 
Charles Town commercial interests, reluctant to lose their im-
perial markets and price supports, came rather late to the revolu-
tionary movement. The merchants and planters kept control 
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throughout the hostilities, weathered a British occupation, and were 
so firmly in authority at the end of the struggle that the class struc-
ture, which had been fairly fluid prior to the Revolution, solidified. 
As a result newcomers found it hard to advance. With the city-
renamed Charleston in 1783-outside the British Empire, only time 
would tell whether a conservative course was the right one to take 
in dealing with the rapidly changing conditions. In any event the 
South Carolina center emerged from the Revolution as one of the 
largest and most significant cities in the new nation; with more 
than 12,000 inhabitants, Charleston dominated the urban scene in 
the lower South. Nevertheless, events in the Tidewater that were 
unrelated to the Revolution soon drastically altered economic and 
urban relationships in the South as a whole. 
By the mideighteenth century Tidewater agriculture had already 
experienced a major transformation. In the tobacco fields a failure 
to rotate crops properly led to the exhaustion of coastal plantation 
lands. As tobacco cultivation moved farther and farther back into 
the interior and eventually onto the Piedmont, many planters found 
it no longer feasible to ship from their own docks. Concurrently, 
Virginia and Maryland officials made concentrated efforts to regu-
late and centralize tobacco marketing. Tobacco laws in the 1740s, 
specifically intended to assure quality, compelled planters to take 
their crops to designated inspection stations prior to overseas trans-
port. This legislation dealt a death blow to several tobacco-exporting 
villages. London Town in Maryland, one of the places adversely 
effected by the changes, dwindled in size from forty houses in the 
mid-1740s to twelve in 1765. Of course, such a community, unless 
it found a way to alter its economic base drastically, never stood a 
chance of becoming a city. 
Further agricultural changes came with a rise in grain production 
in Maryland, with wheat becoming an export crop. At the same time 
there was an increasing demand for goods and products from the 
growing number of people in Maryland and Virginia. These devel-
opments combined to create a need for cities; a few villages no longer 
sufficed in either colony. Norfolk, designated a town by the Virginia 
House of Burgesses in 1680, flourished after becoming a borough (a 
bureaucratic designation) in 1736. Promoters founded Alexandria on 
the Potomac River in 1749 on a former tobacco plantation. Two 
other stations, Richmond and Petersburg, showed promise. In Mary-
land a number of new and old places in the upper Chesapeake Bay 
region competed for designation as a central market. In this confused 
picture, Baltimore emerged as the dominant locality. Its successful 
promoters demonstrated the importance in town building of ample 
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capital, logical plans, and realistic objectives-needs that would 
later present themselves in similar ventures all across the country. 
In the beginning Baltimore appeared to have no realistic pros-
pects, being just another Maryland town site. During its 1729 session 
the Maryland legislature had granted some speculators the right to 
settle a place initially designated as Baltimore Town on the north 
bank of the Patapasco River, just above the head of navigation on 
Chesapeake Bay. In short order, the first promoters laid out and sold 
sixty lots and persuaded the legislature to construct an Anglican 
church. Before much else happened, rival interests secured permis-
sion to establish Jones Town, located directly across a river ford from 
Baltimore Town. The owners of Jones Town platted twenty lots, 
each of which they sold for the price of 150 pounds of tobacco. 
Neither Baltimore Town or Jones Town grew to any extent, and a 
bridge erected at the ford made them virtually one locality. In 1747 
the legislature, acting on a joint petition of the two hamlets, merged 
them into a single town called Baltimore. 
In 1750 the new united community acquired a tobacco inspec-
tion station, and work started on a public wharf. Little appreciable 
progress followed. A census taken in 1752 showed that Baltimore 
had only 200 inhabitants, 25 houses, 1 church, and 2 taverns. The 
hamlet could afford only a single schoolmaster. The outlook was so 
unpromising that, according to the wisdom prevailing among local 
residents, the French and Indian War had curtailed western settle-
ment and had forced people to remain near the coast, possibly keep-
ing discouraged townsfolk from leaving Baltimore and saving the 
place from extinction. In any event, a band of approximately 900 
French Acadians expelled from Nova Scotia by the British migrated 
to Baltimore but arrived virtually penniless. At this juncture, pros-
pects suddenly brightened; an unexpected influx of money enabled 
Baltimore rapidly to outstrip surrounding villages and soon to sur-
pass Annapolis as the most important trading center in Maryland. 
John and Henry Stevenson, two Scotch-Irish brothers who had 
made fortunes in the South American guano trade, took a calculated 
risk by investing heavily in Baltimore. Correctly anticipating the 
rise of wheat growing in Maryland, they built a successful flour mill. 
Next they used profits from this venture and others to construct 
roads from Baltimore into the interior. At Baltimore, which started 
to grow, they erected warehouses and constructed port facilities. 
These activities attracted new business and also entrepreneurs, who 
built gristmills to exploit the increasingly flourishing grain trade. 
Numerous planters in eastern Maryland converted their tobacco 
plantations to wheat production. There followed a new round of 
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prosperity, and Baltimore found its immediate hinterland connec-
tions enhanced. Baltimore became North America's first boom 
town, with thousands of newcomers arriving every year. In 1771 a 
surprised merchant, William Eddis, wrote from Annapolis to friends 
in London about Baltimore's sudden rise as a commercial center. 
"The commencement of a trade so lucrative to the first adventurers 
soon became an object of universal attention," he explained. "Per-
sons of a commercial and enterprising spirit emigrated from all quar-
ters to this new and promising scene of industry .... Baltimore 
became not only the most wealthy and populous town in the prov-
ince, but inferior to few on this continent, either in size, number of 
inhabitants, or the advantages arising from a well-conducted and 
universal and commercial connection."ll 
Baltimore continued to prosper during the Revolution. The city's 
citizens, most of whom enthusiastically supported the cause of in-
dependence, furnished more than the expected quotas of men for 
military service, denounced suspected Loyalists, and built defenses 
to repulse an attack that never came. During 1 777 the Continental 
Congress, on the run from British troops, sat in Baltimore. The con-
fiscation of all British property in Maryland, the undertaking of suc-
cessful privateering activities by locally owned vessels, and the 
freeing of manufacturing from colonial restraints more than com-
pensated for the severing of the ties of empire. Baltimore shipyards, 
starting a business that would become important down the line, built 
ships for the new American navy. 
As the war continued and products from overseas became scarce, 
several manufacturing plants opened. The new operations, all pre-
viously prohibited under old colonial regulations aimed at restricting 
manufacturing, included paper, slitting, linen, and woollen mills. In 
the course of the war, the number of people in Baltimore increased 
from slightly more than 6,000 to 8,000. Great physical changes en-
sued. According to a local historian of the city, "Market street had 
shot, like a Nuremburg snake out of its toy box, as far as Congress 
hall, with its line of low-browed, high-roofed wooded houses in dis-
orderly array, standing forward and back, after the manner of a regi-
ment of militia with many an interval between the files." 12 Within 
twenty years, Baltimore had changed from a small hamlet into a 
major city. 
City building in the North paralleled that in the southern colo-
nies. Natural advantages had loomed paramount in the creation of 
the four cities that dominated the northern urban scene by the Revo-
lution. Two towns, Boston and Newport, were in New England. 
Boston, in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, founded in 1630 by mem-
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hers of a trading company dominated by Puritan merchants, had a 
splendid land-locked harbor that remained open most of the year. 
Although its two rivers, the Charles and the Mystic, furnished only 
moderately good access into the interior, New England settlements 
were very compact and close to the sea, so that communications by 
coastal schooners were relatively easy. Newport, Rhode Island, set-
tled in 1639 by religious dissenters from Massachusetts Bay, was on 
an island at the foot of Narragansett Bayi most of the people in the 
colony lived on the bay's shores. In the middle colonies, the Dutch 
had laid out New Amsterdam around the Battery at the foot of Man-
hattan Island in 1625. Just as important as a fine harbor was the 
wide Hudson River, which was open to navigation by ocean shipping 
for a 150 miles almost straight north into the interior. In 1664, after 
the British occupied New Amsterdam during a trade war, it became 
New York. William Penn established Philadelphia at the confluence 
of the Delaware and Schuylkill rivers above Delaware Bay. The two 
streams and their tributaries functioned as magnificent water high-
ways into eastern Pennsylvania. 
In the North, unlike the South, where urban rivalries throughout 
the colonial period remained local in character, cities soon chal-
lenged each other and newer communities for control of marketing 
areas. No sharp geographical divisions or long distances delineated 
the boundaries between colonies. Agriculture was reasonably ho-
mogeneousi there was grain farming throughout the middle colonies 
and subsistence tillage in New England. The situation invited com-
petition, with New York and Boston mercantile interests clashing 
along the Hudson. The two cities effectively kept Newport from 
gaining markets outside Rhode Island. Philadelphia and New York 
fought over the trade of predominantly farming regions in New Jer-
sey. The tradition of city rivalries surfaced early and would prove 
tenacious. 
The four largest northern colonial cities effectively controlled 
the region until the Revolution. Other places-New Haven in Con-
necticut, Albany in New York, and Marblehead in Massachusetts 
Bay-stayed in secondary positions and were unable to break es-
tablished commercial patterns. The important towns all developed 
distinguishing attributes. Boston became a shipbuilding and ship-
owning center. Its merchants imported goods from overseas and 
grain from colonies outside New England. The chief exports 
amounted to large quantities of fish to the Mediterranean and salted 
pork to the Caribbean. In addition, the cultural pretensions of the 
Boston Puritans and a turbulent confrontational style of politics set 
the city apart from its major competitors. Newport, hemmed in by 
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Boston and New York, had no real future outside Rhode Island. 
Inside the colony, Newport interests had to worry about Provi-
dence's rise as an agricultural center at the north end of Narragansett 
Bay. 
Three factors impaired New York's advance in the first half 
century after the British occupation: a continuation of Dutch land 
policies that called for large estates staffed by tenant farmers, strin-
gent maritime and port regulations that stifled commerce, and a fur 
trading monopoly that wanted to slow hinterland settlement. Once 
New York had straightened out its pressing internal problems and 
had begun to produce a grain surplus for export, the city increased 
markedly in wealth and population. Even so, while conditions im-
proved, disputes between tenant farmers and their landlords vexed 
the colony down until the Revolution. Philadelphia had relatively 
smooth sailing. In Pennsylvania William Penn's policies of offering 
free land and freedom of religion caused Philadelphia to prosper from 
the first. It quickly became a major grain shipping center firmly 
under the economic control of Quaker merchants. The same kind 
of entrepreneurial impulses that shaped successful urban projects in 
the South figured in the erection of their northern counterparts. 
All the northern cities grew against a backdrop of frequent wars 
between England and France, coupled with clashes with the Indians. 
In the eighteenth century, a proximity to the war zones in the upper 
Ohio River valley and French possessions in Canada made hostilities 
a matter of immediate concern more in the North than in the South. 
Military activities acted as a forced draft that helped stimulate com-
merce. Many naval expeditions sailed against Canada from Boston, 
and in 1755 the British designated New York their main military 
headquarters for North America. On the eve of the Revolution, Phila-
delphia, with an estimated 40,000 people, was one of the largest 
provincial cities in the British Empire. New York had 25,000 in-
habitants and Boston 16,000. About 11,000 persons lived in New-
port. The British occupied all four cities at one time or another 
during hostilities. When English forces took New York in 1776, 
approximately 20,000 refugees temporarily fled the community. 
With the coming of peace in 1783, all the major northern cities 
looked forward to building overseas and internal markets free of the 
restraints imposed by British restrictions and regulations. Unprece-
dented opportunities seemed at hand for those willing to take the 
necessary risks. 
Prior to the Revolution, cities throughout the colonies were all 
part of a cumbersome imperial system. Theoretically, under doc-
trines of mercantilism, the purpose of the North American colonies 
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was to help the mother country achieve economic self-sufficiency. 
The Trade and Navigation acts, plus legislation restricting manu-
facturing, embraced the general precepts, although it cannot be said 
that the British necessarily followed a consistent policy. The Mo-
lasses Act of 1733, for example, was special interest legislation in-
tended to curtail colonial trade in the Caribbean. While the British 
policies gave special treatment to the chief southern products (to-
bacco, rice, and indigo), much to the benefit of Baltimore and 
Charleston merchants, the whole concept and its uneven and ar-
bitrary enforcement gave the South complaints in common with the 
North that helped lead to the Revolution. All the colonies had slav-
ery, and so slavery as an issue did not divide them until after in-
dependence. 
New Englanders gave little thought to tobacco subsidies, and 
southerners could have cared less about the Italian cod market. Re-
gardless of these differences and others, however, shared concerns 
and complaints about the general thrust of English policies after 1763 
united the colonial cities. The controversies between the colonists 
and the mother country tended to obscure the emergence of the 
concept of a North Atlantic community. Although the odious tri-
angular slave and rum trade remained part of the community con-
cept, so did other kinds of intercourse among the cities and overseas. 
The Revolution, by bringing together and defining diverse forces, 
highlighted differences and probably made regionalism in America 
an inevitability. Still, for reasons of tradition and precedence, the 
cities, north and south, continued to have many common values 
and goals, the roots of which stemmed from the colonial experi-
ence.13 
Throughout the colonial period the growing cities cooperated 
with each other on a wide variety of concerns relating to urban 
services. They continued to work together to solve joint problems 
even during periods when relations between individual colonies 
were bad. As a result, different places generally took similar ap-
proaches to problem solving. Fire protection is a case in point. As 
might have been expected, every city sought to keep abreast of the 
latest firefighting and prevention techniques and sometimes solic-
ited information from European experts. Fire safety in the closely 
packed colonial communities was of such serious concern that the 
authorities enacted legislation placing restrictions on property own-
ers. Charlestonians, Philadelphians, and New Yorkers were all sub-
ject to rules governing the storage inside their city limits of 
flammable substances and explosives. Special Charles Town mea-
sures forbade cooking and other fires on ships in the harbor from 
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9:00 P.M. until dawn and prohibited the boiling of tar on wharves. 
Each householder had to have a ladder and buckets on the premises 
and available to firemen around the clock. Fire officials called fire-
masters had the power to levy taxes for new equipment, to carry 
out inspections of potential fire hazards, and to blow up buildings 
during conflagrations to create firebreaks. In 1754 authorities up-
graded Charles Town's five fire engines by equipping them with 
"sucking pipes" to improve their water intakes. At that time, New 
York had four engines. 
Charles Town regulations detailed the operation of the local fire 
protective service. Engine managers could 11enroll" whites and 
slaves to run the apparatus, and if the men failed to appear at a fire, 
could fine white firemen five pounds and give slaves thirty-nine 
lashes. Both whites and slaves received small hourly wages for turn-
ing out and working the engines, drilling once a month at a 11publick 
well." Water resources never posed a problem in colonial Charles 
Town, but in the aftermath of a destructive fire in 1740, authori-
ties took the first steps toward establishing an efficient and well-
organized volunteer department. For several years, Charles Town 
had the only real fire service in the South. Then, in 1769, Baltimore 
moved in the direction of creating a structured firefighting company 
when the "Mechanical Company," aided by a general subscription 
of funds raised in the community, bought an engine. Everyone 
wanted to avoid what a governor of South Carolina called the "dread-
ful Consequences" of a hellish conflagration. 14 
A wide range of protective and benevolent services in Charles 
Town reflected the city's position as a leading colonial center. An 
armed watch, financed from import duties and a tavern tax, guarded 
Charlestonians against "Mischiefs and Insults both from ye Inhabi-
tants and Seafaring people." Two special mounted night patrols 
checked on blacks found outdoors after dark. "Broils'' between town 
toughs and visiting sailors, robberies committed by "footpads," and 
other felonious acts all caused problems, but of even greater concern 
was the ever-present possibility of a slave conspiracy or rebellion. 
Hence, the elaborate precautions to control the movement of blacks. 
But while adequate funding was on hand to watch urban slaves, it 
was not always available for other purposes. 15 
Because the colonial legislature refused to appropriate the nec-
essary money to construct an adequate jail, the provost marshal in 
Charles Town kept prisoners in "stifling rooms" that he rented out 
of his own pocket. Public funds did help the city operate a work-
house, most of whose inmates were vagrants and destitute immi-
grants. Charitable societies, including seamen's organizations and 
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those administered by religious orders, performed many welfare 
functions. Parish vestries supervised relief for the poor and assessed 
taxable inhabitants for the purpose. Two classes of people on welfare, 
the parish and the transient poor, received shelter, clothing, and 
medical care. 16 As in other colonial cities, regard for the public order 
in Charles Town extended beyond simply keeping the peace. 
Commissioners in Charles Town, appointed by the legislature, 
managed and regulated a variety of town institutions. Charles Town, 
which technically never officially existed as a city, had neither a 
mayor nor a council. Sometimes the plans of the commissioners 
worked imperfectly. The commissioners of the streets, for example, 
found it difficult to enforce the street law of 1762 that required the 
licensing and numbering of certain classes of vehicles. Following the 
laying out of sidewalks in the late colonial period, carts and wagons 
frequently interfered with pedestrian traffic, openly violating ordi-
nances. Authorities had better success, for which they were not 
entirely responsible, in dealing with garbage disposal. Turkey vul-
tures, indigenous to the region, supplemented the services of other 
scavengers. The unpleasant and foul-smelling birds of prey per-
formed their duties with considerable efficiency. By all accounts, 
Charles Town appeared a very clean city-certainly more so than 
its northern counterparts. Garbage, seldom collected, moldered in 
the thoroughfares and lanes of Boston and New York. 
As for education, Charles Town did at least as well as the other 
colonial cities. The royal government and individuals made liberal 
contributions. As early as 1711 an English Anglican society estab-
lished a school. Furthermore, legislative acts allowed the Charles 
Town commissioners to solicit gifts for educational purposes. Pri-
vate education served the needs of the elite; courses of instruction 
emphasized the classics and the social graces. Several persons taught 
specialized courses in embroidery and needlework for young women. 
While students in the tax-financed schools paid tuition, a few 
children attended a free academy funded by an anonymous philan-
thropist. 
Many urban observers felt that Charles Town did not receive a 
fair share of tax dollars. The South Carolina colonial assembly ap-
pointed all the important city officials, and Charles Town had only 
four of thirty members of the assembly. Critics claimed that the 
dominant planter interests deliberately kept the town in a subor-
dinate position. Charles Town grand juries repeatedly and without 
success called the attention of the legislature to the "want of Public 
Lamps" in many streetsY Under the circumstances, Charles Town 
urban administrators, operating within the context of fiscal and gov-
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ernmental restraints, did a reasonably good job of caring for mu-
nicipal affairs. 
Health matters were of great concern in Charles Town. All the 
colonial cities experienced epidemicsi smallpox attacked Boston on 
at least four occasions, and in 1741 Philadelphia suffered through a 
severe yellow fever outbreak. For its part, Charles Town withstood 
the onslaught of smallpox epidemics in 1733, 1738, and 1760i more 
than 700 inhabitants died in the 1760 scourge. In 1728, 1732, and 
1739, yellow fever visited the community. The city's location 
in a swampy region virtually ensured that conditions would be un-
healthy and fostered a high incidence of both endemic and epidemic 
disease. Various strategies were used to defend Charles Town against 
further depredations. An Anglican hospital was one important local 
institution, and public officials, concerned about preventive mea-
sures, established an isolation hospital for sick mariners and epi-
demic victims on a snake-infested island. 
By the middle of the eighteenth century, approximately thirty 
physicians, many of them trained in Europe, practiced in Charles 
Town. John Lining, a medical doctor educated in Scotland, cou-
rageously conducted experiments on himself concerning "non-
infectious epidemic diseases," which he attributed to fluctuations 
in rainfall. 18 Another medical practitioner, Alexander Garden, spec-
ialized in inoculating people against smallpox and improved on 
methods used elsewhere in the colonies. During the 1760 epidemic 
he inoculated between 2,400 and 2,800 people in less than two 
weeks. Many of the Charles Town physicians belonged to partner-
ships, and all owned their own apothecary shops. The pioneering 
smallpox vaccination and research efforts placed the city on the 
cutting edge of the colonial medical frontier. 
From the earliest days, town planning was important in the 
South. The instructions written in London for the first Jamestown 
leaders had stated, "And seeing order is at the same price with con-
fusion it shall be adviseably done to set your houses even and by a 
line, that your streets may have a good breadth, and be carried square 
about your market place."19 To some extent the pioneers followed 
ordersi the original Jamestown featured a triangular stockade, within 
which three straight streets formed a triangle, with a market square 
in the middle. 
Later attempts to expand upon Jamestown's plans brought im-
perfect results. The plats for the various new towns envisioned by 
the Virginia House of Burgesses generally followed modified grid 
systems. Yorktown's plan called for eight short streets that crossed 
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a main thoroughfare parallel to the York River. Marlborough, a Po-
tomac River location that failed completely, had parallelogram-
shaped blocks and lots. Tappahannock on the Rappahannock River 
featured a regular grid design with three different street widths. Even 
more elementary arrangements characterized the sites designated 
by the Maryland town acts. Vienna Town, Oxford, and Wye all dis-
played gridiron propositions. Charleston, a Maryland town founded 
in 17 42, had a market square and other public grounds. 
Although the exact layouts differed from place to place, the port 
cities intended for North Carolina had conventional grid designs 
oriented toward riverfronts. New Bern had a main road running 
straight back from the Cape Fear River. A wide north and south 
street that moved away from the river divided Edenton in half. The 
Carolina proprietors' "Grand Modell" for Charles Town provided a 
central court, subsequently given over to commercial buildings, as 
a focal point. As the town expanded, new additions followed along 
gridiron lines. Provisions for the aborted Margravate of Azilia, des-
ignated as the capital of a projected province of the same name in 
part of what later became Georgia, were quite elaborate. Recom-
mendations envisioned a square city containing no fewer than four 
640-acre parks. The residence of the chief public official, the Mar-
grave, would have been on a large central plaza.20 Such a develop-
ment showed that an increasingly grandiose approach was being 
taken toward town planning in the colonial South. 
Francis Nicholson, a talented and able colonial Crown executive, 
played a major role in designing new capital cities for Maryland and 
Virginia. Nicholson, who had seen first hand how architect and plan-
ner Christopher Wren redesigned large sections of London following 
the disastrous 1666 Great Fire so as to emphasize open spaces in 
residential districts, had definite ideas about civic design. In par-
ticular, Nicholson wanted green squares and circles, with the aim 
of combining buildings and landscapes to create a harmonious 
whole. During a short tenure as governor of Maryland, from 1690 
to 1691, he supervised the planning of Annapolis. The first layout 
for the city featured two great circles, a large square, and several 
radiating streets. Nicholson envisioned "Bloomsbury Square," ac-
tually never developed, as the central ornament of a fashionable 
residential section. The "Public Circle," which was 500 feet in di-
ameter, the location of the legislative building; and "Church Circle," 
300 feet in diameter, remained main components of Annapolis's 
plan. As for the diagonal streets, a combination of a pinwheel align-
ment at the Public Circle and many bisecting thoroughfares created 
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building sites that were awkwardly shaped. Although his design for 
Annapolis was not entirely rendered, Nicholson had a second 
chance. 
In the late 1690s, when Nicholson served as governor of Virginia, 
he played a major role in planning Williamsburg. The result was a 
significant contribution to urban design. Duke of Gloucester Street, 
a mile long and ninety-nine feet wide, formed the main axis. The 
street ran straight east from the Capitol Square to the College of 
William and Mary, where it broke into three lanes in a goosefoot 
pattern. Midway along Duke of Gloucester Street, a market square 
on the south side of the thoroughfare formed an important com-
ponent of the project. On the north side were the large Palace Green 
and the smaller Church Square. All the crossing streets had ter-
mination points situated so that houses with excellent views of the 
countryside could be erected. On the public squares and grounds, 
manicured lawns, flower gardens, wrought iron gates, and elabo-
rately decorated fences enhanced the beauty of the design.21 These 
features, taken together with the Georgian architectural styles of 
the day used for both public and private buildings, made Williams-
burg a lovely village in the wilderness. 
In 1733 James Oglethorpe's plan for Savannah in the new Geor-
gia colony further demonstrated the extent of the attention given 
in the South to civic patterns. Oglethorpe, who selected the site on 
the Savannah River for the community, noted, "The river here forms 
a half-moon, along the south side of which the banks are about forty 
foot high, and on the top flat .... The plain high ground extends into 
the country five or six miles, and along the river side about a mile."22 
The town proper was a rectangle divided into six parts. The north 
and east outskirts contained 5-acre garden lots. Next came many 
44-acre farms, and, after that, large 500-acre estates intended for 
persons willing to pay their own way to the colony. Diagonal roads 
furnished easy communications to all the gardens and farms. Og-
lethorpe created a number of political units called wards, each hav-
ing forty sixty- by ninety-foot house lots. The center of each ward 
contained a large open square, with frontings on two sides for public 
buildings and commercial structures. Streets seventy-five feet wide 
divided the wards and lanes and provided access to the rear of all 
the house lots. Savannah grew slowly-it had roughly 3,000 in-
habitants at the start of the Revolution-and the authorities never 
completely implemented the plan. The orderly and compact settle-
ment, however, set standards that served well in ensuing years. 
The Savannah design, plus those of other towns, helped to es-
tablish an urban planning tradition in the South. The response in 
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the North was considerably different. Boston grew in a rather dis-
orderly fashion. New York had an undistinguished design in which 
a grid predominated. Philadelphia had elaborate and expensive plans 
set aside by the Pennsylvania proprietors after land earmarked for 
park squares became prime commercial property. Soon grubby struc-
tures covered area that Quaker City designers had envisioned as 
pleasing open vistas. Savannah or Williamsburg might have suffered 
the same fate if they had progressed as rapidly. In its planning, Bal-
timore, during its first flush times, resembled Boston more than 
neighboring Annapolis. As real estate operators surveyed and built 
subdivisions, no one gave serious thought to formulating a coherent 
and comprehensive planning policy. In any event, even though Bal-
timore added little to the art of civic design, the plans of other south-
ern cities did break new paths; examples include plans for the failed 
Margravate of Azilia and the moderately successful Williamsburg 
and Annapolis. A sense of urbanity and calculated rural beauty and 
symmetry gave a special flavor to the best of the southern urban 
designs. 
Over the course of the colonial period, the towns of the South 
underwent major societal changes. Advocates of mercantilism, with 
its fixed view of the Elizabethan world, assumed an orderly class 
structure. So did the founders of Virginia, Maryland, and the Caro-
linas. From 1607 to 1776 local elites remained in control. Still, the 
character of the dominant groups greatly differed from that reflected 
in musings about the nature of society prior to the start of coloni-
zation. Individuals in positions of power were increasingly self-made 
men rather than foppish lords living on large landed estates. A whole 
new breed of city people appeared. Physicians, lawyers, and mer-
chants gained in stature as a middle class developed. So did the 
owners of successful urban-centered enterprises. In Baltimore it was 
the usual practice for persons to live in the same place where they 
conducted their business. Wives and daughters often entered the 
marketplace to work in stores owned by husbands and parents. The 
old ways died hard. Shipwrights, bricklayers, pattern makers, and 
members of other skilled trades continued to dress differently from 
gentlemen with hereditary titles. 11The leather apron was omnipres-
ent among the workmen," a resident reported. 110ingy buckskin 
breeches, check shirts, and a red flannel jacket were their common 
apparel; and men and boys from the country were seen in the streets 
in leather breeches and aprons; they would have been deemed out 
of character without them."23 
Unlike earlier generations, many of the townsmen had realistic 
expectations of upward mobility. Continued planter domination of 
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affairs in the colonies and the introduction of slaves into the cities 
tended to obscure the rise of opportunities and of democratic strains 
of thought. A growing capitalist spirit translated into strong urban 
support for the revolutionary movement from Baltimore and An-
napolis to Charles Town and Savannah. 
Southerners wanted cities. The numerous general and special 
town acts demonstrated the seriousness of the town-building efforts. 
The approach taken involved state-directed planning and came close 
to a complete failure-no place designated as a town site under 
general legislation ever advanced beyond the village stage. The 
towns that emerged in the South were the logical consequences of 
settlement patterns. Entrepreneurs founded Charles Town, whose 
very success virtually forced the Carolina government to abandon 
an unpromising location and to move to the city. Further progress 
for Charles Town followed automatically in direct relationship to 
the rise of rice and indigo production in South Carolina. The Bal-
timore story was somewhat similar. The privately built city crushed 
Annapolis, despite its strong political connections, for status as the 
number one town in the Maryland and Virginia Tidewater. Momen-
tum generated in Baltimore's early days continued to drive the place 
forward during the remainder of the colonial period. Once Charles 
Town and Baltimore came to control their regions, they had no need, 
unlike the northern towns, to compete against established competi-
tors. Rather, Baltimore and Charles Town consolidated power with 
little opposition, establishing orderly precedents for later southern 
urbanization activities. Hinterland agricultural patterns, upon 
which both towns depended, had the effect of wedding urban pro-
gress to slavery. At the time, few people seemed concerned; the 
institution was an accepted part of life throughout the South and 
also throughout the North. 
At the dawn of the Republic there was no real sense of separate 
systems of northern and southern cities. Places throughout the colo-
nies cooperated on many matters and developed strong economic 
ties. No one of consequence viewed the North as taking the lead 
over the South in city building. Most observers assumed that the 
cities would continue to work together on many mutual concerns 
under the august aegis of the United States. A bright day seemed to 
lie ahead. Such was the legacy of colonial southern city building. 
The South had constructed towns in relationship to its needs, a 
characteristic that would continue to distinguish southern urbani-
zation from that in the rest of the nation. As time would tell, despite 
many ups and downs, it was a method tried and true and one that 
would serve Dixie well. 
2 
THE BUILDING OF AN 
ANTEBELLUM SYSTEM 
The early days of the new nation required the emerging cities of the 
South to make various adjustments. For Charleston the immediate 
price of independence was high because the termination of British 
subsidy payments for indigo and rice depressed agriculture in South 
Carolina. The loss of the lucrative British West Indies trade further 
complicated the economic picture. The closing of the Sugar Islands 
in the West Indies to American commerce hurt Norfolk more than 
it did Charleston. Norfolk, which had been literally flattened by a 
British naval bombardment on New Year's Day in 1776, had hardly 
recovered before it lost its main artery of trade. Concessions made 
at Savannah by the local business community in return for the early 
withdrawal of British occupation troops gave English merchants a 
temporary overseas trading monopoly. Other maritime towns-
Wilmington, Richmond, and Alexandria-suffered from the conse-
quences of hostilities. A naval blockade checked the commerce of 
all three places, and British soldiers burned Richmond to the ground. 
Fortunately for future prospects, changing circumstances 
brought new opportunities outside the old Navigation Acts and the 
restraints on manufacturing. The merchant overseas traders of the 
former colonial cities could now go to any port that would receive 
them, as the sailing ship Pallas demonstrated in 1785, when it re-
turned to Baltimore from the Orient laden with a full cargo of lu-
crative China goods. Three years later another Baltimore ship, the 
Chesapeake, dropped anchor in the river Ganges and opened trade 
with India. Other Baltimore vessels made regular runs to Bremen 
and attracted many German immigrants. The gradual growth of 
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manufacturing and the start of adjustments in agriculture more than 
compensated for the loss of British payments. 
The ratification of the Constitution, which seemingly gave the 
federal government the power to formulate a comprehensive trade 
policy, had obvious implications for the future. In the 1790s Balti-
more experienced a new boom, and its population almost doubled 
from 13,500 to 26,500. The city enjoyed a tremendous overseas, 
coastal, and fisheries trade. During 1795 alone, a proud local resident 
claimed that a total of "109 ships, 162 brigs, 350 sloops and schoon-
ers, and 5,464 of the 'bay craft' or small coasters"1 sailed in and out 
of Baltimore. Other cities, the postwar adjustment behind them, 
advanced steadily. Between 1790 and 1800 Charleston grew in num-
ber of inhabitants from 16,400 to 18,800. At the turn of the century, 
three other towns had crossed the 5,000 mark: Norfolk-6,900; 
Richmond-5, 700; and Savannah-5,100. Although the North had 
two cities bigger than Baltimore in 1800, New York with 60,500 
people and Philadelphia with 41,200, there was as yet no real urban 
lag between the two sections as defined by the Mason and Dixon 
Line. The United States had no large city, and only about 3 percent 
of the whole population of 5.3 million lived in places with 10,000 
people or more; 10,000 was the traditional breaking point used by 
demographers until the twentieth century to distinguish between 
large and small cities. Indeed, as the early Republic began to take 
shape, the future looked very bright for both the urban and the ag-
ricultural components of the South. 
In 1790, as part of a famous political deal between northern and 
southern interests, Congress agreed to construct a permanent U.S. 
capital city in the South. The undertaking was intended to stimulate 
southern urbanization and was, as a venture, very much in the im-
perfect old colonial tradition of development at locations designated 
by public officials. The lawmakers directed President George Wash-
ington to select the site. After due deliberation he picked a spot on 
the Potomac River that he had long believed to hold commercial 
potential. It lay just up the river from his Mount Vernon plantation, 
near the villages of Georgetown and Alexandria. Under Washing-
ton's personal direction and that of three commissioners appointed 
by Congress, one of whom was Thomas Jefferson, Pierre L'Enfant, 
a French-born military architect, started to plan the federal city. 
By the end of 1791, Maryland and Virginia had ceded the nec-
essary land for a District of Columbia, and Washington had used his 
prestige to negotiate the necessary real estate agreements with prop-
erty owners in the new district. The commissioners were to oversee 
federal properties and arrange land sales to the general public. It was 
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hoped that the proceeds would generate enough money to pay for 
government buildings, landscaping, and street paving. The proce-
dures and objectives were akin to those followed in laying out a large 
subdivision. Economists predicted a rise in land values in direct 
relationship to the location of projected public buildings. Insiders 
stood to make handsome profits, so the whole operation smacked 
of a rather unsavory real estate venture. 
L'Enfant based his plans for the city on those for Versailles, 
France, the site of the palace of Louis XIV. His proposals called for 
a regular network of rectangular streets and broad avenues, traversed 
by numerous squares, circles, parks, and triangles. Capitol Hill, the 
highest point in the District, was the centerpiece of the design. With 
considerable foresight, L'Enfant planned for very large blocks and 
avenues 160 feet wide, a provision almost unheard of in an era of 
very narrow streets. Indeed, his specifications placed government 
buildings so far apart that detractors spoke sarcastically of what they 
called "the city of magnificent distances."2 Shortly after the begin-
ning of construction, quarrels between the mercurial L'Enfant and 
the commissioners, who thought his ideas unrealistic and unrelated 
to real estate requirements, led to his dismissal. 
But fears that speculators would stay away never materialized. 
Speculators came in droves, and their bids inflated land prices out 
of all proportion to the actual values. Many of the speculations 
failedi a development combine headed by financier Robert Morris 
defaulted on 6,000 lots purchased at eighty dollars apiece. At one 
point-a further indication of the magnitude of the collapse-the 
federal government gained title to an uncompleted hotel which its 
builders had intended to serve as a lottery prize. 
Only loans of several hundred thousand dollars from the Mary-
land and Virginia legislatures enabled the commissioners to have 
the new capital city ready for partial occupancy by the federal gov-
ernment after the maximum ten years stipulated by Congress. Still, 
the District was far from a glorious governmental center. It con-
tained only a few public buildings and small clusters of private dwell-
ings. Swampy ground impeded travel, and the published population 
figure of 3,200 seemed inflated. Without continuing federal help, 
the place might have remained a village. Nevertheless, the strong 
commitment of the U.S. government to developing Washington 
promised to add a major city to the South. 
By 1800 a coherent southern urban mosaic had emerged that 
consisted of two strata of cities. The first included the Atlantic 
coastal towns and the second the old f<lll-line posts that over the 
years had gradually expanded into towns. Small in terms of popu-
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lation, the locations of the second type at junction points gave them 
an advantage over any possible competitors. Some places of course 
had higher hopes and expectations than others. Along the coast, 
Baltimore aspired to becoming North America's greatest city. Wash-
ington's hopes were directly tied to those of the country as a whole. 
Alexandria and Georgetown had limited prospects. Norfolk and its 
satellite community, Portsmouth, continued to have vast potential. 
Wilmington outclassed New Bern and other points and remained 
the most important town in North Carolina. Charleston occupied 
a crucial economic position and was also the undisputed cultural 
center of the South. Savannah had new aggressive leaders with prom-
ising plans. The back-country towns were stepping-stones into the 
interior. Richmond, at the head of navigation on the James River, 
roughly seventy miles above Norfolk, was the emporium of the Vir-
ginia frontier. Other places, Lynchburg and Petersburg in particular, 
were on the verge of gaining a degree of permanency. In 1786 the 
South Carolina general assembly laid out Columbia at the fall line 
on the Congaree River, designating it the new state capital. Situated 
on a fertile plain by an excellent waterpower, defined as a fall of 
water capable of generating horsepower, Columbia had reasonably 
good future aspirations. Augusta, a hundred miles up the Savannah 
River from Savannah, was an old transportation hub founded in 1735. 
As southerners moved into the interior, the basis had already been 
established for an orderly approach to city building by either public 
or private means. 
Richmond, 74 miles from the sea as the crow flies and 150 miles 
by river, was representative of the successful back-country towns. 
Even though the James River community was very old, most growth 
came after the Revolution. As early as 1609 a small exploring party 
from Jamestown established an outpost at the site. In the middle 
1640s, the government of Virginia erected Fort Charles to protect 
the same settlement, challenging the Indians in their own territory. 
Several decades of border warfare followed-in 1659 Indian warriors 
won a bloody battle against a band of colonial border rangers. In 1679 
William Byrd built a warehouse, and the place became known as 
Byrd's Warehouse until its incorporation as Richmond in 1742. A 
few years earlier, a member of the Byrd family had laid out three 
square miles of lots and streets, but few people came. In 1779 Rich-
mond, a center of revolutionary ferment (Patrick Henry uttered his 
memorable "Give me liberty or give me death!" in the city), became 
the capital of Virginia. During 1781, when the town had about 300 
houses, British raiders burned it to the ground. Real growth followed 
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that calamity, as the settlement of the back country proceeded at a 
rapid rate. In the l 780s state authorities constructed a capitol based 
on plans that Thomas Jefferson had found in France. In 1794 a canal, 
which later became part of the important James River and Kanawha 
Canal, opened around the falls of the James River near Richmond. 
By the turn of the century, Richmond had achieved firm foundations 
as a center of both commerce and government.3 
In 1803 the Louisiana Purchase and the subsequent acquisition 
of New Orleans introduced a new and unexpected element into the 
southern urbanization picture. The Crescent City had a past much 
different from that of the Atlantic ports. Jean Baptist, Sieur de Bien-
ville, the governor of French Louisiana, founded New Orleans in 
1718. Although Bienville wanted an economically successful city, 
he deliberately selected for defensive reasons a swampy uninviting 
unhealthy spot for the city, more than a hundred miles from the 
Gulf of Mexico. After a flood had washed away the first crude huts, 
military engineers surveyed streets, marked off lots, constructed 
buildings, raised a palisade, dug a moat, and built a levy. New Or-
leans grew despite the collapse in the 1720s of the "Mississippi 
Bubble," a financial speculative scheme in Louisiana. At the time 
New Orleans had 1,600 inhabitants, a volatile assemblage of soldiers, 
trappers, convicts, and prostitutes. The arrival from France of Capu-
chin and Jesuit priests, Ursuline nuns, and other respectable women 
led to a more stable society, but economic progress remained slow: 
Indian massacres and slave uprisings decimated upriver plantations 
and settlements and understandably complicated the building of a 
hinterland. New Orleans only gradually garnered an export trade. 
When the French lost their North American empire in 1763, about 
4,000 people lived in the city. 
Political changes and intrigues followed. After a brief British 
occupation, a Spanish governor arrived in 1766. Two years later local 
French merchants staged an unsuccessful revolt. Three thousand 
Spanish soldiers restored order and executed five of the insurgents. 
"I found the English in complete possession of the commerce of the 
colony," a new Spanish official with extraordinary powers told his 
superiors in 1769. "They had in this town their merchants and trad-
ers, with open stores and shops, and I can safely assert, that they 
pocketed nine-tenths of the money spent here."4 He drove them out, 
but they soon returned and organized a large illegal trade. Following 
the Revolution, the Spanish closed the Mississippi River to Ameri-
can commerce. Plots by British, French, and American interests 
caused serious tensions. First French and then Philadelphia mer-
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chants held sway. In 1795 the Spanish granted the United States 
navigation privileges on the Mississippi River and the right of deposit 
at New Orleans. 
A promising trade developed that appeared threatened when the 
Spanish retroceded Louisiana to the French. President Thomas Jef-
ferson believed New Orleans so strategically important that the Brit-
ish fleet might be needed to save the United States from a new 
French menace. Whether his analysis was right or wrong, his 1803 
purchase of all of the Louisiana Territory from Napoleon Bonaparte 
eliminated the danger and brought New Orleans its fourth change 
of government in less than half a century. When the Stars and Stripes 
rose over the Crescent City, it contained approximately 10,000 peo-
ple. The acquisition seemed to benefit the South; almost all finan-
cial and political experts believed the Mississippi River crucial to 
prosperity in the United States. It followed from this interpretation 
that New Orleans would become a great entrepot of commerce. If 
such reasoning was true, happy days lay ahead for advocates of an 
urban South. 
At that juncture drastic changes occurred: the demands of the 
European textile market, the perfection of the cotton gin, and the 
development of strains of cotton that grew in upland regions brought 
about a transformation of southern agriculture. Cotton became the 
chief economic force in the region. Just as significantly, the new 
dispensation gave slavery, which some optimistic observers had pre-
dicted would die off, a new lease on life. The resurgence of slavery 
promised to differentiate the South further from the North, where 
revolutionary reforms had brought the outright or gradual abolition 
of the institution. 
Of greater immediate import was the crisis prompted by a re-
newal of the Napoleonic wars. The Embargo Act of 1807 and a sub-
sequent program of trade sanctions undertaken by the U.S. 
government hurt its own maritime commerce. A recovery that 
started in 1809 stopped with the War of 1812. During hostilities 
British naval squadrons blockaded American ports. In the summer 
of 1814 British commandoes raided Washington and burned the gov-
ernment buildings. Shortly afterward, the same units failed in an 
attack on Baltimore's approaches. Early in 1815, Andrew Jackson 
repulsed an English force and inflicted heavy losses in the Battle of 
New Orleans. On the surface the War of 1812 was simply another 
in a long series of disruptive events that affected city building in the 
South. Yet its effects were far more serious. Coupled with the shift 
in southern agriculture, the war gave the North, a region that had 
THE BUILDING OF AN ANTEBELLUM SYSTEM 29 
appeared in the wake of the Louisiana Purchase likely to be an in-
creasingly isolated and decaying section, a new lease on life. 
The United States made a great inward turn after the War of 
1812. A set of political ideas, the American System, which envi-
sioned a self-sufficient economy, spurred interest in possible vast 
markets in the New West. The defeat of the Indians east of the 
Mississippi River provided an opportunity for the quick settlement 
and exploitation of hundreds of thousands of square miles of poten-
tial farm and plantation lands. William Henry Harrison crushed the 
Indians of the upper Ohio River valley. On the southern frontier, 
Jackson overwhelmingly defeated the mighty Creek war machine 
at Horseshoe Bend. Even though the negotiating of fraudulent trea-
ties and the sordid chapter of Indian removal lay ahead, there ap-
peared to be an opportunity at hand to build a nation. Generations 
of European geopoliticians had long believed that whoever success-
fully developed the heart of North America would rise to world 
power. In 1815, with the coming of peace, the United States had an 
opportunity to test the theory. 
A new chapter in the American experience was about to unfold, 
and a wave of optimism swept over the nation. The harbor ports 
that formed a great rim of cities from Maine to Louisiana sought 
ways to exploit the situation, even in advance of actual significant 
settlement. Attention centered on a number of jumping-off points 
into the wilderness. On the northern frontier, Albany on the Hudson 
River, at the eastern end of the Mohawk Valley, the so-called "water-
level" route through the Appalachian Mountains, could serve as a 
gateway to the Great Lakes. Pittsburgh and Wheeling provided ac-
cess to the upper Ohio River valley. A few frontier communities and 
forts already dotted the vast territory. Cleveland was on Lake Erie, 
and Detroit lay on the banks of the Detroit River between Lake Erie 
and Lake Huron. Fur traders had started factories above the conflu-
ence of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers at Kaskaskia, St. Gene-
vieve, and Cahokia. New Orleans interests established St. Louis just 
below where the Missouri River flowed into the Mississippi. Cin-
cinnati on the Ohio River showed signs of becoming an important 
inland commercial port. The main routes of the westward march in 
the South prior to the War of 1812 had been through the Cumberland 
Gap into Kentucky, following the National Road, or over the Smoky 
Mountains into Tennessee. Kentucky entered the Union in 1792 
and Tennessee in 1796. Early centers in the New West were Louis-
ville and Lexington in Kentucky, plus Knoxville and Nashville in 
Tennessee. These places formed a third strata of southern cities, 
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acting as spearheads that gave the region access to large portions of 
the American interior. 
The southern towns in the New West had typical frontier be-
ginnings. Louisville was at the Falls of the Ohio, the only major 
natural obstruction between the start of the Ohio River and New 
Orleans. During low water it was necessary to portage around the 
falls. In 1 778 thirteen families built a road station in the vicinity, 
and two years later the pioneers laid out lots, naming the place 
Louisville. The hamlet appeared to have little hope of survival; fre-
quent Indian raids and epidemics killed a large number of the original 
settlers. In "the dark and bloody ground," Louisville gained a repu-
tation as the "graveyard of Kentucky." Louisville had 355 people in 
1800; only a good river harbor and a seasonal transshipment business 
kept it alive. Prospects brightened as more and more migrants moved 
into the Ohio River valley, and the purchase of Louisiana gave hopes 
to a rise in downstream traffic. 
Virginians founded Lexington in 1770 at a road junction occupied 
for many years only by a blockhouse and three rows of cabins; bitter 
warfare with the Indians discouraged settlers. After 1792, Lexington 
started to gain in population and became the first state capital of 
Kentucky. In 1810 it had 4,300 people and a reputation as a cultural 
center with numerous debating and literary societies. Transylvania 
University, the only real institution of higher education west of the 
Appalachians, was in Lexington, a place that its fans called the 
"Philadelphia of the West." Knoxville, which had never had a fi-
nancial boom during its early years, lost the Tennessee state capital 
to Nashville in 1817. Nashville stood on a bluff above the navigable 
Cumberland River; as early as 1710 French trappers had visited the 
site, situated in the middle of an Indian hunting ground. In 1780 
hunters arrived from Kentucky, established a station, and engaged 
in the Indian trade. Nashville increased slowly to a population of 
345 in 1800, as land speculation in Tennessee generated fortunes 
for a few pioneer families. Real growth started with the rise after 
1810 of a large keel boat and barge trade. Following the War of 1812, 
Nashville leaders and those in the other trans-Appalachian frontier 
communities expected to hew out inland empires from the immense 
hinterlands, but circumstances over which they had no control were 
to end their dreams. 
Shrewd moves by New York capitalists transformed the situa-
tion. In 1817-a key date in the urbanization of the United States-
overlapping combinations of New York businessmen made four cru-
cial decisions. These came during the days of sudden prosperity in 
New York caused by the postwar "dumping" (a technical economic 
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term of the period) in the city by British merchants of goods destined 
for American markets. The movement of commodities through New 
York was so great that merchants found auctions a convenient way 
to dispose of items in their warehouses quickly. When it appeared 
that the British might divert shipments to other ports, New York 
interests persuaded the state legislature to reduce taxes on auctioned 
articles. As a result the goods kept coming, and postwar economic 
ties between New York and the United Kingdom were further ce-
mented over the long term as a result. A second action involved 
plans of the Black Ball Line to run fast packet ships on regular sched-
ules between New York and Liverpool, ultimately enabling New 
York to corner a large percentage of trans-Atlantic passenger traffic, 
plus shipments of high-duty "fine freight," which included optical 
instruments, machine dies, and medical compounds. Third, with 
strong New York backing, Governor DeWitt Clinton steered a mea-
sure through the state legislature and committed the state to the 
construction of the Erie Canal. The 356-mile-long waterway running 
from Albany to Buffalo opened over its entire length in 1825 and 
was profitable from the start. The results more than vindicated the 
men who had promoted the nation's longest canal to date and the 
most expensive state-financed internal improvement project. The 
canal received much national publicity, but a fourth development 
went relatively unnoticed. New York coastal schooners stopped 
deadheading back from southern ports. Instead, they started to carry 
cotton for overseas shipment out of New York.5 
The various programs enabled New York to surge ahead toward 
urban greatness. Between 1810 and 1830 the population of the Em-
pire City rose from 96,400 to 197,000, making it far and away the 
largest metropolis in the United States. New York's northern rivals 
responded as best they could. Philadelphia leaders persuaded the 
state of Pennsylvania to finance the Main Line, a highly unsatis-
factory and unprofitable canal and railroad that ran from the city to 
Pittsburgh. Boston investors, by stages, built a railroad from their 
city to Albany, hoping to tap Erie Canal trade. Experts feared that 
New York, if not challenged, would monopolize western trade. 
The southern coastal cities felt compelled to respond. The Erie 
Canal, in startling fashion, shifted settlement patterns away from 
the Ohio River to the Great Lakes. The National Road lost impor-
tance. It came to handle less than 200,000 tons of eastbound com-
modities annually at a time when the Erie Canal carried several 
million tons. Despite geographical and engineering problems, Bal-
timore interests boldly undertook to build a 400-mile-long railroad 
from Baltimore to Wheeling. Actual construction started in 1830, 
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when no one knew whether tracks could even be pushed through 
the rugged mountains west of the Cumberland Gap. Places to the 
south of Baltimore carried on as best they could. Baltimore was a 
wealthy seafaring city with sources of credit that enabled it ulti-
mately to spend $15 million on antebellum railroad projects. None 
of the other towns had the means of raising a comparable amount 
of money, and parochial rivalries further clouded matters. Norfolk 
wanted to build a railroad to the Ohio River and formulated a plan 
that was aborted by Richmond interests in the Virginia legislature. 
In retaliation, Norfolk leaders successfully opposed railroad lines 
and canal extensions desired by Richmond. Even so, despite their 
antagonism, the two cities combined to stop the internal improve-
ment schemes of Alexandria, Lynchburg, and other cities in the Old 
Dominion. Curiously, Washington canal promoters had more suc-
cess than the Old Dominion cities in dealing with the Virginia leg-
islature, in the 1820s receiving money from that body and its 
counterpart in Maryland to dig the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal from 
the Potomac to the Ohio. Congress also contributed funds, sold on 
the idea that the project had national defense implications. The canal 
failed; it never progressed past the Cumberland Gap. In North Caro-
lina, urban officials could only wish for money to undertake lavish 
proposals; southern officials did well when they were able to con-
struct several local railroads. A favored promotional tactic involved 
linking railroad endeavors to the moving of cotton, which was much 
easier to sell to planter interests than visions of gigantic western 
commercial markets. 
Charleston and Savannah had rival designs to gain Cincinnati 
connections. Savannah entrepreneurs conceived of a magnificent 
integrated sea and land transportation network. A great trunk rail-
road between Savannah and the Ohio River existed only on paper; 
money was unavailable to build it. The ocean plans had more sub-
stance. The Savannahans, with funds raised in New York, commis-
sioned a northern shipyard to construct the steamship Savannah. 
In 1819 the innovative vessel made the first partly steam-powered 
trip across the Atlantic, using sails on only eight days of a twenty-
two-day voyage from Savannah to Liverpool. The ship, ahead of its 
time, combined elements of technological success with financial 
failure, and so its promoters' schemes fell short. Charleston did little 
better. Its leaders produced a grand proposal calling for a railroad to 
run from the city to Cincinnati. Many urban theoreticians, particu-
larly those with a stake in Cincinnati, predicted that the city would 
become the transportation and commercial center of the Ohio River 
valley. An important part of the Charleston railroad plan called for 
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soliciting support from places along the projected 500- to 600-mile 
route. In 1836 Knoxville businessmen were first elated and then 
downhearted when they learned that the promoters intended the 
line to go straight over the mountains, at best a proposition of tech-
nologically doubtful feasibility. 6 No really detailed survey had been 
donei the promoters could offer only faith and a willingness to be-
lieve that a railroad could actually be built. Places along the "paper 
railroad" withheld financial support, as did many wealthy plantation 
owners in South Carolina. After the Charleston-to-Cincinnati pro-
ject had died an unlamented death, Charleston's dominant groups 
concentrated with considerable success on constructing regional 
railroads designed to carry cotton. Much the same thing happened 
at Savannah, where the opening of Georgia cotton lands presented 
the community with the opportunity to hew out a profitable mar-
keting zone. The Georgia Central Railroad between Savannah and 
Macon opened in 1843. More lines followed. The proliferation had 
the effect of challenging Charleston in its natural territory. Follow-
ing false starts, promoters in both Charleston and Savannah scaled 
down their goals and concentrated on sound and profitable regional 
railroads. 
The course of progress in the upper Ohio River valley thwarted 
southern hopes that the newly opened country would have strong 
ties with the South. The region quickly developed important north-
eastern connectionsi no southern railroads penetrated the area. Con-
versely, construction proceeded on canals in Ohio, Indiana, and 
Illinois designed to link up with a route between the Great Lakes 
and the Erie Canal. The federal government furthered the trend 
through the funding of various internal improvements, including 
Chicago harbor and river projects. Other actions worked against 
southern aspirations. Land sharks carried on frenzied speculation in 
thousands of Ohio paper villages. The Panic of 1837, in part nurtured 
by the unhealthy city-building activities, only temporarily checked 
the spiral. Well over 90 percent of the towns failed, but urban pro-
motion together with agricultural advances resulted in many coun-
try villages and a number of "instant cities." Settlement patterns 
appeared chaotic. In many places several towns in close proximity 
to each other struggled to survive. Complicating matters was the 
railroads' arbitrary establishment of town sites. The communities 
in what became the Midwest seemed impermanent because of their 
hastily built structures and transient populations. The pace of set-
tlement demonstrated that cities could be erected in a hurry. Such 
haste was unprecedented and ran counter to southern practices. 
The more resourceful cities fought a massive economic battle 
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for control of the Midwest. There ensued great power rearrange-
ments that affected the sectional struggle. 7 Cincinnati and St. Louis 
leaders shifted their attention from the South in order to exploit 
opportunities present in the new midwestern markets. Cincinnati 
planners saw the problem in terms of the Ohio River and regarded 
it as a key "natural line." Nineteenth-century economic postulates 
held that, once established, natural lines of commerce based on ge-
ography could not be altered by either secondary or "artificial" lines. 
Cincinnati's conceptions led to direct confrontations with perceived 
rivals over markets and transportation connections. Cincinnati won. 
In consequence Pittsburgh capitalists abandoned attempts to estab-
lish an economic empire along the Ohio and turned their attention 
to ironmongering. Louisville authorities, unable to corner markets 
north of the Ohio, shifted their attentions to the building of railroads 
in Kentucky and Tennessee. The problem was that Cincinnati strate-
gists misread the situation and failed to estimate the impact of the 
Erie Canal correctly. In the end they had secured prosperous Ohio 
River markets and constructed a large city, but they had not gained 
the Midwest. 
St. Louis and Chicago both entertained hopes of staking out 
regional empires. The merchants of St. Louis, who thought in terms 
of natural river lines, wanted to strengthen their bonds with New 
Orleans by becoming the transshipment center for the produce of 
the upper Mississippi and Missouri valleys. It was more profitable 
to operate small steamboats above St. Louis than below it. By 1850 
the city, the biggest in the North American interior, held 77,900 
people, but success proved elusive. The metropolis of the Missis-
sippi, the erstwhile "Lion of the Valley" and "Memphis of the 
American Nile," found its hopes dashed by Chicago, a new city on 
Lake Michigan. 
Chicago, incorporated in 1834, after a slow start complicated by 
the Panic of 1837, achieved a well-deserved reputation as the "Won-
der City of the West." Its cunning and able commercial managers 
rejected the ascendancy of natural lines. They viewed first roads and 
canals and then railroads as weapons of conquest. Highways con-
structed by Chicago interests extended into grain-growing areas in 
Illinois and Indiana. These roads, together with a reputation for hon-
est dealing, helped Chicago businessmen garner a large percentage 
of the emerging midwestern grain trade. A canal running from Chi-
cago to the Mississippi River took trade away from St. Louis. None 
of these actions helped the South; no matter what city won the 
Midwest, the section promised to be a separate one with strong ties 
to the Northeast. New realities had drastically changed the methods 
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and goals of city making above the Mason and Dixon Line but not 
below it. 
Southerners doggedly pushed ahead with the construction of 
cities along traditional lines. There was no grand design. It was sim-
ply that an increasingly insular plantation society did not require 
large numbers of cities, nor could it afford the kind of destructive 
rivalries that occurred in the early Midwest. A fourth stratum of 
cities, of which New Orleans was the most important, appeared 
along the Gulf Coast. Another old French town, Mobile, became 
increasingly significant as cotton culture spread into Alabama and 
Mississippi. The former Spanish Florida centers of Pensacola, 
Tampa, and Key West were small communities off main transpor-
tation lines. None of these three places entertained serious hopes of 
quick development. The best hope for rapid urban progress rested 
in a fifth stratum of cities-inland river ports and railroad centers 
intended to facilitate the cotton trade. As these cities advanced, they 
had the potential of providing lucrative markets for the older locali-
ties that ringed them. At the same time they furnished a possible 
way for the South to acquire impressive urban components that 
would more than counterbalance the loss of the Midwest. The care-
fully constructed southern network would contrast starkly with the 
helter-skelter pattern of midwestern city building. 
The most important emerging southern interior towns were new 
cities, products of the aftermath of the War of 1812. Speculators 
established some, state authorities others. Advances in steamboat 
and railroad technology assumed considerable importance and com-
pressed into a few years events that would once have taken decades. 
Steamboats made possible the regular movement of goods and pro-
duce on the South's great rivers. The Western and Atlantic Railroad, 
which in the 1840s opened up northern Georgia, was one of many 
short lines that contributed to city building. Chattanooga, Tennes-
see, and Atlanta, Georgia, both started as railroad centers. Atlanta, 
designated by the state legislature in 1836 as a junction point, was 
a classic railroad town originally named Terminus. In 1828 the gov-
ernor of Georgia authorized the establishment of Columbus as a 
trading post at the head of navigation on the Chattahoochee River. 
Columbus soon became a river port, from which steamboats carried 
cotton down the Chattahoochee and Apalachicola rivers to the Gulf. 
Macon, in central Georgia on the Ocmulgee River, was a hamlet 
until the arrival of the Georgia Central Railroad in 1843. 
Vicksburg, platted by speculators in 1819, eclipsed Natchez, its 
older rival, to become the chief Mississippi River shipping point for 
central Mississippi. Wagons, pulled by six to eight yoke of oxen, 
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hauled cotton into Vicksburg for transfer downriver to New Orleans. 
In 1821 speculators founded Little Rock on the Arkansas River at a 
ferry crossing used by travelers on the Arkansas and Great Southwest 
Trail. The town was at a geographic breaking point between a vast 
alluvial plan to the east and rough highlands to the west. Montgo-
mery, incorporated in 1819 when the Alabama legislature combined 
three villages into one, soon became an Alabama River port. In the 
late 1830s, adding another transportation dimension, it obtained rail-
road connections. The Mississippi River city of Memphis, founded 
in 1819 after the federal government forced the Chickasaws to 
relinquish western Tennessee, increased rapidly in population fol-
lowing the establishment of cotton plantations in its immediate 
three-state region. 8 By midcentury, the urbanization activities had 
helped to create an integrated communication system. Cotton gath-
ered at Macon moved from there to a portal, say at Augusta, and 
then on to Charleston for ocean shipment. 
Despite their predominantly commercial roles, the antebellum 
southern cities displayed much in the way of natural beauty. Rich-
mond stood on two undulating plateaus divided by a small valley. 
Columbia and Augusta had heavily forested rolling hills; Lexington 
lay in the heart of the lush Kentucky bluegrass country. Rich natural 
vegetation gave New Orleans and Mobile a semitropical appearance. 
Atlanta, near the foothills of the Smoky Mountains, featured a mul-
titude of hills and valleys. Montgomery, Memphis, and Little Rock 
all stood on river bluffs. Vicksburg perched on a neck of land high 
above the Mississippi. New Orleans and Mobile alone featured much 
in the way of elaborate planning. Bienville sanctioned a design for 
New Orleans that had a square, the place d'armes, as a focal point. 
An orderly plan that he devised for Mobile called for a modified grid 
with a church square. Most of the newer places, including Macon, 
Montgomery, and Columbia, had gridiron designs. A grid sometimes 
caused unexpected problems. The Memphis grid went up and down 
hills that might more appropriately have received different treat-
ment. Chattanooga's city fathers laid out their town as if it had been 
on flat land rather than in the mountains. Fortunately, throughout 
the urban South lush foliage obscured the more unsatisfactory as-
pects of designs. Moreover, some cities sponsored tree planting pro-
grams along principal streets and in designated parks and squaresY 
Southern cities impressed visitors. In 1829, Basil Hall, an English 
sea captain, identified the fundamental quality that made Charles-
ton a place set apart. "What gives Charleston its peculiar charac-
ter, ... " he concluded, "is the verandah, or piazza, which embraces 
most of the houses on their southern side .... Except in the busy, 
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commercial parts of the town, where building ground is too precious 
to be so employed, the houses are surrounded by a garden, crowded 
with shrubs and flowers of all kinds, shaded by double and treble 
rows of orange trees; each establishment being generally encircled 
by hedges of a deep green, covered over with the most brilliant show 
imaginable of large white roses, fully as broad as my hand .... I was 
much struck with the sort of tropical aspect which belonged more 
to the port of Charleston than to any other I saw in America."10 
Anne Royall, a well-known American travel writer who toured 
Washington during John Quincy Adams's administration, found the 
adolescent nation's capital"scattered over a vast surface/' but domi-
nated by "enormous" buildings. She wrote, "These edifices; the 
elevated site of the city; its undulating surface, partially covered 
with very handsome buildings; the majestic Potomac, with its pon-
derous bridge, and glistening sails; the eastern branch with its lordly 
ships; swelling hills which surround the city; the spacious squares 
and streets, and avenues, adorned with rows of flourishing trees, and 
all this visible at once; it is not the power of imagination to conceive 
a scene so replete with every species of beauty." 11 Monumental 
buildings, white sails, red roses, and shaded gardens all left lasting 
images in the minds of visitors to the Atlantic southern coastal 
cities. 
No town left a deeper impression than New Orleans. Prior to 
the Civil War the city was undeniably the cosmopolitan center of 
the "Old South." In the 1840s a northern sightseer, Joseph Ingraham, 
a prominent Episcopalian clergyman and religious author, concluded 
that New Orleans had all the characteristics necessary to make it 
a great city. He used the city market as a literary device to make a 
central point. To him, it was a "House of Representatives," where 
"delegates" from every family studied the interests of their "con-
stituents" through judicious negotiations for products. "If the mar-
ket at New Orleans represents that city, so truly does New Orleans 
represent every other city and nation upon the earth," he claimed. 
"I know of none where is congregated so great a variety of human 
species, of every language and colour .... Persians, Turks, Lascars, 
Maltese .... If a painting could affect the sense of hearing as well 
as that of sight, this market multitude would afford the artist an 
inimitable original for the representation upon his canvas of the 
'confusion of tongues.' " 12 Who could doubt, after reading those 
words, that New Orleans was a very special place? Indeed, Ingraham 
coined the epithet Crescent City. 
The city builders of the Old South saw progress in terms more 
of growth than of furthering southern urban distinctiveness. A 
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strong spirit of enterprise existed in the southern cities. In all of 
them, merchant organizations played commanding roles in formu-
lating and advancing economic policies. Elected officials either came 
from the business community or reflected its interests. Greater de-
grees of democracy in city government failed to have much impact 
on changing the character or goals of local administrations. As in 
the North, a strain of boosterism accompanied the rise of cities. 
"Baltimore," an enthusiast proclaimed, "possesses in its locality ... 
advantages surpassing those of any city in the world."13 A Memphian 
assured potential northeastern investors, "The plan and local situa-
tion of Memphis is such as to authorize the expectation that it is 
destined to become a populous city." J.W. Grayson, a Louisville 
promoter, discounting reports that his town was unhealthy, said that 
it "must, under the guidance of science and wise legislation, become, 
if it is not already, one of the healthiest cities in the world." 14 
The cotton city of Mobile had a very aggressive community 
dominated by merchants from the United Kingdom and the Ameri-
can North, almost all of whom arrived in the 1820s and 1830s. 
Banker and businessman Thaddeus Sanford, a Connecticut Yankee, 
edited the Mobile Register, which championed community better-
ment. Two other leaders, cotton merchants William John Ledyard 
from New York and Jonathan Emanuel from England, were civic 
activists. Ambitious newcomers, just as in many other cities 
throughout the country, found that money brought quick entry into 
leadership positions. The elite turned over frequently; family back-
ground had little significance. Several leaders acquired a stake in 
the community by buying real estate. A resident claimed in the 
1830s, "No one gets rich who does not embark in speculation in 
real estate, which has turned into gold in the hands of all who have 
touched it."15 Although some entrepreneurs played politics, the ma-
jority exercised control through civic and business organizations. In 
general, the leadership worked together to create a community con-
sensus on municipal concerns and commercial priorities, but affairs 
did not always run smoothly. Bad management caused the Mobile 
city government to default on its debts, and attempts to broaden the 
economic base proved elusive. To reverse a feared stagnation, busi-
ness leaders put their best face forward. They called for railroads, 
direct trade with Europe, and manufacturing. A business directory 
proclaimed in 1850, "A new era of prosperity is beginning to dawn 
and a bright prospect to the Mobilian is in full view."16 
J.D.B. DeBow, a strong proponent of southern progress, had pre-
dicted much the same thing for the South in 1846 when he wrote 
about the possible consequences of a splendid urban future: "The 
THE BUILDING OF AN ANTEBELLUM SYSTEM 39 
growth of the various cities which scatter themselves throughout 
the valley of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, has been so rapid and 
extraordinary .... If the West continues its rapid progress for the 
next fifty years unabated, and the same proportion of population at 
the expiration of that period reside in cities, it has been computed 
by an intelligent writer, that there will be at least twenty cities 
westward of the Alleghany mountains with a population of half a 
million of human beings each. If such a thought as this does not 
awake in our bosoms true conceptions of the greatness of our coun-
try, we know not what will."17 The linking of northern and southern 
urban prospects highlighted an important fact: urbanization contin-
ued, as it had in the colonial period, to cut across the emerging 
sectional boundaries. 
The newer southern cities, with minor regional variations, 
greatly resembled those in the Northeast and Midwest. In downtown 
areas, eclectic two- and three-story brick rectangular structures lined 
the streets. Some places had ordinances that prohibited the con-
struction of wooden buildings in congested districts. An occasional 
building in the Federal, Georgian, or classical style, usually a public 
hall, church, or bank, broke the monotony of the commercial land-
scape. As elsewhere in the nation, entrepreneurs considered first-
class hotels, theaters, and railroad stations symbols of prosperity 
and progress. Tax money frequently helped to pay for such places. 
Advocates appealed to civic pride in gaining support for projects, just 
as they did for gas systems, street improvements, and other urban 
services. 
Residential architecture in the upper South, except for row 
houses patterned after those in Baltimore, differed little from that 
in the lower Midwest. One- and two-story box-shaped single-family 
dwellings predominated, many of balloon-frame construction. In the 
lower South, open galleries and verandahs placed to take greatest 
advantage of cooling breezes were in order, as were high ceilings 
designed to help the air circulate better. Few columned mansions 
graced the southern cities; the wealthy usually resided in brick two-
story houses set near the street on narrow lots. Many slaves lived 
in small shacks behind their owners' homes. Utilitarian rather than 
romantic considerations dictated southern architectural forms. An-
tebellum southern urban dwellers made no conscious attempt to 
define a strikingly different mode of architectural expression. 
Cities all over the South continued to build upon past accom-
plishments in urban services and to provide new ones as conditions 
warranted. As might have been expected, the citizens who paid the 
most taxes-downtown commercial interests and residents in the 
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solid residential districts-received the best services. Because prop-
erty owners paid all or part of the cost of street improvements, the 
quality varied markedly from one part of town to another. According 
to Mobile's amended charter of 1843, for instance, "the mayor, ald-
ermen and common councilmen shall have a proper regard to the 
appropriation of the same to the improvement of the different wards 
of the said city, in proportion to the amount of taxes paid by each 
ward."18 A questionable assumption held that expenditures in the 
better parts of town would spill over and eventually rebound to the 
advantage of the entire community. 
Towns traditionally adopted services pioneered in other places. 
Gas for lighting purposes served as a case in point. In 1818, Balti-
more, using public appropriations, constructed a gas works, and 
other cities followed suit. In the 1830s a private concern obtained 
franchises to erect gas works in both New Orleans and Mobile. 
Louisville and Washington gained gas companies during the 1840s. 
By that time gas lighting had become a prestige item. A writer for 
the Lynchburg Virginian claimed, "The mere fact that a town is lit 
with gas is an assurance to a stranger that there are intelligent en-
terprising, and thrifty people .... It is a passport to public confidence 
and respect, a card to be admitted into the family of well-regulated 
cities."19 
The biggest customers of the gas service companies were public 
street lighting departments. Street maintenance constituted major 
drains on urban treasuries. Cities sometimes levied special taxes in 
order to improve the streets; Alexandria charged property owners 
from $1.25 to $1.30 per foot of frontage to pave a main thoroughfare. 
Street cleaning continued to be treated in a casual manner. A few 
places relied, with little success, on abutters, whose responsibility 
it was to sweep in front of their property. Baltimore had alleys and 
lanes that no one ever cleaned, while municipal herds of pig helped 
to keep other streets clear of garbage. Norfolk authorities experi-
mented by using domestic cows to eat vegetable matter that accu-
mulated along the waterfront. 
Performance in other areas of civic responsibility varied. Edu-
cation received lackluster support; New Orleans, Baltimore, and 
Louisville did not even have public schools until the 1820s. Support 
for a public system in Mobile came from town leaders who believed 
that compulsory education would instill in poor whites a sense of 
public order. Authorities, in keeping with the latest northeastern 
reform trends, placed an emphasis on the practical three R's at the 
expense of the classics. Conversely, Charleston and Richmond pio-
neered in establishing almshouses for the poor in an effort to clear 
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the streets of beggars. With a measure of success, southern cities 
accepted considerable civic responsibilities, all of which added to 
growing tax burdens. Even so, as in colonial days, most charitable 
functions remained in private hands. In championing the private 
approach, the Mobile Advertiser put forward a widely held position: 
"Private charity speaks of a philanthropic heart-such gifts are the 
off-spring of genuine benevolence. Men may be found who would 
vote away public funds for charitable purposes, who would not give 
a dime from their own pockets to clothe the naked or feed the starv-
ing-hence we think that the liberal private donations and tender 
of personal services made by our citizens, reflect much more credit 
upon the city, than had twice the amount voted by the corporate 
authorities."20 During an 1853 outbreak of yellow fever a local or-
ganization called the "Can't Get Away Club" cared for almost 2,000 
patients. Benevolent groups, including the Protestant Orphan Asy-
lum Society and the Mobile Port Society, also ministered to the 
needs of the less fortunate in Mobile society. In Mobile and else-
where a groping toward more comprehensive social services char-
acterized urban solutions to problems. 
Protective organizations ranged from poor to adequate. Boards 
of health, even though badly underfunded, gradually acquired greater 
control over sanitary concerns. New Orleans, Baltimore, and Wash-
ington maintained public hospitals and infirmaries. The New Or-
leans Charity Hospital dated from the eighteenth century. Both 
Baltimore and New Orleans had extensive smallpox vaccination pro-
grams. During nonepidemic periods, health authorities in southern 
cities performed valuable services by gathering data on local sanitary 
conditions and making nuisance inspections. Police services differed 
markedly from place to place. Both Louisville and Lexington em-
ployed salaried policemen, New Orleans officers had a reputation 
for being corrupt, and newspaper accounts claimed that the Charles-
ton police slept on duty and frequented grog shops. The English 
"police idea," which called for regimented uniformed police officers 
with clearly designated duties, very slowly reached the South. In 
antebellum days, only Baltimore had a highly organized professional 
police force. Although the greater number of arrests throughout the 
urban South were for drunkenness and assault and battery, by the 
1850s burglaries had increased to the point where some observers 
feared a crime wave. In a few cities businessmen set up their own 
private police units, and some municipalities responded by hiring 
more night watchmen, so that they appeared to be taking action. 
Fire protection remained an even more casual function; no city 
operated an all-professional force. Volunteer departments, furnished 
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by city governments with engine houses and equipment, guarded 
against fires. Ordinances excusing members from other civic duties 
had the aim of encouraging enrollment in the fire companies. At 
one point Charleston had twenty volunteer units and Richmond 
seven. Some companies developed dual functions as both fire units 
and political clubs, so that it was difficult to replace or change them 
even after they had outlived their usefulness. Pressure for water 
systems to fight fires led to the building of extensive waterworks 
in a number of places, including municipal facilities in Richmond, 
Savannah, and Nashville.21 A slow upgrading was a major feature of 
protective activities in the southern cities. 
Disorders, fires, and epidemics added to the perils of city life in 
the South. Baltimore gained a justifiable national reputation as a 
town prone to violence. August 1835 saw a severe riot following the 
failure of the Bank of Maryland, and in 1839 only the calling out of 
a regiment of city guards prevented a nunnery from being plundered. 
The day after the 1840 presidential election, toughs attacked the 
offices of the Baltimore Patriot and injured several people. In 1847 
and 1848 rival fire companies engaged in a number of brawls, while 
an election riot disturbed the peace in October 1848. Baltimore was 
not the only center of urban violence. French Creoles and American 
newcomers fought on numerous occasions in New Orleans; ethnic 
strife swept over Louisville in midcentury. Keelboat men who fre-
quented Nashville were notorious for lawlessness. Drunken sailors 
frequently went out of their way to pick street fights in Mobile. 22 
Almost every place claimed to have had a "Great Fire." In 1815 
flames consumed 400 houses in Petersburg. Augusta underwent a 
trial by fire in 1829 when a conflagration gutted between 400 and 
500 buildings and accounted for $1 million in damages. A blaze that 
destroyed Louisville's commercial district in 1840 sparked a state-
wide movement for better fire protection in Kentucky.23 Epidemics 
occurred with depressing regularity. In 1822 a a scourge of yellow 
fever threatened to depopulate Louisville. New Orleans, known as 
the "wet grave," experienced almost annual epidemics. Between 
1810 and 1837 alone there were fifteen yellow fever outbreaks. In 
1839 yellow fever killed more than 1,300, and another 1,800 perished 
after contracting the disease in 1841. A sixth of the population of 
Memphis expired from yellow fever in 1828.24 During 1832 a na-
tional cholera pandemic affected the South. In September 1832, 125 
of 500 inmates at the Baltimore almshouse perished from cholera. 
Even under the best of circumstances, a dark shroud of calamity 
hung over the cities of the South. 
The troubles that Savannah encountered in 1820 were compa-
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rable to those of other cities. On the night of January 11, 1820, a 
fire that started in a livery stable raged out of control, fanned by 
high northeast winds. The city's half dozen fire companies, sup-
ported by hastily organized bucket brigades, failed to check the 
flames. Two explosions of illegally stored gunpowder helped spread 
the conflagration. Before the blaze had spent its fury and died the 
following afternoon, 463 buildings lay in smoking ruins, and be-
tween 3,000 and 4,000 people were homeless. The distaster almost 
entirely wiped out the business section of Savannah. "The town 
presents a most wretched picture," an eyewitness to the disaster 
wrote. "There is not a hardware store, Saddler's shop, Apothecary's 
shop, or scarcely a dry goods store left."25 
No sooner had the city started a slow recovery from the $5 
million holocaust-relief donations came from all over America-
when yellow fever struck Savannah. Heavy spring and summer rains 
filled many cellars in the burnt district, creating excellent breeding 
places for mosquitoes. At first, authorities denied that an epidemic 
was in progress. The mayor said that "one ... section ... has been 
rather unusually unhealthy ... ,but the disease ... is confined prin-
cipally to strangers and people of intemperate, dissolute habits ... 
and is no more than the ordinary bilious fever of the climate."26 
Such sophistry failed to stop the epidemic. In September the mayor, 
in the very same prepared statement in which he said that yellow 
fever was not present in Savannah, advised all those who could do 
so to flee the city. More than 6,000 of the 7,500 residents took his 
advice, but before the malignancy ended with the coming of an Oc-
tober frost, about 700 inhabitants had perished. The twin blows of 
the fire and the fever badly hurt Savannah. Despite the elaborate 
plans of its business leaders, Savannah failed to grow during the 
remainder of the decade. Its plight served as a grim reminder of the 
effects that disasters could have on a city at a crucial moment. Only 
the steady expansion of cotton production in the lower South and 
the exploitation of the West Indies lumber trade enabled Savannah 
to resume its advance. 
The trend toward making cotton the fabric of the southern 
economy continued throughout the antebellum period. Cotton pro-
duction rose from 40 million pounds in 1834 to 457 million pounds 
in 1844. By midcentury the amount had increased to nearly a billion 
pounds. The Cotton Kingdom contained the seeds of its own de-
struction. A reliance on slave labor and on foreign markets auto-
matically set the South apart from the rest of the country without 
isolating the region. The special protection that the cotton system 
required for survival helped ignite an unwanted sectional conflict. 
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Balancing free and slave states became a national policy. The Ameri-
can System lost its attraction for southerners, who heartily disap-
proved of high tariffs designed to build up northeastern 
manufacturing and to fund internal improvement projects. The 
South Carolina Nullification Crisis and the subsequent Compro-
mise of 1833 signaled the inherent dangeri a tariff controversy over 
technical issues held the potential for altering the course of Union. 
The move toward states' rights reflected a desire to preserve and 
protect a system that was actually relatively new. When the aboli-
tionist movement started in the 1830s, southern agrarian leaders 
reacted by trying to construct a closed society inside the South and 
by framing elaborate arguments designed to defend the rights of 
minorities within and outside the halls of Congress. Statesman John 
C. Calhoun called slavery a "basic good/' southern postmasters 
pulled abolitionist tracts from the mails, and free black seamen were 
not allowed ashore in some southern ports. Such actions further 
hurt the emerging urban South, in part because the developing sec-
tional creed posed a grave threat to the traditional openness and 
cooperation between the nation's cities. 
Routine commercial intercourse, taken for granted over the de-
cades, became suspect in the eyes of southern nationalists, who 
made impassioned speeches about the threat posed by alleged north-
ern dominance of the South. "We rise from between sheets made 
in Northern looms/' a southerner said in 1850, "and pillows of 
Northern feathers, to wash in basins made in the North, dry our 
beards on Northern towels, and dress ourselves in garments made 
in Northern loomsi we eat from Northern plates and dishesi our 
rooms are swept with Northern broomsi our gardens are dug with 
Northern spades and our bread kneaded in trays or dishes of North-
ern wood or tini and the very wood which feeds our fires is cut with 
Northern axes, helved with hickory brought from Connecticut or 
New Yorki and when we die our bodies are wrapped in shrouds 
manufactured in New England, put in coffins made in the North."27 
It followed from such reasoning that the South should build a manu-
facturing base to meet sectional needs. As events had already proved, 
this good was much more easily discussed than accomplished. 
Supporters of southern industry had to swim against an agrarian 
tide. Slave labor was very costlyi skilled white labor was not readily 
available. A few states had laws making business incorporation dif-
ficult. As cotton interests became more and more entrenched, some 
agrarians found industry inherently evil and debilitating, especially 
when compared with the supposedly more noble pursuit of farming. 
Most experts, while concerned about the impact of manufacturing 
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on society, rejected such an extremist position. Paternalistic expe-
riments carried out in New England mill towns, notably Lawrence 
and Lowell in Massachusetts, had positive results; the use of closely 
supervised women operatives hired for specific tours of duty had 
checked the possible growth of a militant proletariat. 
In the South, the Piedmont, with its numerous excellent sources 
of waterpower, had articulate proponents of manufacturing. As early 
as 1828 the North Carolina legislature proclaimed that the 11hand 
of nature" dictated the rise of industry in the Tar Heel State. William 
Gregg was one of the leading supporters of an industrial South. His 
model cotton mill at Graniteville, South Carolina, attempted to 
prove that Piedmont facilities could effectively compete with those 
in New England. A South Carolina editor claimed that the use of 
slave labor would automatically lead to industrial success, but Gregg 
disagreed and asserted that adequate capitalization represented the 
key element. One expert contended that underfinanced factories, 
which he called "cheap factories," would be self-defeating, while an 
Alabama creditor said cotton mill owners were "public benefactors" 
who would provide jobs for poor whites and render the South in-
dependent of outside influence. No massive amounts of capital were 
forthcoming, however. Southern money remained tied up in slaves 
and plantations; northern funds flowed in other directions.28 Manu-
facturing that started in Dixie was primarily consumer oriented, 
geared to the production of wooden containers, furniture products, 
leather goods, and hardware.29 These were the very kinds of products 
that impassioned orators claimed placed the South under northern 
domination. 
The extensive use of slave labor made the southern cities an 
important cog in the Peculiar Institution. Because of low wage levels, 
chronic shortages of white day laborers plagued the southern cities. 
In antebellum days the South attracted only a small percentage of 
the hundreds of thousands of immigrants who came to America. 
Considerable numbers of Irish and German aliens did settle in New 
Orleans, Louisville, and Baltimore. Still, in numerous places both 
foreign-born and native white workers found it difficult to compete 
with slave labor. Even though the number of slaves in Baltimore 
dropped from 4,400 in 1820 to 2,900 in 1850, most cities registered 
increases in that thirty-year span, as indicated by Table 1. 
Vast numbers of urban slaves toiled as domestic servants. Still, 
human chattels could be found in almost all other lines of employ-
ment. At Richmond they made up the majority of the workers in 
the tobacco and iron industries. In 1850 the New Orleans Levee 
Steam Cotton Press owned 104 slaves; a Mobile owner trained a 
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Table 1. Number of Slaves in Selected Southern Cities, 1820 and 
1850 
Slaves Increase 
City 1820 1850 Number Percent 
Baltimore 4,357 2,946 -1,411 -32 
Charleston 12,652 19,532 6,880 54 
Louisville 1,031 5,432 4,401 426 
Mobile 836 6,803 5,967 714 
New Orleans 7,355 17,011 9,656 131 
Norfolk 3,261 4,295 1,034 32 
Richmond 4,387 9,927 5,540 126 
Savannah 3,075 6,231 3,156 103 
Washington 1,945 2,113 168 9 
slave to examine cotton grades. Slaves worked as stevedores in sev-
eral ports. At railroad and river junctions they performed the trans-
shipment work. Under a hiring-out system, masters signed contracts 
for their slaves' services or allowed them to negotiate their own 
work agreements in exchange for a percentage of the pay. This loos-
ening of traditional restraints was linked with the fluid and complex 
labor requirements of urban areas. The hiring out of slaves made it 
possible to deal with short-term employment needs.30 
Alarmists contended that city life undermined the Peculiar In-
stitution. In 1835 a Louisville editor aroused fears that urban slaves 
had stopped regarding themselves as being in bondage and contended 
that they became "insolent, intractable, and in many instances 
wholly worthless."31 The perception that urban slaves failed to mind 
their masters helped to spawn fears of slave rebellions; Denmark 
Vesey's alleged 1822 plot in Charleston colored white thinking. 
Some suspicious people called the actual number of urban slaves 
much greater than had been indicated by official statistics. Suppos-
edly, masters cheated on the number of slaves they owned to avoid 
municipal head taxes. In addition, large groups of runaways were 
said to lurk in back alleys and outskirts. Growing populations of 
free Negroes were a special worry. A Mobile editor, concerned about 
racial competition on the job, declared, "There are now among us 
free negroes whom the law proscribes holding situations which 
scores of young white men among us would be glad to get."32 The 
number of free Negroes in major southern cities generally increased 
between 1820 and 1850, as shown by Table 2. Although the pro-
portion of whites generally rose faster than that of blacks, several 
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Table 2. Number of Free Negroes in Selected Southern Cities, 1820 
and 1850 
Free Negroes Increase 
City 1820 1850 Number Percent 
Baltimore 10,326 25,442 15,116 831 
Charleston 1,475 3,441 1,966 133 
Louisville 93 1,538 1,445 1,553 
Mobile 183 715 532 291 
New Orleans 6,237 9,905 3,668 59 
Norfolk 599 956 357 60 
Richmond 1,235 2,369 1,134 92 
Savannah 582 686 104 18 
Washington 1,696 8,158 6,462 381 
southern cities took steps to reduce their slave populations. In the 
1850s Savannah cut its black inhabitants from 14,700 to 7,700; the 
number of slaves in Charleston dropped from 19,500 to 14,000. In 
spite of such measures, no major downward movement occurred in 
the number of either slave or free Negro urban dwellers. 
In the first fifty years of the nineteenth century, southerners 
proceeded with the task of constructing an urban network, one in-
creasingly designed to serve the demands of the plantation economy. 
By 1850 the South had thirteen places with a population of more 
than 10,000. 
Baltimore 169,000 


















Dixie contained two of six "Great Cities" in the United States-in 
nineteenth-century demographic terms, metropolises of 100,000 or 
more. The Atlantic and Gulf Coast towns formed the backbone of 
the urban South. Baltimore was the biggest place in the section; in 
the whole country only New York, which had 515,500 persons, was 
larger. Washington and Charleston both ranked among the top 
twenty American cities. Savannah and Norfolk continued to show 
progress. Mobile was a major center. New Orleans was the nation's 
fifth city in size. The important Piedmont towns were Richmond, 
Petersburg, Wheeling, and Augusta. In the old New West, Louisville 
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Table 3. Population of Five Southern Interior Cities, 1840 and 1850 
City 1840 1850 
Memphis 8,841 
Montgomery 2,171 8,728 
Macon 3,927 5,720 
Atlanta 2,752 
Little Rock 1,967 
and Nashville continued to rise in importance. Between 1840 and 
1850 Baltimore gained 66,700 inhabitants, Louisville 22,000, Wash-
ington 16,600, and Charleston 13,700. 
Equally impressive was the population growth during the forties 
of some of the newer interior cities, as shown in Table 3. Montgom-
ery grew by 6,500 and Macon by 1,800. Memphis, Atlanta, and Little 
Rock all rose after 1840. Yet actual figures for frontier cities meant 
little, because, given the right circumstances, midwestern experi-
ence suggested that they would be capable of spectacular population 
increases. During the 1840s Chicago mushroomed from 4,500 people 
to 30,000 and Milwaukee from 1,700 to 20,100. Potential was what 
counted, and southern nationalists could only hope that places like 
Atlanta and Chattanooga had the right stuff from which cities were 
made. 
Throughout the period after the War of 1812, the South found 
itself increasingly falling behind the rest of the nation in the building 
of new cities; the implications for the American economy as a whole 
were serious. The rise of the port of New York upset the slow and 
orderly approach being taken to city building in the South, where 
activity was conducted within the contours of established norms. 
The cities on the southern Atlantic seaboard failed to secure com-
munication links of the type necessary to challenge the Empire City. 
The emerging Midwest lined up with the Northeast; Cincinnati and 
St. Louis, despite their ties to the South, switched allegiance, pri-
marily for monetary reasons. Southerners' careful way of building 
strata of cities designed to serve the needs of a cotton economy 
accentuated a growing gulf between the sections. 
3 
THE RAVAGES OF 
CIVIL WAR AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 
Southern city builders entered the 1850s on an optimistic note. The 
Compromise of 1850 gave rise to hopes for an end to the sectional 
crisis, and a general renewal of ties with the North seemed in the 
offing. The growing gap in purpose and scope between the southern 
and the northern urban systems continued to pose problems. Even 
so, none of the points of difference seemed insurmountable, espe-
cially if the new southern interior cities grew rapidly and the old 
coastal centers expanded their commercial functions. As it was, the 
differences between the sections had not poisoned economic rela-
tionships. New York merchants continued to enjoy amicable com-
mercial arrangements with their counterparts in Charleston, 
Mobile, and New Orleans. Furthermore, a common feeling of ur-
banity served to unite American city people. Charleston gentility 
and hospitality were legendary, and the cosmopolitan traditions of 
New Orleans reflected the nation's growing cultural diversity. 
Few responsible observers realized that a terrible trial of pesti-
lence, sword, fire, and humiliation lay ahead for Dixie. Frightful 
epidemics would decimate whole cities, invading armies would de-
stroy entire urban districts, and a victor's peace would humble a 
proud people. By the end of Civil War and Reconstruction, the goal 
of southern leaders would be not how to overcome the North's com-
mercial advantage but rather how to regain something approaching 
equal status within the Union. The thoughtful arguments framed 
in antebellum times by southern statesmen about how best to pro-
tect the South's position paled by way of comparison. 
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Southern commercial conventions held between 1837 and 1859 
had attempted to set economic policies for Dixie. The conventions 
were a natural consequence of the growing paranoia and sense of 
isolation that swept across the South after William Lloyd Garrison 
commenced publication of the Liberator in 1831. Garrison's call for 
the immediate abolition of slavery without compensation to slave 
owners sharpened sectional variances and placed the South on the 
defensive. The delegates at the conventions represented a cross sec-
tion of southern life. Luminaries in attendance at one time or an-
other included statesman John C. Calhoun, manufacturer William 
Gregg, and editor J.D.B. DeBow. Some of the meetings attracted as 
many as a thousand people, and the proceedings received wide notice 
throughout the South. 
Three distinct periods characterized the convention movement. 
The first, which featured several assemblies held from 1837 to 1839 
in either Charleston or Augusta, dealt with the threat to the South 
posed by the rapidly increasing wealth and power of the North. Rep-
resentatives paid special attention to the rise of New York and its 
overseas trade. In the 1840s a second sequence of conventions in 
New Orleans and Memphis concentrated on formulating a southern 
railroad strategy designed to unify the eastern and western parts of 
the South. During the 1850s the third set of meetings considered a 
range of issues related to southern nationalism. The gatherings fell 
increasingly under the control of "Fire Eaters" intent on using the 
sessions as justification for promoting secession as a practical means 
of countering increasing northern economic incursions into the 
South. 
The conventions, over the years, first recognized problems, then 
established goals, and finally expressed a general sense of frustration 
with the course of national events that eventually led to the creation 
of the Confederate States of America. Gloom and doom character-
ized the early meetings. The call for the 1837 convention issued by 
the business community of Athens, Georgia, reflected the situation. 
It stated: "A crisis has arrived in the commercial affairs of the South 
and Southeast; a crisis the most favorable that has occurred since 
the formation of the American Government to attempt a new or-
ganization of our commercial relations with Europe. We ought to 
be our own importers and exporters, for the very best reason, that 
we furnish nearly all the articles of export in the great staples of 
cotton, rice and tobacco. This is a singular advantage for any people 
to enJoy. Yet, with all this in our favor by nature, we employ the 
merchants of the Northern cities as our agents in this business."1 
New York imported six times the amount of its exports; all the 
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southern states put together imported only one-fourth of theirs. 
None of the early conventions came up with a specific way of al-
tering foreign trade patterns to encourage direct trade between the 
South and Europe. The conclusion was that the state of things was 
unnatural and that it should not continue. There was a growing 
recognition that commercial penetration by outside forces had social 
and political implications that menaced the peculiar nature of south-
ern society. 
Calhoun hoped that the second wave of conclaves in the 1840s 
would overcome parochial political prejudices and lead to a spirit of 
cooperation between the eastern and western southern states. He 
regarded the Mississippi River and its tributaries as an inland sea 
with the capacity to bridge the growing gap between the Atlantic 
and Gulf ports. Calhoun wanted large and comprehensive internal 
improvement projects designed to connect the lower Mississippi 
valley with the South Atlantic cities. He envisioned an immense 
network of railroads and canals. Here was a vision of southern na-
tionalism at its best. As a matter of record, Calhoun's proposals were 
star crossed. Even such a distinguished southerner was unable to 
stop the spirited entrepreneurial rivalries among cities in the South. 
New Orleans railroad plans aimed at helping the city's position 
at the expense of its competitors. In 1852, at a commercial conven-
tion in the Crescent City, banker and railroad promoter James Robb 
of New Orleans received a thunderous ovation from a partisan home-
town audience when he proclaimed, "Our fate and interest are 
blended with those of the Great West .... We have only to increase 
the facilities of getting here, when the people of the West will look 
naturally to New Orleans as the center of the arts, of fashion, and 
of ideas, as the people of France do to Paris."2 Such an insular brand 
of boosterism-so much a part of the American experience-spelled 
the decline of the convention movement when it should have been 
approaching full bloom as an instrument for sectional cooperation. 
The last convention, a grim affair, seemed to follow naturally 
from the failure of the earlier gatherings to solve the South's com-
mercial problems. The sessions became the sounding board for pol-
iticians who contended that the South was subservient to theN orth. 
An 1858 article in DeBow's Review speculated on how the delegates 
would travel to a Montgomery convention: "They will start in some 
stage or railroad coach made in the North; an engine of Northern 
manufacture will take their train or boat along; at every meal they 
will sit down in Yankee chairs, to a Yankee table, spread with Yan-
kee cloth. With a Yankee spoon they will take from dishes sugar, 
salt, and coffee which have paid tribute to Yankee trade, and with 
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Yankee knives and forks they will put into their mouths the only 
thing Southern they will get on the trip."3 
The statement was an apt prologue to the Montgomery gath-
ering. Those in attendance, instead of searching for harmonious 
themes, wasted time in acrimonious debates over such peripheral 
issues as the possible revival of the foreign slave trade. No one quar-
reled about either the existence of slavery or the vitality of the cotton 
economy. By then the loyalty issue had so crystallized across the 
South that northern-born merchants who had lived in Mobile for 
thirty years and who supported slavery found themselves under at-
tack. Men of moderation across Dixie found their motives ques-
tioned. Over the years the primary contribution of the conventions 
was to prompt inquiries about the needs of the southern economy. 
By illustrating the inability of the South to compete on equal terms 
with the North, the meetings actually furnished a rationale for 
southern nationalism and hence secession. 
All the conventions stressed the need for a great commercial 
city in the South that could compete with New York. A general 
consensus held that the South could at best only afford one gigantic 
metropolis. Unfortunately, the recognition of a condition did not 
automatically lead to a solution, because the problems associated 
with building such a place went deeper than nationalistic theory. 
No matter how desirable it might have been for southerners to unite 
and concentrate their resources on creating a city to rival New York, 
the section's urban leaders proved unwilling to sacrifice their own 
ambitions on the altar of southern nationalism. Charleston and Sa-
vannah continued to contend for the cotton trade; Mobile and New 
Orleans worked against each other in constructing railroads. The 
Piedmont towns, from Virginia through Georgia, vied for northern 
capital to build cotton mills. As elsewhere in the country, a strong 
spirit of urban rivalry held sway. No one wanted to help a competitor 
get ahead. 
Hinton Rowan Helper, a brilliant and alienated native of North 
Carolina, created a national sensation in 1857 when he claimed in 
his widely read polemical book The Impending Crisis of the South: 
How to Meet It that the slavocracy's manipulation of the economy 
blocked the emergence of a magnificent southern commercial city. 
He said that the actions of a selfish few allowed northern interests 
to drain $120 million annually from the South. As a direct conse-
quence southern money had gone toward building New York, Phila-
delphia, Boston, and Cincinnati at the expense of Norfolk, Beaufort, 
Charleston, and Savannah. Commenting on what would have re-
sulted if the dollars had stayed in the South, he wrote, "How much 
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greater would be the number and length of our railroads, canals, 
turnpikes, and telegraphs. How much greater would be the extent 
and diversity of our manufactures .... How many more clippers and 
steamboats would we have sailing on the ocean, how vastly more 
reputable would we be abroad, how infinitely more respectable, pro-
gressive, and happy, would we be at home." Concluding with an 
impassioned plea for urbanization, he declared, "Almost invariably 
do we find the bulk of floating funds, the best talent, and the most 
vigorous energies of a nation concentrated in its chief cities; and 
does not this concentration of wealth, energy, and talent, conduce, 
in an extraordinary degree, to the growth and prosperity of the na-
tion? Unquestionably. Wealth develops wealth, energy develops en-
ergy, talent develops talent. What, then, must be the condition of 
those countries which do not possess the means or faculties of cen-
tralizing their material forces, their energies, and their talents? Are 
they not destined to occupy an inferior rank among the nations of 
the earth? Let the South answer."4 
Actually no plot fermented, although it was true that the plan-
tation economy had failed to generate the tremendous amount of 
surplus capital necessary to build great cities quickly. Especially in 
formulating the transportation strategies necessary to gain control 
of vast marketing areas, southern urban leaders had to operate within 
severe fiscal restraints that left little margin for error. 
New Orleans, which tried very hard to become the great me-
tropolis of the Mississippi valley, served as a prime example.5 The 
refinement of boilers made it possible for steamboats to go upriver 
against strong currents and added a new dimension to the city's 
commercial possibilities. In the 1820s, members of the French, Span-
ish, and American business communities gazed with pleasure on the 
"forest of masts" that lined the levee. The general prosperity that 
accompanied the presidential administration of Andrew Jackson 
helped New Orleans; exports and imports rose from $26 million in 
1831 to $54 million in 1835. Regional cotton and sugar planters 
borrowed vast sums of money in New Orleans and became increas-
ingly dependent upon the city's financial institutions. At that junc-
ture the Panic of 1837 severely affected the banks of New Orleans; 
a gigantic $72 million in uncollectable mortgages caused all except 
a few of the houses to fail. 
The unhappy situation served as a stark indication of the Cres-
cent City's vulnerability to outside forces. After several down years 
prosperity returned, and the amount of grain brought downriver for 
transshipment at New Orleans increased, despite difficulties caused 
by huge drayage costs, poor docking facilities, and spoilage. During 
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the Mexican War, New Orleans was a principal military staging base, 
and the unprecedented business generated tended to hide deficien-
cies. In means of distributing goods the city compared unfavorably 
with Atlantic coast ports. As a result New Orleans was a poor im-
porting center, and shipping rates were high. A detailed 1858 analysis 
indicated that a loaded 700-ton vessel sailing from Charleston to 
Liverpool could expect a profit of $2,054.01. The same ship sailing 
from New Orleans to Liverpool would have earned only $552.96. 
To make matters worse, the construction of railroads from the 
Northeast to the Midwest, augmenting water links, threatened to 
deal a death blow to natural lines of communication. Consequently, 
the New Orleans business community reexamined its objectives and 
realized to its dismay that the bulk of Midwest trade was perma-
nently lost. Technology had turned against the Crescent City; the 
iron horse rather than the steamboat reigned supreme in America. 
New Orleans gradually adopted a railroad strategy. Grandiose 
proposals called for the quick obtaining of Pacific coast connections. 
One aborted scheme called for a complicated link that involved both 
sea and land and meant building a railroad in Mexico across the 
Isthmus of Tehuantepec. A railroad actually started in the direction 
of California failed after less than two miles of tracks had been laid. 
More limited and realistic railroad proposals aimed at securing re-
gional hinterlands and feeding the Mississippi River trade. Robb 
made the plans, DeBow handled the publicity, and Judah P. Benja-
min, a wealthy plantation owner and political leader, provided a 
measure of respectability. Robb's New Orleans, Jackson and Great 
Northern Railway, 206 miles long, ran to Canton, Mississippi, where 
it joined other lines and consolidated the "Black Belt" cotton trade 
for New Orleans. Another road, the publicly aided New Orleans, 
Opelousas and Great Northern Railway, thrust west eighty miles 
from the New Orleans suburb of Algiers to Brashear on Berwick Bay, 
making Texas connections via the Morgan Line of steamers. The 
road, very difficult and expensive to build through snake- and alli-
gator-infested swamps, was a limited success. The "sugar region" 
trade that it brought to New Orleans would have come anyway. 
Because New Orleans's program worked imperfectly, critics 
found fault. Even so, while mistakes abounded and goals over-
reached, the men involved in New Orleans's railroad planning made 
their decisions within an objective framework that took into account 
the declining role of the Mississippi River. They therefore concen-
trated on a strategy of consolidating their own markets in the lower 
Mississippi River valley. Although this course of action was far from 
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what extremists like Helper or the Fire Eaters wanted, consolidation 
represented the best option available. 
Throughout the 1850s, railroad considerations constituted a pri-
mary element in southern economic thinking. Jefferson Davis 
emerged as a leading communication theorist. Within the South, he 
wanted an elaborate east-to-west system. Within a broader frame-
work, he envisioned a "Pacific Railroad" running from Memphis to 
California, but the fires of sectional conflict dashed his plans, al-
though he did succeed in helping Mobile interests obtain a federal 
land grant for the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. When it was completed, 
just prior to the Civil War, from Mobile to Columbus, Kentucky, 
on the Ohio River, the 472-mile-long railroad was the longest in the 
South and the cornerstone of Mobile's overland transportation strat-
egy. As early as 1852 an official for the Mobile and Ohio Railroad 
made a speech in which he bragged about all the trade that the line 
would supposedly take away from the Crescent City. 
Louisville was another place with growing southern railroad am-
bitions. After Cincinnati thwarted the plans of Louisville's leaders 
to build trunk railroads in Ohio and Indiana, they turned south, first 
constructing local roads in Kentucky and Tennessee. Of greater sig-
nificance was the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, owned jointly 
by Louisville and Nashville capitalists. The road, which by the end 
of the 1850s had a trunk line that ran between Louisville and Nash-
ville, held tremendous potential as a route into the center of the 
lower South. Baltimore had already made important progress in rail-
roading. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, finally completed to 
Wheeling in 1853, soon gained through connections to St. Louis. As 
a result the Monumental City became the only southern Atlantic 
coastal city to penetrate the Midwest successfully, no mean feat in 
the American railroad battles of the mid-nineteenth century. 
Some southerners hoped in vain that railroads would overcome 
sectional differences. In February 1861 William Burwell, a Virginia 
economist, anticipated that a "series of trade zones" centered in 
Chicago, Cincinnati, Louisville, Memphis, and New Orleans would 
"become principal depots for the collection and exportation of the 
trade along the Ohio and Mississippi valley, as well as for the im-
portation and distribution of merchandise."6 Southern nationalists, 
who abhorred such thinking, never found an effective way-beyond 
championing tracks in the South with a different gauge from those 
in the North-of preventing railroads from overcoming sectional 
boundaries. 
Throughout the 1850s yellow fever continued to pose a threat 
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to southern city people that on occasion overshadowed the growing 
sectional conflict. Victims died a swift and painful death. A minister 
who had lived through numerous New Orleans epidemics wrote, 
"Often I have met and shook hands with some blooming, handsome 
young man today, and in a few hours afterwards I have been called 
to see him in the black vomit, with profuse hemorrhages from the 
mouth, nose, ears, eyes, and even the toesi the eyes prominent, 
glistening, yellow, and staringi the face discolored with orange color 
and dusty red. The physiognomy of the yellow fever corpse is usually 
sad, sullen, and perturbedi the countenance dark, mottled, livid, 
swollen, and stained with blood and black vomiti the veins of the 
face and the whole body become distended, and look as if they were 
going to burst."7 
In 1855 yellow fever swept through Norfolk, killing 2,000 peo-
ple, including the mayor and other leading citizens. A stunned sur-
vivor wrote, "But for the occasional appearance of an idle white 
vagabond, sauntering along the wharf, gazing wistfully into the 
water, we should have imagined ourselves wandering amid the ruins 
of a lost city."8 The Norfolk epidemic would have qualified as one 
of the worst disasters of its kind if it had not been for an even more 
terrible one that had struck New Orleans two years earlier. 
In 1853 a general yellow fever outbreak engulfed the lower Mis-
sissippi valley. New Orleans had been virtually free of the disease 
since the death of 2,000 people in a 184 7 pestilence. The absence of 
yellow jack had caused unrealistic optimism in medical circles. In 
November 1852 the editors of the New Orleans Medical and Sur-
gical Journal claimed that soon the scourge would be "among the 
diseases that have passed and gonei and the students of medicine 
will seek only in the record of the past, to learn its history-its 
symptoms and its treatment." They cited the effectiveness of a 
swamp-draining program designed to remove "miasmatic influ-
ences."9 
A favored theory held that swamp gas caused disease, but many 
local residents were not so sure. In any event, sanitary laxities 
abounded. Stagnant water stood in vacant lots, the streets were filthy 
and muddy, and no technological means existed for the systematic 
flushing of street gutters and canals. The unsanitary conditions 
caused little concern among local officials, who refused to appro-
priate the funds required for sanitation because they were unwilling 
to admit to having been wrong. One of New Orleans's medical au-
thorities actually advanced the theory that large amounts of filth 
and offal in the streets retarded the formation of a yellow fever 
atmosphere. Such sophistry did not stop outsiders from calling the 
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Crescent City "a pesthole," "the wet grave," and "the city that time 
forgot. " 10 
The 1853 New Orleans epidemic started slowly and then swept 
like an angel of death over the stricken city. The first victim expired 
in late May, and others followed. In the beginning the newspapers 
ignored the outbreak, but on June 10 an observer reported an "un-
questionable case" of a child who turned yellow and threw up an 
"unmistakable, old fashioned, coffee-grounds black vomit."11 By 
mid-July, when deaths averaged more than sixty a day, epidemic 
conditions could no longer be ignored. The press slowly acknowl-
edged the danger of the moment. 
A crisis followed in New Orleans, as desperate and perplexed 
medical men, grasping at straws to contain the outbreak, ordered 
the killing of all stray dogs and the quarantining of the slaughter-
house district. During the first week of August the fever, which 
raged with special vehemence in German residential sections, car-
ried away 94 7 victims. A report told of seventy-one bodies at one 
cemetery "piled on the ground, swollen and bursting their coffins, 
and enveloped in swarms of flies." 12 A total of 228 sufferers went 
to their graves on August 8, and on August 21 officials recorded 269 
interments. Death carts went door to door searching for victims, 
and grave diggers were hard to find, even at the high wage of five 
dollars a day. Four hundred cannon shots and the burning of tar 
failed to purify the air. 
New Orleans sanitary workers, particularly those associated 
with the Howard Association, performed heroic service throughout 
a horrible summer in which rain fell almost every day. The affliction 
decimated nearby towns. A dispatch dated September 7 from little 
Thibodauxville on the Great Northern Railway lamented, "Stores 
closed; town abandoned; 151 cases of fever; 22 deaths; postmaster 
absent; clerks all down with the fever." 13 Before the epidemic ran 
its course in late fall as many as 11,000 may have perished in New 
Orleans, and more than 5,000 died of yellow fever in the next two 
summers in and around the city. A local sanitary commission es-
tablished to combat yellow fever recommended improvements in 
the sewerage and an inquiry into the value of quarantine regulations. 
In the end very little was done; no one knew for sure what caused 
yellow fever. 
The growing sectional emergency muted concerns about poten-
tial epidemic conditions. Pressing national problems occupied center 
stage. The troubles that followed the enactment of the Kansas-
Nebraska Act in 1854 starkly illustrated the inability of the federal 
government to solve the problem of the extension of slavery into 
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the territories. With the collapse of the Compromise of 1850, a host 
of sectional issues defied resolution. The Panic of 1857 hit the 
Northeast especially hard, but world cotton prices remained high. 
According to many southern Fire Eaters, the South's good fortune 
demonstrated the superiority of an emerging southern civilization. 
The premise required selective judgments; in 1857 alone at New 
Orleans fifty-eight mercantile houses failed, and trade declined by 
$36 million. A large upward swing in New Orleans during the three 
years prior to 1860 served to cloud affairs further. 
During the economic crisis, New York came in for violent attack 
as the embodiment of all southern grievances against the North. 
"New York," declared an editorial in the Vicksburg Daily Whig on 
the eve of the Civil War, "like a mighty queen of commerce, sits 
proudly upon her island throne sparkling in jewels, and waving an 
undisputed commercial spectre over the South. By means of her 
railroads and navigable streams, she sends out her long arms to the 
extreme South; and with avidity rarely equalled, grasps our gains 
and transfers them to herself-taxing us at every step and depleting 
us as extensively as possible without destroying us."14 Such bombast 
ignored the belief among northern extremists that New York, by 
virtue of its long-standing trade ties, had southern tendencies. Right 
down until the eve of secession, relations between northern and 
southern cities continued to cut across political boundaries. 
The Confederate States of America started with a shattered ur-
ban network. At the outset three of the largest cities in the South 
remained in Union hands. Federal troops secured Washington, which 
had 61,000 people, before the start of hostilities. In May 1861, Union 
soldiers moved into Baltimore (212,400), and President Abraham 
Lincoln soon suspended habeas corpus in the city for the remainder 
of the war. These actions followed clashes between Massachusetts 
troops passing through the Monumental City and local pro-Confed-
erate elements. Louisville (68,000) yielded to Union troops without 
military opposition, as did Kentucky's other important cities: Lex-
ington (9,300), Covington ( 16,500), and Newport ( 10,000). Both Cov-
ington and Newport were right across the Ohio River from 
Cincinnati. The northern actions removed any immediate threat to 
Cincinnati, a possibility much feared by Queen City residents, and 
secured valuable jumping-off points into the C.S.A. St. Louis nearly 
came under Confederate control at least temporarily, but a quick 
military response by U.S. forces prevented Missouri secessionists 
from seizing the city. Without much fanfare, the Union gained a 
tremendous strategic military and economic advantage over its Con-
federate adversary. 
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One could hardly imagine a more inauspicious beginning for the 
Confederacy. Only six cities, as opposed to thirty-nine such cities 
in the North, had as many as 20,000 people. 






New Orleans was the only metropolis in the entire new nation. The 
second biggest municipality, Charleston, actually declined in popu-
lation by 2,500 between 1850 and 1860. Six other Confederate cities 







The Confederacy lost Alexandria, and Wheeling in the first hours 
of hostilities. Five other significant Condererate towns had under 
10,000 residents according to the 1860 census. 
Montgomery 9,800 




When slaves were subtracted, the Confederate cities looked even 
smaller. There were 13,900 human chattels in Charleston, 13,400 
in New Orleans, 11,700 in Richmond, 7, 700 in Savannah, and 7,600 
in Mobile. Nor did the C.S.A. gain many urbanities by persuading 
the western state of Texas to join; the Lone Star's largest cities were 
San Antonio and Galveston, which had respective populations of 
8,200 and 7,300. If the goal of the Fire Eaters was the creation of a 
true agrarian nation, they had come close to success. 
In an age in which cities increasingly stood for wealth and power, 
the Confederacy had to contend with the loss or disruption of the 
upper half of the carefully built southern urban mosaic. The Louis-
ville and Nashville Railroad closed north of Nashville, Atlanta no 
longer functioned as a shipping point for cotton sent north via Chat-
tanooga, and Memphis lost an important downriver trade in mid-
western products. The closure of the Mississippi River especially 
hurt New Orleans. Along the Atlantic seaboard, Savannah, Charles-
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ton, Wilmington, and Norfolk saw the suspension of northeastern 
trade nurtured since colonial days. In addition, the cities lost all the 
advantages associated with membership in the Union, not the least 
of which had been large expenditures for railroad aid and various 
internal improvement projects. Some places entertained hopes that 
increased cotton shipments would more than compensate for any 
short-term losses. Wishful thinkers believed that North American 
trade would return to normal once northerners had accepted south-
ern independence. Richmond leaders, touting the potential of their 
city, gained what they regarded as a considerable plum in June 1861 
when it was designated the Confederate capital, but the northern 
determination to prosecute the war to a conclusion dashed any last 
hopes that the acquisition of the Confederate government could be 
used as a means of realizing an urban advantage. 
The North won by wrecking the South's means of waging war. 
Union strategists never officially adopted Winfield Scott's Anaconda 
plan, which called for constricting the South through a naval block-
ade and dividing it in two by taking the Mississippi River. The actual 
northern assault on the South proved much more comprehensive. 
By the summer of 1863, combined land and sea actions had opened 
the Mississippi River. A gradual tightening of a northern naval block-
ade virtually drove Confederate commerce from the high seas. The 
capture of Fort Pulaski in January 1865 near the mouth of the Cape 
Fear River virtually closed the port of Wilmington and effectually 
ended most significant blockade running. Meanwhile, in the fall of 
1864 William Sherman took Atlanta, began his famous march to 
the sea, and occupied Savannah at the end of December. He then 
moved north through the Carolinas and on into Virginia, while Ulys-
ses S. Grant tied down Robert E. Lee's forces at the approaches to 
Richmond. Lee's surrender on April 9, 1865, marked the end of the 
Confederacy. The experiment in nation building below the Mason 
and Dixon Line had ended in complete failure. 
Four years of Civil War brought hard times to Dixie's cities. 
There was despair and frustration inside New Orleans when the great 
ships of the Union navy, after running the forts at the mouths of 
the Mississippi, anchored off the Crescent City and forced it to sur-
render under the threat of naval bombardment. When the Federals 
laid siege to Vicksburg, the inhabitants were obliged to live in caves 
and eat rats prior to their glorious surrender. A military band sere-
naded Sherman with Italian opera music as he watched his soldiers 
burn Atlanta. Federal fighting men, running amuck, burned and 
pillaged in Columbia. Admiral David Farragut was lashed to the 
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mooring of his flagship, the Hartford, as it and other Federal ships 
swept into Mobile Bay. 
Union troops sang "The Battle Hymn of the Republic" as they 
tramped through otherwise empty streets in occupied Charleston. 
Sleek black-hulled blockade runners loaded cotton at the Wilming-
ton waterfront. Units of the Confederate army put the torch to Rich-
mond's commercial districts during their withdrawal in early April 
1865 so that military stores could not fall into Union hands. The 
flames brought to an end the city's hopes of becoming the great 
center of the C.S.A. The flickering embers were a reminder of the 
vast quantities of blood and treasure expended to protect and defend 
the failed experiment of southern nationalism. 
During the Civil War, southern towns, north and south, enjoyed 
shifting fortunes. None of the places beyond the Confederate orbit 
sustained any appreciable war damage. Louisville flourished 
throughout hostilities as a staging base for northern operations; the 
Louisville and Nashville Railroad carried tremendous amounts of 
military traffic. At Baltimore, a bottleneck caused by a gap between 
railroads running into the city from the Northeast and on to the 
Potomac front generated a tremendous transshipment business. In 
addition, Baltimore contractors made money building military for-
tifications. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad tried to remain neutral 
without success; with shifts in the fortunes of combat, both sides 
used the line and on occasion tore it up. Washington rose in power 
and prestige as the conflict progressed. Alexandria, which suffered 
a serious blow when Union authorities confiscated stacks of rails 
intended for a regional railroad, served as a major Union hospital 
center. Norfolk, which had yet to recover fully from the 1855 yellow 
fever epidemic, lost almost all its trade during the northern occu-
pation. After its fall, Memphis was a center of illicit trade between 
the North and South until Union officials clamped down. Nashville, 
occupied by both Union and Confederate forces, was at different 
moments a storehouse for both sides. 
From the fall of New Orleans to the tightening of the blockade, 
Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, and Mobile garnered a large cot-
ton trade. Augusta, hardly scarred by war, enjoyed considerable eco-
nomic good fortune as both a munitions and convalescence center. 
Atlanta, its population temporarily doubled by refugees, did very 
well until its destruction. 15 Several places, among them Atlanta and 
Richmond, experienced large temporary increases in population. In 
the end, the realities of the fighting and the great issues involved 
came home to all the Confederate cities, including those that ex-
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perienced little or no physical damage. Even places outside the Con-
federacy sustained more injury than was known at the time; the 
struggle ruined traditional hinterlands, ushering in a long period of 
agricultural depression. 
After the war, southern cities that had remained outside the 
Confederacy tried as best they could to emphasis their ties to Dixie. 
Going a step further, a Louisville editor claimed-while taking a 
slap at northern merchants-that his town played a humanitarian 
role in the stricken South. He wrote in the Louisville Journal in 
1867, "First: since the close of the war, our merchants have acted 
toward those of the South in a spirit of truest magnanimity .... This 
generous example has scarcely had one imitator in the opulent cities 
of Cincinnati, Philadelphia, New York, or Boston, whose merchants 
have enjoyed and grown fat on the custom of the South in years 
past. Second: In time of direst adversity the Southern people never 
appealed to our citizens in vain. Louisville was for six or eight 
months the great central storehouse from which the famished thou-
sands in Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, and the other States were 
fed." He omitted to say that Louisville business interests made tre-
mendous amounts of money supplying the Union army. 16 
The occupation governments varied in severity. One of the harsh-
est was that imposed in New Orleans under the rule of controversial 
Massachusetts general and politician Benjamin Butler, whom diarist 
Mary Boykin Chesnut called a "hideous cross-eyed beast."17 Butler 
incurred ill will with inconsistent, sensational, and eccentric deci-
sions. In keeping with his contention that civil government was 
subordinate to the whim of military officers, he arrested prominent 
citizens, suppressed newspapers, seized property, and ordered Epis-
copal clergymen to include in their morning prayers words of praise 
"for the President of the United States and all in civil authority." 
In a notorious affront, he said that any southern white female who 
insulted a Union soldier should "be regarded and held liable to be 
treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation."18 Even his 
well-publicized sanitary program to clean up New Orleans, based 
on his contention that the city's condition threatened the health of 
northern troops, came in for attack. Local leaders considered it un-
necessary and an insult to their town. Butler was an extreme case. 
Nathaniel Banks, his successor in New Orleans, ran a much less 
pugnacious administration. 
The more successful military administrations were rather be-
nign. John W. Geary, a former territorial governor of Kansas, the 
head of the Savannah military government, won the praise of the 
mayor and other leading citizens for his evenhanded rule, as did 
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the evenhanded Union officials who ran Augusta following its oc-
cupation. In Tennessee, Andrew Johnson, appointed military gov-
ernor by Lincoln, had set an important precedent by leaving the city 
governments almost entirely in place. During the ensuing period of 
Military Reconstruction in the South, military commanders, Freed-
men's Bureau commissioners, and other radical regime officials 
often tried to interfere with mayors and councils. In Tennessee the 
governor took over the police departments in Chattanooga, Mem-
phis, and Nashville. 19 Even so, traditions of local control were so 
strong in America that the state Reconstruction governments had 
little direct impact on the art of urban administration. 
Social regulation of newly freed blacks became an important 
concern of white civil governments. While blacks served as mayors 
and aldermen in the Reconstruction South, they never controlled 
an important city for any length of time. 20 In Wilmington, whites 
gerrymandered the city so that each black ward had twice as many 
voters as a corresponding white one. The odious black codes, which 
provided for a wide variety of segregated facilities and institutions, 
never went into full operation because of the enactment of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. Urban race relations, rather casual in the past, 
became strained at the municipal level. In Memphis white mobs 
burned black districts and murdered innocent blacks in broad day-
light simply to reassert white supremacy. Despite such odious ac-
tions, there were some instances of racial accommodation. During 
the Reconstruction period in New Orleans, authorities succeeded 
in desegregating the schools and public transportation. 
Conditions in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, typified more moderate 
white racial attitudes. In the course of 1865, blacks swarmed into 
the city and became a majority, to the alarm of white officials, who 
established a night patrol and strengthened the police department. 
The editor of the Baton Rouge Advocate, expressing the views of 
many whites, said that he longed for a return to the day when even 
minor offenses, such as blacks' use of insulting language, were "set-
tled with a dose of fifteen or twenty lashes." Reestablishing au-
thority over blacks became a goal of whites. By April 1867, at the 
start of Military Reconstruction in East Baton Rouge Parish, civil 
authorities already had racial matters in hand. The Baton Rouge 
municipality had taken the lead in dealing with the "darkies."21 In 
Baton Rouge and elsewhere, well in advance of a legal system of 
segregation, the precedent had been firmly established of using civic 
authority to keep blacks in a subordinate position. 
Railroads were crucial to the recovery of the southern urban 
system. During the conflict the Confederate government converted 
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the few southern rail and iron shops to ordnance production. Con-
federate troops demolished tracks to prevent their use by Union 
forces; Sherman's "bummers" ruined thousands of miles of lines. 
The war saw the destruction of more than half the railroad tracks 
in the South. Estimates of the damage ran as high as $28 million. 
At the start of Reconstruction, southern interests still owned most 
of the afflicted system. The return by the federal government of 
3,000 miles of railroads to the private owners and the sale on liberal 
terms of $11 million in military railroad equipment were of con-
siderable help. State aid, much of it tinged with the corruption of 
carpetbag rule, aided a few lines, but the majority of roads they 
rebuilt as best they could without any outside help. Within five 
years after the war, all except a few insignificant rural lines had 
resumed operation. Still, through the 1870s freight rates in the South 
were twice as high as those in other parts of the country, and during 
the decade southern routes built only 4,000 of 35,000 miles of rail-
roads constructed in the United States. In the aftermath of the Panic 
of 1873, half the railroads in the South either went into receivership 
or defaulted. 
A movement of northern railroad interests into the South added 
a new and important element. Many carpetbag owners, little more 
than small-time pirates, went under, doused by a sea of red ink. The 
powerful Pennsylvania Railroad was another matter; its Southern 
Railway Security Company gained control of eleven trunk lines and 
many other lines before becoming overextended and folding in 1875. 
The Atlantic Coast Line and what ultimately became the Southern 
Railway system evolved from various reorganizations and mergers. 
Other outsiders ventured South. Collis P. Huntington of California 
gained control of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad; the Illinois 
Central Railroad acquired a New Orleans trunk connection. Both 
the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad fell under the domination of northern capitalists.22 It af-
forded little solace to know that the trend toward railroad consoli-
dation was nationwide in scope. To unreconstructed Confederates, 
outside ownership, even if it resulted in better service, was another 
indication that the postwar South was unable to chart its own des-
tiny. The carefully built regional system of antebellum short lines 
designed to move cotton no longer existed. 
Southerners lacked the resources to restore their cities rapidly. 
Columbia, for instance, still showed the scars of war more than a 
decade and a half after Sherman's troops had passed through. In 1879 
New York reporters who toured Dixie found Mobile "dilapidated 
and hopeless," Norfolk "asleep by her magnificent harbor," and life 
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in Savannah and Wilmington "at a standstill." They agreed that, 
"tried by Northern standards, there are only a few cities between 
the Potomac and the Rio Grande that can be said to be growing and 
prospering."23 The depression that followed the Panic of 1873 bore 
down hard on Dixie, as the national economy remained flat until 
the end of the 1870s. 
During the Civil War decade, five of the Confederate states 
underwent a decline in industrial production. In 1880 only three 
states in the entire South-Maryland, Kentucky, and Virginia-
ranked in the top twenty of the thirty-eight states in manufacturing. 
Equally distressing were the consequences of the collapse of the 
plantation economy. The production of all major crops languished. 
Not until 1879 did the number of cotton bales produced surpass 
1859 totals. Fluctuations in cotton prices and changed marketing 
arrangements contributed to a bleak picture. A giant potential post-
war expansion of the cotton market, predicted by experts who made 
the mistake of discounting the importance of the opening of new 
sources of supply in Egypt and India, failed to occur. 24 The emerging 
sharecrop and crop lien systems threatened to keep both white and 
black farmers in permanent poverty. None of these developments 
furthered the creation of prosperous urban hinterlands-so many 
forces buffeted southern cities that the urban network remained in 
disarray throughout Reconstruction. 
During the 1870s still another round of terrible epidemics added 
dimension to the plight of the urban South. In September 1873, right 
at the start of the national depression, yellow fever, cholera, and 
smallpox struck Memphis simultaneously. Out of 7,000 people 
felled by yellow fever, 2,000 died. Of 1,000 cholera victims, 276 
perished. Smallpox raged among the black population. More than 
half the 40,000 inhabitants temporarily fled town. Next, in 1878 a 
massive yellow fever outbreak afflicted the lower Mississippi River 
valley. In Memphis, a quarantine did not prevent 19,500 persons 
from leaving. Of those forced to stay, 17,600 contracted yellow fever. 
In all, 5,200 succumbed to the dreaded disease. New Orleans was 
almost as hard hit; the official death toll reached 4,046. These di-
sasters, compounded by another yellow jack scourge in Memphis 
the following year that claimed 500 victims, spurred reform efforts.25 
Memphis and New Orleans responded differently. Memphis au-
thorities accepted the results of an investigation by a new federal 
agency, the National Board of Health, which attributed the city's 
troubles to poor sanitary facilities. Memphis had virtually no sewers 
outside the business district, and filth from open gutters accumu-
lated in adjacent bayous. Memphis adopted and carried through on 
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a sewerage plan proposed by George Waring, Jr., a prominent member 
of the National Board of Health. Waring, a "noncontagionist" who 
rejected the "germ theory" of disease, steadfastly argued that "sewer 
gas" and other odors caused disease. Because he believed that lethal 
vapors accumulated in large outlet sewers, he called for "separate 
systems" of sewers for ground runoff, household wastes, and human 
excreta. His fellow board members claimed that Memphis would 
soon "become one of the healthiest cities in the valley of the Mis-
sissippi."26 They did not mention the fact that the cause of yellow 
fever remained a mystery. 
As for New Orleans, Dr. Samuel Choppin, president of the Lou-
isiana board of health, remarked, "Undoubtedly the most impressive 
lesson of the great epidemic of 1878, to the people of this city, was 
the importance of improving its sanitary condition."27 The contin-
ued drain on the Crescent City's population, plus the demands by 
northern health experts that it be placed under a permanent quar-
antine, led to concerted efforts at reform. The Auxiliary Sanitary 
Association, a new organization that was primarily privately fi-
nanced, directed a massive cleanup campaign. Potential business 
losses rather than human costs brought about the first tentative 
steps in a locally supported program of sanitary reform. Concern 
about health matters constituted another problem with which 
southern urban leaders had to contend in rebuilding the section's 
urban components. 
During a period of defeat and humiliation for Dixie, articulate 
spokesmen came forward to promulgate a creed designed to allow 
the South to regain its place in the Union quickly. Right after the 
war, J.D.B. DeBow, reiterating a view he had enunciated prior to 
hostilities, wrote, "We have got to go to manufacturing to save 
ourselves. We have got to go to it to obtain an increase in population. 
Workmen go to furnaces, mines, and factories-they go where labor 
is brought."28 In the 1870s agitation for an urban and industrial 
South intensified. By the end of the decade the New South creed 
had emerged. 
Several of the leaders of the movement were journalists, in-
cluding Henry Watterson of the Louisville Courier-Journal, Richard 
Edmonds of the Baltimore Manufacturers' Record, and, above all, 
Henry Grady of the Atlanta Constitution. They called for welcom-
ing northern capital to build up southern society. North of the Ma-
son and Dixon Line they told potential northern investors what they 
wanted to hear, that the Civil War changed attitudes and that white 
southerners regarded northerners as brothers under a single flag. The 
South was said to offer unparalleled opportunities for those willing 
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to take advantage of them. Race was supposedly no longer an issue. 
Speaking of blacks, Grady wrote, "The love we feel for that race you 
cannot measure nor comprehend."29 Conversely, the New South 
advocates had little trouble convincing southerners that they had 
been ruthlessly exploited by generations of northerners. Now they 
predicted that an influx of northern money would enable the South 
to achieve independence by acquiring new factories and transpor-
tation systems without having to pay for them. Everyone had some-
thing to gain from the changed conditions. 
The concept of the New South moved its spokesmen to extrav-
agant praise. Grady conjured up visions of a harmonious, stable, and 
prosperous South. He said, "I see a South the home of fifty million 
people; her cities vast hives of industry; her country-sides the trea-
sures from which their resources are drawn; her streams vocal with 
whirring spindles; her valleys tranquil in the white and gold of the 
harvest ... ,sunshine everywhere and all the time, and night falling 
on her gently as wings of the unseen dove."30 Edmonds, extolling 
the Southland, proclaimed, "The more we contemplate these ad-
vantages and contrast them with those of all other countries, the 
more deeply will we be impressed with the unquestionable truth 
that here in this glorious land, 'Creation's Garden Spot,' is to be the 
richest and greatest country upon which the sun ever shone."31 Wat-
terson bluntly stated, "The South, having had its bellyful of blood, 
has gotten a taste of money, and it is too busy trying to make more 
of it to quarrel with anybody."32 Glory awaited all who wanted to 
help the South attain its destiny. 
The men of the New South creed talked much differently about 
the race issue before southern audiences from the way they spoke 
in addressing northerners. "But the supremacy of the white race in 
the South must be maintained forever, and the domination of the 
negro race resisted at all hazards, because the white race is the su-
perior race," Grady declared before a group of white supremacists. 
"This is the declaration of no new truth; it has abided forever in the 
marrow of our bones and shall run forever in the blood that feeds 
Anglo-Saxon hearts."33 Edmonds, who wrote movingly about the 
"progressive evolution" of blacks "from the darkness of slavery into 
the fullness of freedom," accepted the concept of white racial su-
periority. He claimed that the economic plans of "white men" would 
be realized by using the "strong muscles of industrious negroes."34 
Watterson, a bitter opponent of the Ku Klux Klan, thought that 
freedmen needed the protection of their former owners. In print he 
actually called blacks "barbarians" and "ignorant and degraded" peo-
ple hardly removed from African jungles.35 Here was a difficulty 
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with the New South creed. A New South resembling that extolled 
by Grady, Watterson, Edmonds, and their colleagues necessitated 
changing and moderating the racial attitudes of the region and its 
leaders. Until attitudes altered, Dixie would remain apart from the 
rest of America. 
The men of the New South creed came forward at a dark moment 
to paint pictures of castles in the sky that uplifted the spirits of their 
fellow southerners. Even those who rejected their call for northern 
capital were moved by their visions of a restored South. The New 
South spokesmen did not dwell on failure. Rather, they talked of 
the wonderful days that lay ahead. They were keepers of the faith-
honorable heirs to southerners' ambivalence regarding the kind of 
cities they wanted. Keeping the dream of progress alive was of special 
concern as Reconstruction drew to a close and a new chapter in the 
life of the South was about to unfold. In no small measure, the course 
of urban development would decide the fate of Dixie over the next 
several decades. 
4 
THE ADVENT OF TI-IE 
NEW SOUTH 
The purveyors of the New South creed claimed that a combination 
of southern managers and northern money had the capacity to de-
velop cities quickly. After all, Chicago, not even incorporated until 
1834, had made dramatic progress. Its population grew from 30,000 
in 1850 to 503,200 in 1880, making it the fourth largest city in the 
nation and the fastest growing place in the world. There seemed no 
reason why well-established southern cities, some with roots 
stretching back into the colonial period, could not grow in similar 
fashion. Nevertheless, while Henry Grady and other New South 
leaders talked in broad sectional terms, they actually sought to pro-
mote their own cities at the expense of rival communities. 
Even though the concept of the New South received widespread 
support, it never constituted a coordinated movement with clearly 
stated objectives. Working at cross-purposes was not necessarily 
counterproductive; urban rivalry had been a constant theme in the 
American experience. The South's largest problem was an age-old 
one-it did not have the resources to develop an urban network on 
the same scale as that in other parts of the nation. The men of the 
New South creed, like J.D.B. DeBow in earlier times, talked around 
the situation, substituting rhetoric for specific programs. Southern 
cities attracted some outside capital, but to northern investors the 
South remained a sideshow. More concretely, urban promoters in 
Dixie were unable to overcome the realities of the depressed state 
of agriculture in the South. A subservient relationship to outside 
banking interests further complicated matters. Dixie's cities grew 
in the 1880s, although far from the extent predicted by New South 
advocates. In a decade that proved crucial in shaping the American 
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Table 4. National and Southern Places Compared by Size and Place, 
1880 
Population Size 
Places over 4,000 
Places over 10,000 
Places over 20,000 
Places over 100,000 















urban mosaic for many years to come, the South fared poorly. Con-
sequently, many people became reconciled to the dismal reality that 
there was no way that the region could quickly regain a position of 
distinction in the American Union. 
The 1880 census, which surveyed the nation at a crucial cross-
over point as an older rural society gave way to a new industrial 
one, raised important questions about southern urban prospects. At 
that date, when the South consisted of all the states of the old Con-
federacy except Texas, plus Maryland, Kentucky, and the District 
of Columbia, the census data showed a serious erosion of the sec-
tion's urban status in the United States. Between 1870 and 1880, 
cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants increased in the country 
as a whole from 165 to 227 but only from 26 to 30 in the South. 
Other 1880 demographic statistics also reflect the South's urban 
plight, as illustrated by Table 4. The figures, which show Dixie 
lagging far behind the rest of the nation, reflected developments 
outside the South-the building of a great railroad network, the 
exploitation of mineral and timber resources, the growth of medium-
sized industrial and agricultural centers, and the consolidation of 
markets by regional metropolises. Considering the depressed con-
ditions that followed the Panic of 1873, progress seemed amazing. 
Advocates of the New South creed were right to extol the region's 
potential. Unfortunately, possible investors not only worried about 
their welcome but weighed their chances of making more money 
elsewhere. With profits in the range cattle industry said to average 
more than 40 percent per annum and speculative mining stocks 
seeming to offer unlimited returns, few plungers expressed more 
than a passing interest in the South. 
In 1880 the best product the South had to market was an urban 
network of thirty cities with more than 10,000 people (see Table 5), 
an important demographic crossing point in the Gilded Age. The old 
Atlantic coastal towns had histories that reflected faded glories and 
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Table 5. Southern Cities over 10,000 in 1880 
City Total Population City Total Population 
Alabama Maryland 
Mobile 29,132 Baltimore 332,213 
Montgomery 16,713 Cumberland 10,693 
Arkansas Mississippi 
Little Rock 13,138 Vicksburg 18,814 
Dist. of Columbia North Carolina 
Georgetown 12,578 Wilmington 17,350 
Washington 147,293 
Georgia South Carolina 
Atlanta 37,409 Charleston 49,984 
Augusta 21,891 Columbia 10,036 
Columbus 10,123 
Macon 12,749 Tennessee 
Savannah 30,709 Chattanooga 12,892 
Memphis 33,592 
Kentucky Nashville 43,350 
Covington 29,720 
Lexington 16,656 Virginia 
Louisville 123,758 Alexandria 13,659 
Newport 20,433 Lynchburg 15,959 
Norfolk 21,966 
Louisiana Petersburg 21,056 
New Orleans 216,090 Portsmouth 11,390 
Richmond 63,600 
renewed hopes. Baltimore remained the South's largest commercial 
and industrial city. Since the Civil War, Washington had more than 
doubled in size, primarily because of the growth of the federal gov-
ernment. Washington simply overwhelmed the nearby communi-
ties of Georgetown and Alexandria. Norfolk's prospects seemed 
bright; in 1880, as often in its history, prosperity seemed just around 
the corner. Neighboring Portsmouth remained a satellite city. Wil-
mington faced the age-old problem of trying to develop a hinterland. 
Charleston continued to experience a genteel decline in status; Sa-
vannah had aggressive leaders and few resources. In the old Virginia 
back country, Richmond was the largest city, while Lynchburg and 
Petersburg had emerged as factory centers. In South Carolina, Co-
lumbia hoped to recover from the war by attracting industry to its 
impressive Congaree River waterpower. Augusta, long a major trans-
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portation hub, appeared on the verge of acquiring an important 
manufacturing dimension. The largest cities in the old New West 
were Louisville and Nashville, as they had been from the earliest 
days of settlement. Cumberland, Maryland, one of the first settle-
ments on the western side of the Appalachians, was a railroad di-
vision point. Lexington had been eclipsed by Louisville; Covington 
and Newport had grown because of their proximity to Cincinnati. 
Along the Gulf coast, Mobile continued to function as a significant 
cotton-shipping port and railroad terminal. The metropolis of the 
lower South remained New Orleans. Although the Crescent City 
had failed to fulfill the predictions that it would be the greatest city 
in North America, it continued to function as one of the nation's 
most important ports. Some of the places on the edges of the South 
appeared old and beaten down; others continued to have fairly good 
prospects. 
The hopes of the postwar South rested with the central river and 
railroad cities, most of which had just started to grow in the years 
immediately before the war. In 1880 these places, ravaged by the 
vicissitudes of hostilities and hurt by the destruction of the old 
agricultural system, remained virtual frontier communities, whose 
prospects required evaluation according to different standards from 
those used for the older and more established southern cities. Two 
of the new towns, Columbus and Macon, wanted to expand their 
roles as cotton-processing centers. Vicksburg progressed slowly; Lit-
tle Rock was the only place of importance in an underdeveloped 
area. Chattanooga and Montgomery intended to grow as industrial 
centers. Memphis had been hurt by terrible epidemics. Atlanta, after 
making a swift recovery from the Civil War, looked ahead to achiev-
ing metropolitan status. The odds were long against building an 
urban empire from this group of cities, but optimistic entrepreneurs 
believed the southern interior towns had chances as promising as 
those of their counterparts in the golden West. In 1880 Los Angeles 
had only 11,200 people, San Diego 2,600, and Seattle 3,500. Oppor-
tunities to build cities persisted in the United States. 
The band of men who promoted a South of cities and industry 
emphasized the supposed opportunities in what one of their number 
praised as "the coming El Dorado of American adventure." Henry 
Grady claimed in 1884 that the South had surpassed the trans-
Mississippi West as a land of opportunity. "The time will come," 
he said, "when there will be an amendment to the shibboleth, 'West-
ward the hand of empire holds its sway.' " 1 Unfortunately, actual 
conditions in Dixie were somewhat unpromising. The South entered 
the 1880s with an agricultural system unsuited to the needs of a 
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free market; land barons and country merchants presided over a 
fragmented economy in which sharecropping and crop liens stifled 
individual enterprise. The dominant agricultural groups were sym-
pathetic to the needs of the commercial interests that had long 
charted affairs in the cities. After all, the country and town com-
binations had marketing ties stretching back to antebellum days. 
Unfortunately a desire to improve conditions was not enough to 
bring about significant changes. The traditionally limited functions 
of almost all of the southern towns precluded any rapid advances. 
As previously noted, the section had cities geared to the needs 
of a plantation economy based upon King Cotton. In the wake of 
Reconstruction, the postwar southern leaders had little to sell po-
tential outside investors except dreams. For better or worse, cities 
could make the South more like the rest of the nation. They func-
tioned as a common denominator that overrode sectional consid-
erations, but there seemed little necessity for more of them in the 
South. For the moment the main task was to shore up the existing 
urban network. Under the circumstances, even that task was not 
going to be easy. Of course, the men of the New South creed could 
not admit that the South had little need for more cities; they had 
to put their best foot forward and claim, as Grady did in 1886 in a 
speech before northeastern businessmen, "Somehow or other we 
have caught the sunshine in the bricks and mortar of our homes, 
and have builded therein one ignoble prejudice or memory."2 
Grady preached his doctrines of a changed South during an urban 
boom in America, for the 1880s saw the completion of the basic 
elements in the nation's urban network. Many established places 
added large numbers of inhabitants. During the decade Chicago grew 
by more than 500,000 people and New York by 250,000. On the edge 
of the Great Plains, Kansas City and Omaha emerged as regional 
metropolises, fueled by huge amounts of outside capital, as the rapid 
settlement of the central plains led to countless opportunities in 
agribusiness. Even greater riches awaited on the Pacific coast. San 
Francisco was a dynamic and flourishing city. One of the largest 
land booms of the nineteenth century was under way in Los Angeles, 
where thousands of speculators threw money to the wind; some lots 
changed hands several times in a single day. In the Pacific North-
west, the arrival of eastern rails touched off a spiral of land specu-
lation. Tacoma, Seattle, and Everett vied with one another for 
control of the Puget Sound region. A spirit of progress was abroad 
from Maine to California. Under the auspices of a series of overtly 
probusiness presidential administrations, the country appeared 
about to become an urban and industrial society. 
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The continual rise of New York had followed almost naturally; 
the city's business community had emerged stronger than ever from 
the Panic of 18 73. In a period marked by the consolidation of wealth, 
the money power was centralized as never before in the Empire City. 
Great investment banking houses benefited from a wave of mergers 
and stock transactions that made trusts and monopolies an integral 
part of economic life. In many ways, the worst fears of antebellum 
southern statesmen had materialized, but with the South in an in-
ferior position and agrarianism vanquished, little could be done to 
check the concentration of wealth in New York. The attacks on 
Wall Street by Populist ora tors in Kansas and Nebraska had a familiar 
sound; the message had been heard before south of the Mason and 
Dixon Line. 
Of course, any attempt to obtain outside capital on a vast scale 
meant going hat in hand to New York banking interests, because 
no one else had access to the sums of money necessary to direct the 
course of national development. Thus when Grady and others asked 
investors to come south, they were in effect promoting New York 
domination, a historic turn of events in Dixie. For understandable 
reasons, supporters of the New South creed, when speaking inside 
their section, glossed over the need for New York capital and instead 
emphasized that southern whites had taken the lead in rebuilding 
their defeated land. 
The extent to which southern communities could integrate into 
a nation of cities was of vital significance for the section's future. 
As an urban society cut sharply across old sectional barriers, eco-
nomic integration was only one aspect of a larger whole. If cities in 
the South differed radically in character from those elsewhere, they 
might not fit in, and the New South creed would die at birth. If it 
did, the section might find itself permanently reduced to colonial 
status. Therefore, the social statistics of southern cities took on new 
importance. Numbers and percentages concerning a wide variety of 
subjects, ranging from the incidence of immigrants to school at-
tendance, registered the state of urban progress in the South by show-
ing what southern cities were like and where they stood in relation 
to the rest of America. 
Between 1870 and 1880 the population of the United States rose 
from 36.6 million to 50.2 million, an increase of 26 percent. In 1880 
there were 14.2 million southerners, accounting for 28 percent of 
the people in the country. In character Dixie's population differed 
sharply from that elsewhere. Of the nation's 6.6 million blacks, 6 
million, or 83 percent, lived in the South. Conversely, the South 
contained only 306,000 of the country's 6. 7 million foreign born, 
THE ADVENT OF THE NEW SOUTH 75 
for a total of 5 percent. These figures alone set the South apart. Of 
all southerners, 39 percent were black and 2 percent foreign born. 
No southern state had a foreign-born population of more than 10 
percent. In the rest of the United States, fewer than 1 percent of the 
people were black and 19 percent foreign born. Southern leaders, 
ignoring the presence of blacks, liked to claim that the section's 
population was homogeneous, a statement which failed to reflect 
conditions accurately. 
The demographic profiles of the thirty southern cities with more 
than 10,000 people in 1880 did not fit into any neat category. A 
total of 1.4 million inhabitants, 10 percent of the southern popu-
lation, lived in such places. These municipalities differed from the 
South as a whole in that blacks accounted for 31 percent of the urban 
populace and foreign born for 13 percent. Indeed, 61 percent of all 
immigrants in the South lived in the thirty cities, compared with 
only 8 percent of the blacks. Oppressive legislation made it hard for 
black sharecroppers to leave the land. Cities had attracted most of 
the foreigners who settled in the South since before the Civil War. 
Yet in ethnic composition the South's cities were unlike their coun-
terparts throughout the rest of the United States. Most of the 197 
cities of more than 10,000 outside the South had insignificant num-
bers of blacks, and roughly 30 percent of their populations were 
foreign born. Being white supremacists, none of the New South sup-
porters emphasized the racial mix in southern cities, although they 
had no choice except to recognize that the future of the South rested 
upon the shoulders of city people. 
Absolute numbers provided another way of considering the 
populations of southern cities. In 1880 fifteen of the thirty largest 
cities had more than 10,000 blacks.3 The most were the 57,000 in 
New Orleans, the 53JOO in Baltimore, and the 48,400 in Washing-
ton. Only three northern cities had more than 10,000 blacks: Phila-
delphia (31JOO), St. Louis (22,300L and New York (20,000). As for 
foreign-born, thirty-nine places in the nation had more than 10,000 
immigrants. The South had but four of those communities: Balti-
more (56)00), New Orleans (41,200), Louisville (23,200), and Wash-
ington (14,200). While the numbers represented large concentrations 
of people, they hardly compared to the totals in the seven American 
cities with more than 100,000 immigrants, which included 593,500 
alone in the New York-Brooklyn area. The fewest immigrants in the 
southern cities were 294 in Columbus and 338 in Columbia; the 
lowest black totals were 315 in Newport and 391 in Cumberland. 
Obviously, in these demographic respects southern cities differed 
from the rest of urban America. 
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In 1880 a total of 146,000 of the 182,000 foreign born in the 
thirty municipalities of 10,000 or more in the South lived in the 
eight largest cities of the section.4 The greatest number of foreign 
born in the eight cities, people who had come from Germany, Ire-
land, and Great Britain, accounted for 80 percent of the urban im-
migrants. Baltimore had the most British-born residents, or about 
3,000. The only other cities with more than a thousand were New 
Orleans, Washington, and Louisvillei in spite of claims that the 
South personified the best of Anglo-Saxon civilization, the region's 
cities had attracted few Englishmen. The majority of Irish immi-
grants lived in the North, where between 15 and 20 percent of the 
inhabitants of New York, Boston, and Chicago were from the Old 
Sod. Seventeen places outside the South had more than 10,000 Irish 
immigrants. Even so, there were considerable congregations in 
Dixie: 14,200 in Baltimore and 11,700 in New Orleans. Although 
the Midwest contained more than half the Germans in the nation, 
Baltimore had 34,100, or 10 percent of all the people in the Monu-
mental City. In addition, the 13,900 Germans in New Orleans and 
13,500 in Louisville represented large totals by comparison with 
many other places in the nation. 
New Orleans continued to have a reputation as a cosmopolitan 
city. It had 6,900 French-born residents, more than any city except 
New York, which had 9,900. With 2,000 Italians, New Orleans had 
proportionally the most people of that nationality in the country. 
Native resentment of them was indicated in official Louisiana state 
documents, which called them "Dagos," and by the 1891 lynching 
of Italians in New Orleans. Overall, the increasing number of im-
migrants in the large southern cities had the subtle effect of gradu-
ally changing their character and making them more like localities 
outside the section. 
The 1880 statistics indicated that both black and white popu-
lations of the eight largest southern cities had been born close to 
home. A total of 90 percent of the people in Richmond were born 
in Virginiai 89 percent of all Charlestonians were from South Car-
olina. Their own states had contributed between 70 and 80 percent 
of the populations of Atlanta, Nashville, Baltimore, and New Or-
leans. Some 74 percent of all Washingtonians were from the District 
of Columbia, Maryland, or Virginia. Louisville, even though right 
across the Ohio River from Indiana, still counted 67 percent of its 
inhabitants as Kentucky natives. None of the other fifty largest cities 
in the country had such provincial population characteristics. More-
over, only two Dixie cities had more than a thousand persons who 
had been born more than one southern state away. More interesting 
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were the statistics for migrants from outside the South, which 
showed that only the four metropolises contained more than a thou-
sand northerners. Baltimore, for example, had 7,000 Pennsylvanians 
and 3,000 New Yorkers. More typical figures were the 24 Wiscon-
sinites in Atlanta, the 86 Rhode Islanders in Atlanta, and the 3 Ne-
braskans in Nashville. 
The New South advocates used religion to buttress their creed. 
Grady claimed, "The South is American and religious," asserting 
that "God-fearing people" supported the "old fashion" by according 
equal honor to God and the U.S. Constitution.5 In 1890 the U.S. 
census office took what officials claimed was the nation's first sci-
entifically conducted religious enumeration. It indicated that the 17 
southern cities of the 124 cities in the nation with populations of 
more than 25,000 had many religious organizations, numerous 
houses of worship, much valuable property, and substantial mem-
bership counts. Of special significance were the figure for church 
members as a percentage of total population; there was a marked 
difference between rural and urban areas. The national average for 
urban communicants was 38 percent; the percentage for the United 
States as a whole stood at 45 percent. Only three of the southern 
cities had lower percentages of communicants than the nation as a 
whole. Membership statistics, of course, were far from exact as mea-
surements. Still, the totals reflected the strong strain of religiosity 
in the late nineteenth-century urban South. 
In 1890 totals for the seventeen largest southern cities reflected 
the diversity of religion in America. In eight cities, Roman Catholics 
accounted for 10 percent or more of the total population and in three 
cities for more than 20 percent: New Orleans (28 percent), Covington 
(27 percent), and Louisville (21 percent). The totals for Protestant 
groups followed sectional trends. Regular Baptists accounted for 
more than 10 percent of the city dwellers in the seventeen cities. 
Six places were between 5 and 10 percent Southern Methodist. Col-
ored Methodists made up 30 percent of Mobile and 12 percent of 
Charleston residents. The biggest percentages of Methodist Epis-
copals were the 6 percent in Charleston, of Episcopalians the 5 per-
cent in Mobile, and of Southern Presbyterians the 3 percent in 
Mobile. Of the people in nine of the towns, 1 to 4 percent had a 
Jewish affiliation; the largest number was 3,500 in Baltimore. In 
addition to the main-line denominations, a variety of Pentecostal 
and other groups contributed to the richness of southern urban re-
ligion.6 The reality was far different from the propaganda used to 
further secular causes. 
In the course of Reconstruction, officials sought to rekindle in-
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terest in education. A basic problem was that hardly any money was 
available. In the 1870s, Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina all 
temporarily closed their public school systems. In 1880 school sta-
tistics for the thirty largest southern cities told a depressing story. 
Only the four largest cities spent more than $100,000 during the 
year, while thirteen towns expended less than $30,000. Generally, 
student-teacher ratios in the city schools were at least 60 to 1. For 
blacks the ratio was frequently as high as 100 to 1. Inadequate fa-
cilities made the situation bleaker. Many schoolhouses were poorly 
maintained converted sheds or private homes. Overcrowding was a 
frequent problem. Atlanta authorities tried to alleviate matters by 
giving white students priority over blacks; Savannah officials insti-
tuted an automatic promotion policy. The courses of instruction 
minimized so-called frills. Mobile students studied basics: orthog-
raphy, reading, writing, grammar, geography, and arithmetic. Few 
places had foreign language, music, or physical education programs. 
The educational system challenged only a small number of students. 
Not surprisingly, daily attendance, poor everywhere, was usually 
under 50 percent. 7 
Developments in urban higher education in 1880 appeared much 
more promising, even though many of the leading institutions had 
few students, few faculty members, and few books. Enrollments 
varied from 524 at Baltimore City College to 15 at Washington's 
Howard University. The libraries of several institutions contained 
fewer than 2,000 volumes. The Johns Hopkins University, the most 
prestigious in the South, had 159 students, 33 faculty members, and 
9,000 library books.8 Southern higher education represented an im-
portant sectional asset, but a few small, elitist institutions exerted 
disproportionate influence. With their predominantly classical cur-
ricula, they appeared bastions of conservative thought rather than 
breeding grounds for change. 
A growing sense of urbanity continued to characterize the south-
ern cities at the dawn of the early metropolitan era. While business 
interests continued to dominate affairs and obvious ethnic, racial, 
sexual, and class differences remained, the gradual emergence of a 
small middle class and of a shared set of values among city people 
gave rise to a distinctive urban culture. The city, both individualistic 
and communal, forced people to share experiences. Even reclusive 
urbanities had to venture forth to shop with others in department 
and specialty stores. Daily newspapers carried a wide range of ma-
terials on all aspects of life in the city and concentrated on business, 
human interest, disaster, crime, and political topics. 
Other shared experiences served to set city folk apart from their 
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country brethren. Horse racing at Churchill Downs, Pimlico, and 
other great tracks attracted thousands of spectators. The theater was 
a uniquely urban phenomenon. All towns had their "red light" en-
tertainment districts; none was so well known as the French Quarter 
and Storyville in New Orleans. Stylish restaurants and ornate tav-
erns were peculiar to the urban scene. Cities stimulated the fine 
arts to such an extent that most music, painting, and literature was 
born in an urban setting. Although the city had the capacity to bring 
out the worst in human beings, it could also bring out the best. The 
passage of time threw the urban cultural trends of the Gilded Age 
into high relief. Reformer Frederic C. Howe concluded, "The modern 
city marks an epoch in our civilization. Through it, a new society 
has been created. Life in all its relations has been altered. A new 
civilization has been born, a civilization whose identity with the 
past is one of historical continuity only. We but dimly appreciate 
the full import of this fact. And yet, it is more significant, possibly 
more pregnant for the future than any previous political or social 
change."9 
The great currents of industrialism that transformed the United 
States almost missed the South. In 1880 the backbone of manufac-
turing in the South lay in sixteen cities that ranked among the 
hundred largest in the United States. The only places in the top 
twenty in value of products were Baltimore (eight) and Louisville 
(seventeen). The total value of products for the sixteen cities 
amounted to about $200 million. More than half were in Baltimore 
($78.4 million) and Louisville ($25.4 million). By comparison, the 
value of products for the three largest American industrial centers 
alone exceeded $1 billion. 
Capitalization figures were of considerable interest in deter-
mining the state of southern industrial progress. Of the $130 million 
invested in southern manufacturing, $100 million was in the sixteen 
largest municipalities. The only southern cities with an industrial 
capitalization of more than $9 million were Baltimore ($36.6 mil-
lion) and Louisville ($21.8 million). Statistics for other towns indi-
cated a pattern of many small and undercapitalized firms. New 
Orleans claimed 915 manufacturing establishments valued at $8.6 
million. Atlanta's 196 factories had a capitalization of $2.5 million. 
Agribusiness was the major sectional industrial pursuit. In Baltimore 
more than $8 million was invested in flour milling, fertilizer pro-
cessing, tobacco making, and meat packing. Richmond had five flour 
mills valued at $1.2 million. Capital in Augusta's six cotton mills 
amounted to $1.4 million. 
The South lacked heavy industry. The only concentrations of 
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machine shops and foundries, basic to the operation of an industrial 
economy, were $6 million worth of establishments in New Orleans, 
Richmond, Baltimore, and Louisville. Covington, Newport, and Bal-
timore each had iron and steel mills with a total value of $3 mil-
lion. 10 Rapid change seemed possible, as evidenced by developments 
in the heart of the coal and iron district in Alabama. New iron 
furnaces at Birmingham, not even founded until 1871, prompted 
rapid growth. Unfortunately, a whole series of Birminghams would 
have been needed to build an industrial empire in the South. Without 
a dramatic rise in the South's industrial capitalization, there seemed 
no quick way for the section to gain parity on a national level. 
The actual task of driving Dixie ahead fell to urban business 
leaders all across the South, many of whom thought in much broader 
terms than simply a single city. Some of the most masterful capi-
talists in the South were from the North. Henry Morrison Flagler 
of Cleveland, Ohio, a former Rockefeller partner, played a major role 
in opening up Florida and William D. ("Pig Iron") Kelley of Penn-
sylvania was instrumental in building up the Alabama iron and steel 
industry. The greatest native southern industrialist was James Bu-
chanan Duke of Durham, North Carolina, who turned a small to-
bacco company founded by his father into one of the largest trusts 
of the period, the American Tobacco Company. He took advantage 
of technological breakthroughs in cigarette production, and he 
achieved success through a combination of ability, comparative free-
dom from government regulation, and methods that his competitors 
considered ruthless. The South had many businessmen of stature 
ready to take the risks necessary to achieve success. The leaders of 
the Wilmington firm of Alexander Sprunt and Son used innovative 
methods to transform the overseas cotton-exporting business. They 
engaged in considerable experimentation and endured hardships that 
would have deterred lesser risk takers. E.H. Summers built the New 
Orleans cotton firm of Hillford, Summers and Company into a major 
enterprise. In Columbus, a locally owned cotton mill, the Columbus 
Manufacturing Company, employed hundreds of women and chil-
dren. More than 2,000 operators worked in Petersburg's eight cotton 
manufacturies. 11 
Depressed agricultural conditions tended to vitiate many of the 
manufacturing advances. The sorry state of southern farming and 
the continued dependence on outside capital precluded the spectac-
ular gains envisioned by the proponents of the New South creed. 
Although all the southern states had probusiness governments, it 
was simply not enough for Dixie's entrepreneurs to master what 
Grady called "the great commercial chessboard."12 
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Little help came from southern urban governments. The Gilded 
Age, generally an unhappy period for American city halls, witnessed 
much graft and corruption. One of the worse scandals occurred in 
Washington. Alexander Shepherd, a Ulysses S. Grant appointee, was 
accused of distributing lavish patronage and construction contracts. 
He once reported to a congressional committee expenditures for a 
project of $6.6 million when actual costs amounted to $18.9 million. 
Before leaving for Mexico, Shepherd left behind a significant legacy. 
Upon completion of physical renovations that he supported, Wash-
ington emerged as one of the country's most beautiful and livable 
cities. 13 Unfortunately, few other places had the resources to follow 
the standards set in Washington. 
Statistics for 1880 indicated that almost all the South's largest 
towns were in poor financial shape. The high costs associated with 
Reconstruction and a concurrent reluctance on the part of municipal 
authorities to assess property at its true valuation and to establish 
adequate tax bases were partly responsible. The state of Dixie's 
economy made the taxes far harder to bear than in the more pros-
perous portions of urban America. Outstanding bonded debts added 
to the tax burdens in the cities of the South. The District of Colum-
bia's debt, the nation's largest, amounted to $21.7 million. Balti-
more's $20.2 million debt and those of New Orleans and Louisville, 
$15.3 million and $8.1 million respectively, were also discourag-
ing.14 Twelve other southern cities had bonded debts of more than 
$1 million. Outstanding bonded debts reflected the need to fund 
floating debts and to refund old debts. At least nineteen cities had 
yet to pay off bonds issued for railroads or other transportation 
schemes. As cities broadened their functions, urban leaders had to 
resort to bond issues to stay afloat. There was no way communities 
in the South could finance large, necessary, and expensive projects, 
such as sewerages and waterworks, without increasing their bonded 
indebtedness. In many cases, however, faced with health and sani-
tation crises, they had no choice but to do so, hoping that user fees 
collected over several decades would eventually pay off the bonds. 
It remained a major goal of southern city fathers to improve the 
quality of life. Several of the park systems in the South predated a 
national City Beautiful movement that caught the interest of the 
general public in the 1850s with the planning of Central Park in 
New York. By 1880 Savannah's committee on parks had spent 
$20,000 to improve parks, twenty-three of which were 1-acre squares 
at intersections that in some cases had been part of James Ogle-
thorpe's original plan. The city of Charleston owned 33 acres of 
public grounds and intended to acquire an additional 20 acres. The 
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Battery at the harbor's edge featured tree-shaded walks and benches. 
In Atlanta, the 5-acre City Hall Park was the centerpiece of the city's 
312-acre park system. Macon's Central City Park had a total space 
of 720 acres. Donated to the municipality by the state and designed 
by a former Macon mayor, it contained a large stand of trees, a 
racetrack, and a fairgrounds building. Of New Orleans's 660 acres 
of public squares, the most famous was the original main square. 
Renamed Jackson Square, its distinguishing attribute was an im-
posing equestrian statue of Andrew Jackson. 15 
Baltimore and Washington had the South's largest park systems. 
The Monumental City had many park squares with statues of fa-
mous people. After the Civil War, Frederick Law Olmsted, consid-
ered the leading American park designer, planned Baltimore's 693-
acre Druid Park. An imposing stone gateway served as the main 
entrance. Visitors could savor the park's various attractions by driv-
ing over twenty miles of winding roads. Druid Lake, actually a water 
reservoir, featured a fountain that sent a jet of water a hundred feet 
into the air. Nearby, herds of deer and flocks of sheep ranged over 
the grassy hillside. In Washington, great improvements included the 
upgrading and extension of the park system. Pierre L'Enfant's plan 
had set aside numerous desirable locations for parks and for public 
and government buildings. Some property was sold or given away; 
the rest, amounting to 513 acres, remained in federal hands. Much 
of the land served as the grounds for government buildings, including 
the Capitol and the White House. Manicured lawns, beautiful flower 
gardens, and winding walks added to the beauty of Washington, as 
did the numerous squares and circles that graced different parts of 
the city. Outlying intersections contained unimproved spaces des-
ignated as triangular reservations. Numerous opportunities existed 
to honor American heroes, at the same time further enhancing the 
beauty of Washington. The redesigned city, from the elaborate Capi-
tol grounds planned by Olmsted to the smallest circle, represented 
an important manifestation of the national City Beautiful move-
ment.16 Parks enhanced the beauty of metropolises in Gilded Age 
America: Fairmont in Philadelphia, Belle Isle in Detroit, and Golden 
Gate in San Francisco. None assumed the monumental quality of 
those in Baltimore or the historical character of those in the District 
of Columbia. 
Spokesmen of the New South creed ignored the housekeeping 
side of city building. Who, after all, could get excited about street 
surfaces when the paramount task was to provide the philosophical 
foundations for a South of cities? But someone had to fill the pot-
holes and make decisions concerning public safety, or a city could 
Above, an 1838 view of Baltimore, the "Monumental City." The Battle 
Monument afforded an example of beautification and ornamentation 
in the antebellum urban South. Below, Louisville's bustling Main 
Street in 1846. Lined with three- and four-story commercial buildings, 
it was typical of pre-Civil War urban America and had little in the 
way of distinctive southernness. 
All illustrations are from the National Archives. 
Above, Key West, ca. 1856, already displayed the attributes of urbanization, 
especially the "forests of masts" associated with American ports of the 
period. Below, Georgetown, D.C., in this 1862 Mathew Brady photograph, 
had the appearance of a closely packed urban center. Note the empty Chesa-
peake and Ohio Canal in the foreground. 
Mathew Brady's photographs of the ruins of a railroad roundhouse in Atlanta 
in 1864 (above) and of destroyed buildings in Richmond in 1865 (below) 
provide stark evidence of the destruction wrought by the Civil War on the 
urban South. 
Above, an 1865 view of Charleston's Bay Street shows the kind of street 
conditions that all urban Americans of the Reconstruction era (not just those 
in the South) had to cope with every day. Below, this view of bridge con-
struction across the Ohio between Newport and Cincinnati, taken in 1870, 
demonstrates the growing suburban character of Newport and its sister city, 
Covington. In all but name the two Kentucky cities had lost much of their 
southern identity. 
Two differing views of Washington, D. C.-above, ali thograph of "Newspaper 
Row" in 1874; below, a photo of marshes on the Anacosta River in 1882-
are indicative of the blending of urban and rural conditions characteristic 
of much of Gilded Age urban America. 
-
Above, an August 1881 photo of weather-beaten wharfs between Piety and 
Desire streets in New Orleans illustrates the slow pace of economic recovery 
in the post-Civil War urban South. Below, beautification efforts character-
istic of the nineteenth-century South are half hidden in this Charleston city 
park as citizens camp out in the aftermath of the earthquake that struck 
the city on August 31, 1886. 
Above, Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, looking toward the Capitol, 
was by 1915 a major thoroughfare. Throughout much of its history, Wash-
ington has remained a metropolis of national stature. Below, in 1921 the 
littered alley entrance to a Baltimore garment factory emphasized the prob-
lems associated with the rise of industry in the South. 
Right, crude oil stills, rundown 
tanks, and "cat crackers" at the 
Baton Rouge Esso refinery in 
1945 graphically show the rise 
of the petrochemical industry in 
Louisiana. 
Below, the famous "March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom" of Au-
gust 28, 1963, was a dramatic event that helped lay the groundwork for 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
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not function. In their newspapers, the New South editors urged that 
local services be improved, commented vigorously on conditions 
they felt needed attention, and took sides on questions of public 
concern. Without codifying their actions, the men of the New South 
used their pages to further important aspects of city building. They 
realized that knowledge and experience in urban problem solving 
and decision making were necessary for successful urbanization. 
Cities in the South, as elsewhere in the nation, shared certain con-
cerns regarding urban services; in this area southern urban ante-
cedents crossed sectional barriers. Urban authorities had to cope 
with many consequental and often vexing tasks. The methods and 
priorities varied markedly, even within a single community. There 
was little, however, in the way of radical experimentation. No place 
wanted to appear backward, so the tendency was to take a safe course 
and to work within established norms. In any event, the ways in 
which emerging communities handled their first large-scale urban 
and social services problems indicated their relative maturity and 
responsibility as well as the expense that city fathers and citizens 
were willing to incur for civic improvements. 
Street maintenance was a constant source of frustration. No one 
knew what surfaces were best. Authorities found cobblestones noisy 
under traffic conditions, difficult to clean, and hard to replace. Gran-
ite and sandstone blocks were noisy and expensive; wood, cheap and 
easily installed, wore out quickly and became permeated with horse 
urine and axle grease; seashells cracked on impact, creating a surface 
much like broken glass; asphalt, still in the experimental stage, 
melted under the rays of a hot sun; and broken stone and gravel, 
inexpensive and readily available, proved hard to maintain. 17 Many 
city governments were content to throw gravel on the main tho-
roughfares and simply concentrate on keeping the streets passable. 
Lack of resources made it impossible to tend all the streets. Even 
in Washington, which had the highest level of urban services in the 
South, 96 miles of 230 miles of streets remained unimproved. More 
startling were the figures for New Orleans, where 472 miles of 566 
miles of street surfaces had no pavement. Similar conditions pre-
vailed elsewhere. Charleston had 36 miles of dirt streets in a total 
of 54 miles; only 3 miles in 100 miles of lanes in Atlanta had a 
surface. 18 
Paving substances varied greatly in cost, quality, and availability 
from city to city. In 1880 the price of cobblestone by the square yard 
was 60 cents in Alexandria, 36 cents in Norfolk, and $2.25 in New 
Orleans. Broken stone sold for 70 cents per square yard in Covington 
and $1.50 in Memphis. Repair costs added to civic burdens. Some 
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cities used the method employed in Macon, where the chain gang 
serviced the roads at an estimated cost of $5,000 annually. 19 
Sidewalks were subject to much less wear and tear than the 
streets. In the commercial districts they were usually made of fairly 
permanent substances. The downtowns of Louisville, Alexandria, 
and Augusta all had brick sidewalks. Lynchburg's were of gneiss 
stone.20 Walks in the residential sections of southern cities were 
almost always wood planks or dirt paths running along drainage 
ditches because high costs made other materials impractical. 
It was difficult to clean streets when horses represented the 
primary form of transportation. In a single working day of eight 
hours, a thousand horses deposited about five hundred gallons of 
urine and ten tons of dung in the streets. Cities had roughly one 
horse for every four persons.21 Constant travel theoretically merged 
street dirt with gravel and the dirt of unsurfaced streets, but in fact 
thoroughfares became quagmires under heavy horse traffic, un-
less there was adequate drainage, which there seldom was. Street-
cleaning methods, results, and expenditures differed across the 
urban South. Lexington and Memphis required householders to 
sweep in front of their dwellings before pickups by private crews. 
Authorities in Alexandria, Norfolk, Covington, and Macon arranged 
to have public ways swept only when it seemed necessary. Colum-
bia's sanitation budget was so small that available manpower 
scrubbed open surface drains. Atlanta's force did much of its cleaning 
in the commercial parts of town. Working within such per annum 
budgets as $810 in Alexandria, $15,000 in Savannah, and $105,800 
in New Orleans, officials fought a losing battle to keep the streets 
clean. A wide number of uses were found for the street sweepings. 
Street departments in Baltimore, Richmond, and Charleston sold 
high-grade manure for fertilizer and dumped the rest onto low-lying 
lots. Columbia ordinances simply called for depositing the dirt out-
side town. Memphis owned a special boat that carried street matter 
downriver for unloading.22 Unhappily, practical economic consid-
erations frequently overrode the need for better health and sanita-
tion. 
The need to remove dead animals was another problem. Horse 
carcasses were sometimes abandoned to rot in the streets. The dead 
bodies of cats and dogs were sometimes discarded in the streets or 
left in vacant lots. Southern cities found ways to dispose of the 
carcasses as a matter of necessity rather than from any desire to 
assume responsibility and usually did so as cheaply as possible. The 
quality of the work varied greatly. Baltimore spent $3,500 annually 
to remove deceased beasts to local bone-dust factories. Washington 
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contractors hauled away 6,415 animal remains in 1880 for use in 
what an official vaguely called "various ways." An Alexandria regu-
lation required owners to bury any creature larger than a domestic 
cat beyond the city limits. Charleston attempted a cooperative ar-
rangement; the municipal scavenger collected and dumped small 
dead beasts into a nearby swamp, and local farmers carried away 
decayed horses, mules, and cows for grinding into fertilizer. The 
town contractor in Mobile charged owners ninety-five cents a head 
to ship approximately 800 animal bodies a year to a fertilizer plant 
downwind from town.23 Whether by public or private means, people 
throughout the urban South needed to improve methods of disposing 
of dead animals. It was small consolation that similar circumstances 
prevailed in other parts of the country. 
In 1880, garbage and ash disposal added to the cost of urban 
services in southern cities. Householders routinely mixed the two 
substances. Every city of importance had public garbage collectors, 
with the exception of Covington, which hired a private contractor. 
Crews throughout the South removed refuse on regular schedules, 
from daily to twice weekly. Practices differed, depending on the 
community. In Baltimore the drivers of garbage wagons blew a horn 
at intervals to warn patrons to have their garbage ready for collec-
tion. Even if individuals followed instructions, serious health men-
aces frequently resulted from haphazard disposal practices. Once the 
garbage wagon passed, few people cared about the fate of its contents. 
In some places, including Washington, large amounts of garbage 
went uncollected. A health officer in the District of Columbia ad-
mitted in an 1880 report that decayed offal accumulated throughout 
his jurisdiction in alleys, yards, vacant lots, and cellars. With the 
daily addition of putrefying animal waste, potato parings, eggshells, 
dishwater, and other refuse, the resulting concoction emitted foul 
odors and noxious gases, especially on hot steamy days. Residents 
of Washington and elsewhere frequently complained about poor ser-
vice and piles of street garbage, but to the despair of reformers, there 
was little interest in increasing appropriations by raising taxes.24 
The "garbage question" remained unanswered in America during 
the Gilded Age. 
Inefficient disposal of sewage caused increasing concern among 
southern sanitary experts. In a period of growing fears about a pos-
sible connection between a lack of sewers and high urban death rates, 
only a few southern cities had anything resembling sewer systems. 
Others had sanitary arrangements that were little better than noth-
ing. At Lexington, where no new lines had been constructed for 
several years, a few limestone sewers eighteen inches square emptied 
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into the sluggish Elkhorn Creek. Augusta relied on old sewers once 
used exclusively for drainage. The inadequate sewers that served 
Macon discharged into a swamp outside the city limits. Montgomery 
had unventilated brick and wooden mains, none of which flushed 
very well. Baltimore had twelve miles of storm sewers but no system 
designed to carry away regular sewage. Tidal waters caused such 
serious difficulties at the outlets on the river front that the city 
remained without sewers until the early twentieth century.25 
Because New Orleans had a very high water table, almost all 
sewage passed through open drainage gutters and canals. Throughout 
the Gilded Age, New Orleans had no underground sewers, a lack 
that contributed to the community's serious health hazards. Mem-
phis was the only southern city with a comprehensive sewer sys-
tem.26 Elsewhere large quantities of excreta ran into porous privy 
vaults rather than into sewers. Liquid household wastes-the runoff 
from laundries and kitchens-ran into gutters, backyards, or ces-
spools. No town had effective regulations regarding the disposal of 
industrial wastes. In the absence of adequate systems of sewerage, 
crucial sanitary issues remained unresolved. 
In 1880, in keeping with national norms, many southern cities 
had waterworks. In the previous twenty years, the number in the 
country had increased from 200 to 500. Although the general trend 
was in the direction of public ownership, several southern cities 
lacked municipal works. In fact, neither Portsmouth nor Lexington 
had waterworks. Even a small system cost more than $100,000 to 
construct. Memphis had a private works valued at $650,000, and 
one at Montgomery cost $130,000. Both of the waterworks used 
machines to pump water, as did a new concern in Charleston that 
brought up water from artesian wells a thousand feet deep. Chat-
tanooga's Lookout Water Company, organized in 1866, pumped 
Tennessee River water through twelve miles of lines. A few 
municipalities had publicly operated works. Norfolk spent $500,000 
on a pumping station that moved half a million gallons of water 
daily through twenty-five miles of lines. At New Orleans, the water-
works had a checkered history. In 1869 the city bought an old private 
works, only to sell it again in 1878 to the New Orleans Water Works 
Company. The facility, which had an estimated worth of $1.3 mil-
lion, pumped untreated Mississippi River water directly through 
seventy-one miles of pipesP No one worried much about purifi-
cation, and the quality of drinking water steadily deteriorated as the 
Gilded Age progressed. Sewage and industrial waste polluted water-
ing grounds so badly that by the second decade of the twentieth 
century, the water in almost all places needed chemical treatment 
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to make it reasonably safe for human use. The best policy to follow 
was to boil water prior to drinking it. 
Public transportation underwent major changes in the Gilded 
Age. Privately owned horse railroads became important symbols of 
urban progress even if they provided inadequate service. Petersburg, 
Portsmouth, Columbia, Macon, Lexington, and Montgomery had no 
lines, but most southern cities did. Firms built street railroads in 
several places in the years immediately after the war. Charleston's 
and Augusta's opened in 1866, Atlanta's in 1869, and Norfolk's in 
1870. 
As might have been expected, the metropolitan centers had the 
largest horse railroads, and a city often had more than one route. In 
1880 Washington had five different horse railroads, with a total 
length of close to thirty-one miles. They all charged the standard 
national fare of five cents a ride. Horse railroads in Louisville carried 
more than 8 million passengers annually. The fifty miles of tracks 
required the services of 323 men to operate 1 73 cars pulled by 726 
horses and mules. One hundred and forty miles of horse railroads, 
which attracted 24 million riders yearly, serviced New Orleans. To 
run this large transit system there were 373 cars, 1,641 horses and 
mules, and 671 employees. 
In smaller places, the horse railroads frequently ran for only a 
couple of miles down a single street. Sometimes the roads ended at 
a pleasure ground or amusement park owned by the traction com-
pany. Lynchburg's two-mile line had 6 cars pulled by 12 horses and 
12 mules. Eight men operated the single-track line. The horse rail-
road in Norfolk had 4 miles of track. Charleston's line, 21 miles 
long and using 57 cars, 125 horses, and 89 employees, hauled 1.5 
million passengers yearly. The horse railroads of Augusta, running 
over 4.5 miles of track, employed 3 7 men, who used 7 cars and 34 
horses to carry more than 377,300 passengers annually. The horse 
railroads in the southern cities afforded another indication of in-
creasing urbanization.28 
Omnibuses, large cumbersome vehicles with a standard capacity 
of about forty riders, augmented horse railroads in many places. 
Those in Washington ran between depots and hotels. In Richmond 
and Savannah they served hotels, railroad stations, and steamboat 
landings. Atlanta, despite its size, had none. 29 In many localities, 
given the fixed routes of horse railroads and the nature of the om-
nibus service, private conveyances, horseback, or walking remained 
the easiest way of getting around. 
Southern municipalities assumed primary responsibility for in-
ternal security and stressed law and order at the expense of other 
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forms of protection. In 1880 health services were very weak in all 
except a few places. Generally, the mayor and council did little more 
than appoint a board of health. These organizations, usually but not 
always including a physician, met infrequently except during epi-
demics and had insufficient resources to undertake meaningful pro-
tective programs. The boards in Lexington, Covington, and Newport 
did not even have regular budgets. Members of Atlanta's five-man 
body received salaries of $100 a year to make recommendations to 
the city council. Columbia had a twelve-person advisory board that 
included only two physicians; the chief health agency in Montgom-
ery was a branch of the state board of health. Chattanooga's board 
had a twelve-month budget of approximately $500, and during an 
epidemic the board could spend as much as an additional $250. It 
had no authority to quarantine infected areas, but like most boards 
it could wield emergency powers in a crisis. Forward progress fre-
quently came only in the wake of catastrophe. In 1879, for instance, 
Memphis obtained an independent board with broad sanitation re-
sponsibilities. In its first year the board spent $35,000 on a wide 
variety of activities that related to the health of the city, with ex-
penditures alone for street cleaning and garbage removal amounting 
to $20,000.30 Almost all of the rest of the money went to fill in old 
cesspools and privy vaults. Health authorities in cities fortunate 
enough to have remained relatively free of epidemics were unable 
to convince elected officials of the need to give high priority to health 
services. For practical political reasons, many officials did not want 
to hurt their chances for reelection by implying that their city had 
a health problem. 
By 1880 nearly all the cities in the South had professional fire 
departments. An exception was the relatively new center of Chat-
tanooga, which continued to depend on volunteers divided into three 
companies of 102 men. Departmental expenses for 1879 amounted 
to $5,400; losses in eight fires reached $15,500. As long as a system 
worked, there seemed to be no compelling reason to change it. 
Professional departments were not usually formed until a disastrous 
fire had discredited the volunteers or until firefighting had become 
more complicated and the era of the bucket brigade and volunteers 
had ended. Several of the professional departments in the South were 
impressive from a statistical standpoint. Petersburg's force of thirty-
three full-time firemen had at its disposal six hose reels, one hook-
and-ladder truck, and 1,500 feet of what authorities called "good 
hose." During 1879 the department responded to thirty-one alarms, 
only three of which were false. Fire losses amounted to $110,000, 
while the cost of running the department for the year was $9,200. 
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Charleston's fourteen steamer and three truck companies relied on 
11).00 feet of hose; the department's budget amounted to $26,000. 
The funding required to run a first-rate department increased mark-
edly as a city expanded in population. The need for rapid response 
usually meant that a single central station was insufficient. Louis-
ville's department had many line companies, funded by a twelve-
month budget of $108,500. The Baltimore force had a $175,000 
annual budget, and the chief engineer, who received a salary of 
$2,000 a year, supervised the daily activities of 208 firemen. During 
1880 the Baltimore Fire Department answered 343 alarms, and fire 
damage for the period, amounting to $580,300, was mainly caused 
by two large blazes.31 
Firemen ran considerable risks in exchange for few benefits and 
privileges. Even with the move toward professionalization, there 
remained a reluctance to regard firemen as full-time employees be-
cause the old volunteer tradition died hard. Still, firefighters were 
generally held in high esteem by the public. The mayor of Louisville 
observed, "Our firemen, as they always have been, are active and 
fearless in discharge of their duties."32 
Civic authorities put much effort and money into building police 
departments. In all cases, the law officers were under civilian con-
trol. Usually, the mayor had the power to appoint the chie( subject 
to confirmation by the city council. Under a variation of this 
method, a police board had selection powers. In actual practice, the 
authorities left day-by-day administration to high-ranking police ad-
ministrators, maintaining jurisdiction over budgetary matters. In 
1880 relatively large annual salaries paid to top law enforcement 
officials-they were the highest paid public officials in the South-
demonstrated the importance attached to police work. The super-
intendent of the metropolitan police in Washington made $2,610, 
the chief of police in New Orleans $3A80, and the marshal of the 
Baltimore force $2,500. The heads of the police departments in 
Montgomery, Augusta, Chattanooga, and Macon received salaries 
of about $1,000. Southern police chiefs had wages comparable to 
and in many cases better than their counterparts in other parts of 
the country. The superintendent of the large Chicago department 
made $3J80; chiefs in medium-sized Peoria, Fond duLac, and Osh-
kosh were compensated at rates ranging from $650 to $1,000.33 
The annual salaries and duties of men in the lower ranks re-
flected the financial resources available for remuneration of public 
employees in southern cities. Patrolmen seldom made as much as 
the national annual average of about $900; those in Chattanooga, 
Augusta, and Macon received $600 and those in Savannah $720. 
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Police departments in the South required officers to wear modified 
standard blue metropolitan uniforms and to carry specified accou-
terments. In accordance with national standards, the men had to 
purchase their own uniforms and equipment. Beats and duty hours 
were long and hard; the lawmen in many southern cities worked 
twelve hours daily, the national average. Norfolk peace keepers pa-
trolled twenty-six miles of streets and lanes and performed their 
duties on schedules of six hours on and twelve off. Macon officers 
toiled twelve hours on and twelve hours off as they tried to protect 
116 miles of thoroughfares.:>4 Police everywhere, while devoting 
their primary efforts to protecting prime business property and resi-
dential properties, kept high crime districts under close surveillance. 
But the value of having police officers walk long hours on the beat 
provided more the semblance of a deterrent than an actual service 
that stopped crime in the streets. 
Southern city dwellers tolerated heavier expenditures for police 
departments than for other urban services. In 1880 Baltimore spent 
$590,000 and Washington $302,000 for police protection. Some 
smaller cities had impressive funding levels. Charleston's budget 
was $68,600, Memphis's $35,000, and Augusta's $30,000.35 Expen-
ditures were generally higher in the South than elsewhere; fear of 
what some white editors called the "black brute" continued to per-
meate southern life. "A single day rarely passes that a case of lynch-
ing is not flashed over the wires and the cause is almost the same 
in each instance, the rape of a white woman or child by a big, burly 
negro," the Nashville Banner noted on May 16, 1881. "It is rape and 
hang. As often as it is done, that often will a devil swing off into 
eternity." A decade later, the editor of the Louisiana Alexandria 
Town Talk wrote that "whenever a negro or a white man rapes a 
woman that man dies. It is understood by both races that a proven 
case of rape means death."36 Such inflammatory statements, re-
peated all across the South, added to white racial fears and furthered 
a law-and-order syndrome. Of course, popular opinion notwithstand-
ing, rape did not constitute the primary reason for the lynching of 
blacks. 
Blacks accounted for a high proportion of all arrests. Some white 
leaders used the police as a means of harassing blacks to keep them 
aware of their place in society. Nashville policemen made regular 
weekend sweeps in which they automatically arrested on suspicion 
all blacks whom they encountered. Authorities held the blacks for 
a few days and then released them without formal charges or a trial. 
During tht: short incarceration, they performed roadwork or other 
menial tasks.37 The relationship between law enforcement and the 
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perceived needs of the white majority in regard to the omnipresent 
race question was never officially admitted, nor was much written 
about it in annual reports. 
The cities of the New South continued to experience the same 
service and protective problems prevalent in the Old South. The 
only real difference was that the questions had increased in mag-
nitude as a consequence of growth. Just as before the war, not enough 
money was available to give a high level of support to a wide range 
of civil endeavors. Moreover, public safety took precedence over 
health and fire protection. As in other ways, the legacy of the Pe-
culiar Institution continued to be a significant factor in determining 
policy in cities. Lurking beneath talk of law and order was the fear 
of black violence; institutionalized forms of protection from blacks 
helped deplete already hard-pressed city treasures. 
None of the South's thirty largest communities in 1880-with 
the possible exception of debt-ridden Washington-had the public 
or private means to furnish residents with uniformly high levels of 
service. Thus Baltimore had a large waterworks but no comprehen-
sive sewerage. New Orleans expended more money on sidewalk re-
pair and extensions than on drainage ditches designed to carry away 
kitchen slops and household wastes. Lynchburg, with a horse rail-
road, had few paved streets. Richmond was better at disposing of 
dead animals than at removing garbage. To a greater or lesser extent, 
all the cities tried to set priorities, always influenced by politics and 
immediate needs. The same considerations influenced policy in 
other sections of the country, but in the South the burden of a de-
pressed economy and race complicated matters. Attempts by south-
ern city leaders to deal with considerations ranging from sewerage 
to a harsh racial policy on law and order were further indications of 
tentative progress toward an urban society. 
Throughout the 1880s southern urban promoters sought to con-
vey the impression that great advances were being made. A Bir-
mingham resident, catching what he considered the spirit of events, 
wrote, "Why, men would come in at four o'clock in the morning 
and begin making trades before breakfast. Property changed hands 
four and five times a day .... Men went crazy two hours after getting 
here .... A brand-new sensation was born every day." This descrip-
tion, characteristic of claims made all over America about the won-
ders occurring in cities of the Gilded Age, contained a grain of truth. 
Birmingham was a "boom town" and the showcase of the New 
South. Boomers claimed that riches lay for the taking throughout 
Dixie. Middleboro, Kentucky, was expected soon to reach metro-
politan proportions, fueled by what the Baltimore Manufacturers' 
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Record claimed was "fully $10,000,000" in English investment capi-
tal. 38 
Other promotional projects were the subject of similar exagger-
ated claims. The organizers of Cardiff, Tennessee, predicted amazing 
success for their 11paper city," located in what their promotional 
literature called the 11Richest and Most Inexhaustible Coal and Iron 
Region in the South." Richard Edmonds in his book The South's 
Redemption from Poverty to Prosperity, published in 1890, con-
tended that unnamed New England capitalists planned to pour sev-
eral million dollars into a gigantic industrial complex at Fort Payne, 
Alabama. Real estate companies in dozens of southern towns 
worked to attract funds, spawning a land boom that brought in some 
northern currency. The peak years came between 1887 and 1890, 
when promoters gambled sums that were considerable by southern 
standards on new town sites touted as potential industrial com-
plexes.39 True believers thought the millennium at hand. Henry 
Grady wrote in The New South, 11The promise of her great destiny, 
written in her fields, her quarries, her mines, her forests, and her 
rivers, is no longer blurred or indistinct, and the world draws near 
to read."40 
Actually, prosperity was spotty. Much of the money went into 
ironworks in Alabama, lumber operations in Louisiana and Arkan-
sas, and land booms in Florida. Enthusiastic promotional froth about 
huge investments in Cardiff and Middlesburo held no truth. It be-
came increasingly clear that southern prosperity paled when com-
pared with that of the rest of the country. The real action was in 
the West and in the great timber stands of the upper Midwest. For 
every dollar poured in the South, a thousand more went toward 
opening up and cutting down the North Woods of Wisconsin, Michi-
gan, and Minnesota. In the 1880s, on the banks of the Missouri and 
Kansas rivers in Kansas City, land worth more than $88 million 
changed hands in a single year during a boom. Great booms in south-
ern California transformed Los Angeles and San Diego from un-
important country towns into regional centers. Between 1880 and 
1890 the population of Los Angeles grew from 11,200 to 50,400 and 
that of San Diego from 2,600 to 16,200. In the Northwest, around 
Puget Sound, the arrival of rails from the East touched off a flurry 
of speculative activity. During the 1880s, Seattle's population leaped 
from 3,500 to 42,800; Tacoma had 1,100 residents at the start of the 
decade and 34,900 at the end. Such growth was what the southern 
cities, particularly the newer ones in the interior, needed. But the 
South failed to rise as the New South soothsayers had predicted. 
The 1890 census made for very depressing reading in many quar-
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ters south of the Mason and Dixon Line-in the 1880s the South 
actually lost ground. During a decade of rapid urbanization, the num-
ber of places in the United States with populations of more than 
2,500, which the census considered the breaking point between rural 
and urban territory, increased from 939 to 1,348. At the end of the 
1880s only 192 of those communities were in the South. Other urban 
statistics presented an even gloomier picture. From 1880 to 1890, 
when the number of places in the United States with populations 
of more than 10,000 rose from 227 to 354, an increase of 127, the 
South added only 18 such cities. Numerous American cities expe-
rienced rapid growth, with a total of 117 places adding more than 
10,000 inhabitants. Only 16 of these were in the South. 
Of special interest were the large population increases enjoyed 
by a number of medium-sized midwestern industrial cities. For in-
stance, from 1880 to 1890, Grand Rapids gained 28,300 people, Peoria 
11,800, Toledo 31,300, and Youngstown 17,800. None of these com-
munities achieved metropolitan status, but they became manufac-
turing towns of the kind the men of the New South wanted for their 
section. Like significant numbers of people, industry moved from 
east to west rather than from north to south. In the twelve states 
treated by the census as part of the north-central division, the num-
ber of cities with populations of more than 8,000 rose from 95 in 
1880 to 152 in 1890. No comparable growth occurred in the South. 
The number of places with more than 8,000 inhabitants increased 
from 35 to 44. According to census experts, there was a rough cor-
relation between industrial and urban expansion. With regard to the 
situation in the South, a census official stated, "The industries of 
these states are mainly agricultural, and while manufactures and 
mining are making some progress they are still in their infancy .... 
In certain of these states that proportion of urban population is still 
trifling; thus in Mississippi it constitutes but 2.64, in North Carolina 
but 3.87 and Arkansas but 4.89 per cent of the total population."41 
The census estimated in 1890 that capital invested in American 
industry amounted to $6.5 billion, more than double the figure of 
ten years earlier. Total investments in the South reached $585 mil-
lion, against $2 billion in the north-central division alone. In 1890 
only the southern states of Maryland (fourteenth) and Kentucky 
(sixteenth) ranked in the leading twenty American manufacturing 
states in gross value of products. The money invested in southern 
manufacturing had increased markedly, up from $234 million in 
1880. In an era of almost no inflation, this increase was impressive. 
Manufacturing capital in Georgia rose from $11 million to $57 mil-
lion, in Alabama from $11 million to $46 million. Yet these gains 
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seemed small by national standards; industrial investments outside 
the South rose by more than $3.5 billion. Manufacturing capitali-
zation in the state of New York grew from $500 million to $1.3 
billion. The additional $800 million added to New York's capital 
base was more than the total worth of all Dixie's industries.42 The 
"industrial revolution" in the North generated so much money so 
quickly that the South could not catch up. 
Only a few bright spots broke an otherwise depressing picture 
in the urban South. The capitalization of manufacturing in Baltimore 
soared from $38.6 million to $92.8 million. New Orleans ($26.3 
million), Washington ($28.9 million), and Louisville ($36.1 million) 
all had fairly substantial capital bases upon which to build in the 
future. These figures seemed small, however, by comparison with 
Chicago's total of $359.7 million. In all, seventeen southern cities 
ranked among the top 100 cities in aggregate capital. Richmond's 
capitalization more than doubled during the 1880s, increasing from 
$6.9 million to $16.8 million. In the same span the midwestern city 
of Columbus, Ohio, which had a heavy industrial base comparable 
to that of Richmond, enjoyed an increase in capital investment of 
from $5.4 million to $16.2 million. Except for Richmond and the 
South's four largest manufacturing areas, no city in the region had 
more than $10 million invested in manufacturing. Industry in the 
Piedmont remained in an early stage, although there had been some 
gains. 
The highly publicized new interior manufacturing centers ex-
perienced disappointingly little progress. Chattanooga did not even 
rank among the top 100 industrial cities. Atlanta had $9.5 million 
and Memphis $9.4 million in manufacturing capitalization in 1890. 
These increases were more than 300 percent, but so were those of 
many northern industrial centers. By contrast, the capital invested 
in Peoria plants jumped from $4.2 million to $15.1 million, and 
Peoria was only a cog in the midwestern manufacturing empire. 
Birmingham had yet to fulfill its promise. In 1890 the aggregate for 
all industries was $4.6 million and for iron and steel $1.6 million. 
Racine, Wisconsin, just another rising midwestern mill town with 
5,000 fewer people than Birmingham, reported $11.2 million in 
manufacturing capital. In Pittsburgh $48.2 million in an industrial 
capitalization of $108.4 million was in iron and steel.43 Clearly, the 
magnificently conceived attempt to raise the South to the level of 
the North had failed; the predictions of Grady and his colleagues 
turned sour. 
The unrealistic expectations of the men of the New South creed 
obscured urban accomplishments in Dixie during the Gilded Age. 
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Building on foundations laid as far back as the colonial period, the 
South continued to construct cities in relation to the needs of the 
society. A depressed agricultural society did not require burgeoning 
towns. The developments that occurred represented a necessary ur-
ban consolidation accompanied by limited progress. The old and new 
cities modernized many of their urban and social services. Cities 
could be built and peopled with great speed; the Oklahoma land rush 
cities of Guthrie and Oklahoma City, from scratch, acquired popu-
lations of more than 10,000 between dawn and dusk in 1889. The 
southern cities, poised to expand, bided their time until the South 
could rise again. 
5 
HOLDING THE LINE 
During the 1890s the South stopped overtly trying to compete with 
the North and turned inward. Widespread opposition developed to 
any policy that sought accommodation with the new northern in-
dustrial order, although the goals of the leaders of the New South 
movement were not necessarily rejected en masse. After all, shortly 
after his untimely death in 1889, Grady came to rank as one of the 
South's fallen heroes. Moreover, Henry Watterson continued to gain 
stature as a sectional leader, and Richard Edmonds's Baltimore 
Manufactures' Record remained the South's foremost commercial 
publication. Rather, the change in emphasis related directly to the 
realities of sectional relations. Of particular significance was the 
growing perception that the North had lost interest in trying to 
influence the course of southern events. 
The South underwent a period of retrenchment based on the 
recognition that there was continuity in southern history. Back in 
the 1850s the delegates active in the commercial convention move-
ment had reached the conclusion that the South could not compete 
with the North on its own terms; they concluded that a unique 
southern civilization should take its own distinctive path. Forty 
years later, following the Civil War, the Reconstruction period, and 
the abortion of the New South concept, a new generation of southern 
leaders, for somewhat different reasons, reached essentially the same 
conclusions. In the 1850s the main reason for retrenchment was 
economic. No one gave much thought to racial problems because 
they were mainly handled by the institution of human slavery. Dur-
ing the 1890s the top priority involved retaining the supremacy of 
the white race. The result was legislation, including the Louisiana 
separate car act, sustained in 1896 by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Plessy v. Ferguson. In the aftermath of that controversial decision, 
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state legislatures throughout the South enacted whole bodies of laws 
that created a highly structured segregation system based on the 
separate but equal doctrine. In 1898, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Williams v. Mississippi accepted the "Mississippi Plan," which 
called for the disfranchisement of black voters. 
During both the 1850s and the 1890s the North cared little about 
the development of an autonomous South. Few northerners had paid 
much attention to the full ramifications of the convention move-
ment until it was too late. And no great outcry in the North arose 
to oppose the trend in the South toward white racial domination, 
although the Jim Crow laws regulated race relations more com-
pletely and along the same lines as the discredited black codes of 
the immediate post-Civil War era. Northern attitudes contrasted 
sharply with those of 1861. The circumstances had changed-there 
was no Abraham Lincoln, and the Peculiar Institution was long dead. 
The rise of industry and the exploitation of previously virgin areas 
had drastically changed northern priorities. 
Agricultural discontent served as another indication of the 
South's growing isolationism. Supporters of the Populist movement 
opposed the New South approach to solving economic problems; 
they wanted to eradicate rather than encourage what they perceived 
as outside domination of southern economic institutions. Although 
it usually went unrecognized, a direct connection existed between 
the agrarian revolt and the South's historic inability to erect a great 
mercantile and banking center able to control credit, all the while 
offering farmers low interest rates, bargain prices, and other in-
ducements. The leaders of the agrarian movement would have been 
perfectly at home at one of the prewar commercial conventions. 
Indeed, the Civil War represented but an interlude in the quest of 
southern agrarians for more equitable commercial arrangements. 
During the 1870s large numbers of distressed farmers in the 
South had joined the Patrons of Husbandry. About a thousand local 
chapters sprang up, but beyond performing the task of educating 
farmers about the need for joint political action, the southern Grange 
had little impact on affairs. The movement also spawned internal 
disharmony, which New South spokesmen ignored in their propa-
ganda about investment opportunities. In the 1880s the Grange gave 
way to a series of state-level alliances of farmers and to local groups 
called agricultural wheels. A large number of the members were 
tenant farmers and sharecroppers united in opposition to land bar-
ons. This combination gave rise to the Southern Alliance and also 
to schemes for the cooperative marketing of farm products. By the 
1890s, business opposition and insufficient capital had doomed 
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these plans, causing a reappraisal of goals and objectives that led to 
the subsequent entry of the Southern Alliance into the political 
arena. Rejecting overtures for a great national Populist party, some 
Alliance supporters formed populist organizations that often allied 
with the Republican party. Most leaders, however, worked through 
the southern Democratic party, a bulwark of white supremacy. The 
Alliance, which initially claimed to have considerable black support, 
declined in importance after agrarian Democrat William Jennings 
Bryan lost the 1896 presidential election. The bitter realities of abject 
poverty and racial strife took their toll from Dixie's inhabitants. As 
long as the rural South remained depressed and divided, the promise 
of southern life envisioned by the architects of the New South re-
mained an impossible dream. The failed agrarian crusade was not 
an aberration but another frustrating episode in the South's eco-
nomic inability to build cities that could have freed the section from 
outside domination. 
In the final analysis, southern urbanites responded negatively 
to the agrarian efforts, despite urban and rural interdependence. The 
prospect of black and white farmers' banding together in a com-
munity of interest to achieve specific political ends frightened many 
urban dwellers. The antiurbanism that culminated in Bryan's cam-
paign pointed up divergent urban and rural interests. City people did 
not want to pay more than absolutely necessary for their food prod-
uctsi rural folk felt gouged by urban businessmen at just about every 
conceivable level. Interest rates and shipping rates were causes of 
continual friction. On the other hand, few southern businessmen 
listened seriously to the proposals put forward by the Southern Al-
liance. Nor did they formulate significant counterproposals. Of 
course, more was involved than simply the protection of vested in-
terests. Everyone agreed that a southern agricultural depression had 
started long before the Panic of 1893. The failure of the rural South 
to recover from the Civil War assured the section of what its na-
tionalists considered colonial status within an industrialized United 
States. Yet the traditionally cautious nature of southern city build-
ing also meant that, because of the South's consistent lack of in-
vestment capital, there was by and large an unwillingness to take 
risks. Of course, the men of the New South creed described a section 
in which business leaders were alert to change. Although this sce-
nario may have been accurate in a few places, notably the rebuilt 
city of Atlanta and newly industrialized Birmingham, it did not 
extend to the urban South as a whole. City building continued to 
take its course, proceeding along customary conservative channels. 
In 1890 the South contained forty-eight cities of more than 
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10,000, as indicated by Table 6. The thirty cities that had formed 
the backbone of the southern urban network in 1880 all experienced 
population gains during the following ten years. Eight of the towns 
enjoyed increases in excess of the national average of 56.5 percent 
for all the people in the country living in urban territory. Atlanta 
grew by 75.18 percent and Chattanooga by 125.72 percent. Six of 
the southern towns were among the forty largest places in the United 
States. Baltimore was the nation's seventh largest city. New Orleans 
ranked twelfth, Washington fourteenth, and Louisville twentieth. 
All told, the South's four largest cities continued to be the section's 
only true metropolises. Richmond, in the thirty-fourth position, and 
Nashville, in the thirty-eighth, were urban centers of respectable 
size although they fell short of metropolitan status. The precarious 
state of the southern economy precluded the building of instant 
cities. 
The 1890 population statistics for the thirty largest 1880 towns 
further reflected the continued gradual evolution of the southern 
urban system. In an age in which many potential investors based 
their decisions in part on urban growth rates, census returns had 
considerable economic ramifications. Within this context, several 
old towns were just not growing very fast. Baltimore had 434,000 
people and Washington 230,400. Savannah, which had 43,200 resi-
dents, continued to gain on Charleston, a city of 55,000. Norfolk, 
which had 34,900 people, was the principal port and the second 
largest city in Virginia. A population of 20,000 cemented Wilming-
ton's hold as North Carolina's number one port. Alexandria, George-
town, and Portsmouth were unimportant in the larger scheme of 
urbanization matters. Along the Piedmont, Richmond's 81,400 per-
sons made it the largest fall-line city. Neither Petersburg nor Lynch-
burg improved upon their positions in Virginia. Columbia remained 
the second largest city in South Carolina. Augusta enhanced its in-
dustrial base. Louisville, a city of 161,000 inhabitants, moved ahead 
as a regional banking, transportation, and commercial center. Lex-
ington continued to lose ground to Louisville. Covington and New-
port, glorified suburbs of Cincinnati, along with Cumberland, were 
for all practical purposes no longer in the southern urban network. 
Nashville, with 76,200 people, continued to be central Tennessee's 
major center. New Orleans, despite a sluggish 12 percent rate of 
increase, had 242,000 residents and remained the leading city of the 
lower South. Mobile, throughout its history in the shadow of New 
Orleans, had hardly grown since antebellum days. For the most part, 
long-established urban relationships remained unchanged. 
Mixed growth rates during the 1880s in the interior of Dixie did 
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Table 6. Population Trends in 48 Southern Cities, 1880-1890 
Population Increase 
City 1880 1890 Number Percent 
Alabama 
Birmingham 3,086 26,178 23,092 748 
Mobile 29)32 31,076 1,944 7 
Montgomery 16,713 21,883 5,170 31 
Arkansas 
Fort Smith 3,099 11,311 8,212 265 
Little Rock 13,138 25,874 12J36 97 
Dist. of Columbia 
Georgetown 12,578 14,046 1,468 12 
Washington 177,624 230,392 52J68 30 
Florida 
Jacksonville 7,650 17,201 9,551 125 
Key West 9,890 18,080 8,190 83 
Pensacola 6,845 11J50 4,905 72 
Georgia 
Atlanta 37,409 65,533 28,124 75 
Augusta 21,891 33,300 11,409 52 
Columbus 10,123 17,303 7,180 71 
Macon 12,749 22J46 9,997 78 
Savannah 30,709 43,189 12,480 41 
Kentucky 
Covington 29,720 37,371 7,651 26 
Lexington 16,656 21,567 4,911 29 
Louisville 123J58 161)29 37,371 30 
Newport 20,433 24,918 4,485 22 
Paducah 8,036 12J97 4J61 59 
Louisiana 
Baton Rouge 7,197 10,478 3,281 46 
New Orleans 216,090 242,039 25,949 12 
Shreveport 8,009 11,979 3,970 50 
not significantly alter the hierarchy of cities. Not a single one even 
approached metropolitan status-an expected but disappointing cir-
cumstance. Atlanta advanced to 65,500 people. Chattanooga and 
Little Rock moved forward as expected. Memphis underwent a 
quicker recovery than predicted, mainly because of a combination 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Population Increase 
City 1880 1890 Number Percent 
Maryland 
Baltimore 332,313 434,439 102,126 31 
Cumberland 10,693 12,729 2,036 19 
Hagerstown 6,627 10,118 3,491 53 
Mississippi 
Meridian 4,008 10,624 6,616 165 
Natchez 7,058 10,101 3,032 43 
Vicksburg ll,814 13,373 1,559 13 
North Carolina 
Asheville 2,616 10,235 7,619 291 
Charlotte 7,094 11,557 4,463 63 
Raleigh 9,265 12,678 3,413 37 
Wilmington 17,350 20,056 2,706 16 
South Carolina 
Charleston 49,984 54,955 4,971 10 
Columbia 10,036 15,353 5,317 53 
Tennessee 
Chattanooga 12,892 29,100 16,208 126 
Jackson 5,377 10,039 4,662 87 
Knoxville 9,693 22,535 12,842 132 
Memphis 38,592 64,495 30,903 92 
Nashville 43,350 76,168 32,818 76 
Virginia 
Alexandria 13,659 14,339 680 5 
Danville 7,526 10,305 2,779 37 
Lynchburg 15,959 19,709 3,750 24 
Norfolk 21,966 34,871 12,905 58 
Petersburg 21,656 22,680 1,024 5 
Portsmouth 11,390 13,268 1,878 16 
Richmond 63,600 81,388 17,788 28 
Roanoke 669 16,159 15,490 2,315 
of confidence in the sanitary reforms imposed after the 1870s epi-
demics and progress in the surrounding region. Macon and Mont-
gomery experienced moderate growth, and both retained their 
importance as cotton markets while adding some manufacturing. 
Columbus supporters had expected their city to have more than its 
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recorded 17,300 people in 1890. Vicksburg, the largest city in Mis-
sissippi, still functioned as a connecting link in the downstream 
cotton trade. The interior cities continued to reflect decisions made 
many decades earlier. 
Population trends in the eighteen southern cities that first 
passed the 10,000 mark in the 1880s were fairly predictable. No new 
seaport cities of importance arose from Maryland through South 
Carolina. In Florida, Jacksonville increased by 9,500, reaching 17,200 
inhabitants, Key West attained a population of 18,100, and Pensacola 
a population of 11,800. Only a few Louisiana and Mississippi River 
cities crossed the 10,000 mark-Baton Rouge, Shreveport, Meridian, 
and Natchez. Four commercial cities that moved past the 10,000 
figure had modest urban pretensions-Jackson, Tennessee; Fort 
Smith, Arkansas; Paducah, Kentucky; and Hagerstown, Maryland. 
None of these places was crucial to southern urban progress. Of more 
potential consequence was the rise of a few Piedmont mill towns. 
Big Lick, Virginia, had 669 residents at the start of the 1880s, when 
textile factories financed by Yankee capitalists ushered in a boom. 
Under the new name of Roanoke, the place had 16,200 inhabitants 
in 1890. Danville, Virginia, showing a 37 percent rate of increase, 
went from 7,500 to 10,300 persons. In North Carolina, textile and 
cigarette manufacturing led to three moderately successful new mill 
towns; Charlotte, Raleigh, and Asheville. Two other localities, one 
old and one new, exhibited attributes associated with the New 
South. Knoxville finally started to display the success predicted by 
its early promoters. During the 1880s, Knoxville, helped by an in-
fusion of industry, more than doubled in population, with an in-
crease from 9, 700 to 22,500. Birmingham was another case. The 
number of inhabitants grew from 3,100 to 26,200-a spectacular rise 
of 7 48 percent. As Knoxville, Birmingham, and the Piedmont towns 
demonstrated, manufacturing had more potential than cotton ship-
ping for building towns in a hurry. Even so, once manufacturers had 
built the first mills, it took a new wave of factories to sustain growth. 
Birmingham hoped to become a regional metropolis. The Louis-
ville and Nashville Railroad connected Birmingham with a number 
of neighboring iron- and coal-producing towns, including Bessemer, 
Talladega, and Anniston. According to promotional literature, 
thirty-two iron furnaces operated in and around Birmingham. The 
editor of the Birmingham Iron Age claimed that more outside capi-
talists arrived every week. By 1890 Alabama was producing more 
iron and steel than any other southern state, and Andrew Carnegie 
remarked that the South was the "most formidable industrial 
enemy" that Pennsylvania encountered in the struggle for control 
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of the American iron industry. 1 Northern money, some of it supplied 
by Carnegie, had provided the necessary resources to start a boom. 
Unfortunately for Birmingham's future aspirations, the building of 
a great city required more than outside money and a few small towns 
with furnaces and mines. Hinterland agricultural connections were 
of crucial importance, and as long as the farmlands around Bir-
mingham stayed depressed, the city was bound to have problems in 
sustaining the rapid growth needed to make it a significant national 
center. Birmingham did not fit neatly into the South. Dixie's fragile 
agricultural economy simply did not require a proliferation of com-
peting cities. After the construction and staffing of the mills, Bir-
mingham, like the new industrial towns in the Piedmont, faced the 
rather unpromising prospect of competing with older towns for de-
pressed agricultural markets; even with some outside help and a 
boldly stated program for industrial progress, city builders continued 
to encounter serious challenges. 
In 1900 the South contained only nine more cities with popu-
lations of more than 10,000 than it had ten years earlier. The largest 
of the new places, none of which posed any immediate threat to the 
older communities, was Newport News, Virginia, which advanced 
from 4,400 to 19,600 inhabitants. Part of the complex of ports in the 
Norfolk area, it hardly had an independent status. An old seaport, 
Tampa, Florida, had 15,800 people and could count on future growth 
in relationship to progress along Florida's west coast. Two internal 
towns enjoyed some success: Owensboro, Kentucky, on the Ohio 
River between Paducah and Louisville, reached 13,200. Pine Bluff, 
Arkansas, on the Arkansas River, grew apace with the development 
of the rice industry on the Grand Prairie in east-central Arkansas. 
Pine Bluff had 11,500 residents but little immediate hope of being 
more than a farm marketing town. The chances of the agricultural 
and educational community of Athens, Georgia, which attained a 
population of 10,200 in 1900, were scarcely better. The four other 
places that crossed the 10,000 line were mill towns; the addition of 
so few new industrial centers reflected the general slowdown in the 
national economy that followed the Panic of 1893. Whether more 
limited growth than anticipated was good or bad depended on the 
viewpoint taken about the New South concept, because the more 
industry the South acquired, the more the section's economy de-
pended on outside forces. 
The 1900 census demonstrated that at best the South had only 
slightly improved its urban position in the United States during the 
Gilded Age. Whether southerners liked it or not, they had no choice 
except to judge their own progress by standards set in the North. If 
104 THE URBAN SOUTH 
northerners decreed population totals important, people in the South 
had to follow suit. In 1900 there were 400 cities with more than 
10,000 people in the United States. Only 57 of these were in the 
South. Twenty years earlier, 30 of 227 such cities had been in the 
South. Other indexes nullified the small gain. Of 82 American cities 
in 1900 in the 25,000-to-50,000 population class, only 10 were in 
the South. Of 40 cities with between 50,000 and 100,000, the South 
had but 5. Of 38 cities in excess of 100,000, there were 5 in the 
South. Dixie had added only one city in that category in twenty 
years; the rest of the country counted 17 more. The figures failed 
to convey a fundamental point about the southern urban network, 
however; as throughout much of its history, the South entered the 
new century with its regional metropolises, with the exception of 
Washington and to a lesser extent Baltimore, designed to serve sec-
tional commercial needs. The South could do no better, given its 
inability to raise up a city capable of combating New York. The 
South never had the means of controlling its own credit. For that 
reason and because of the nature of the agricultural system, most 
southerners approached city building reasonably and realistically. 
Dixie's urban areas need separate consideration on their own merits; 
a statistical lag was inevitable, given the circumstances. 
Failure to match the performance of the North did not mean 
stagnation or decline. The five largest southern cities all advanced 
in the 1890s. Memphis was the section's newest metropolis. It 
moved ahead, in part because of annexations, to 102,300 residents 
in 1900; 37,800 people had been added in ten years. Baltimore, con-
tinuing to feed on its carefully constructed midwestern connections, 
increased by 78,600. With 509,000 persons, it moved up a notch from 
1890, ranking as the sixth largest city in the nation. The increased 
functions of the federal government helped to generate a 89,800 rise 
in the number of Washingtonians. At the dawn of the new century, 
the nation's capital ranked eleventh in the country, with 278,700 
inhabitants. New Orleans grew by 25,900 to 242,000; Louisville by 
43,600 to 204,700. The expansion rates were not out of line with 
those for numerous metropolises outside the South. For example, 
Detroit (285,700) added 79,800, Newark (246,000) added 65,200, and 
Providence (175,600) added 45,500. New York and its boroughs grew 
by 929,800, to 3.4 million, making it one of the largest world centers. 
None of the other cities in the South of more than 50,000 people 
in 1900 had added as many as 25,000 inhabitants over the previous 
ten years. Atlanta had come the closest, pushing ahead by 24,400 
to 89,900. The 12,200 augmentation for Birmingham (38,400) de-
molished the extravagant predictions by New South spokesmen that 
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it would soon rival Pittsburgh, a city of 451,500 at the turn of the 
century. An increasingly settled state of urban relations in the South 
made it difficult for new and smaller cities to get ahead. By the dawn 
of the twentieth century, the 10,000 mark had lost relevance as a 
measurement of urbanism. Once metropolises had hewed out and 
established hinterlands, rapid advances by lesser places became dif-
ficult outside newly opened areas. The New South advocates did 
the South a disservice by claiming that the very adoption of a pro-
gram designed to attract northern monies would soon allow Dixie 
to build a series of monster great cities. Such a statement made 
substantial achievements appear almost as failures. 
Southern urbanization in the Gilded Age underscored the con-
tinuity of the section's experience. Economic, social, racial, reli-
gious, and political attitudes all had antebellum roots. Neither the 
Civil War nor Reconstruction had much more than a temporarily 
disruptive impact on southern cities. Indeed, there was little need 
to transform these cities so that they reflected northern images be-
cause they had mirrored national urban values since colonial times. 
The manner of their construction and their attempt to garner mar-
kets through transportation systems were all in line with the pre-
vailing trends in American city making. Even so, the realization that 
the South lacked the resources to achieve urban and hence economic 
parity with the rest of the country dulled the spirit of many white 
southerners. An inferior agricultural system militated against a 
quick recovery. In the wake of the failed agrarian crusade, southern 
leaders concentrated on maintaining segregation and remembering 
the Lost Cause. A general acceptance of second-class status in the 
Union in exchange for a measure of social control over internal 
affairs gave the South the appearance of a failed and conservative 
bastion. The failure to realize the plans of the New South leaders 
obscured the continuity and the progress made in southern city 
building. At the same time the New South concept provided, as had 
J.D.B. DeBow in antebellum days, a rationale for building the very 
kind of urban society about which Thomas Jefferson had expressed 
ambivalence. Throughout the process the cities remained the best 
hope for a progressive South. Indeed, they continued to grow along 
logical lines. The next stratum developed in Florida. 
Events that transpired in Florida, where northern capitalist 
Henry Morrison Flagler sought to become the Sunshine State's coun-
terpart of empire builder James J. Hill in the Northwest, provided 
hope for the future. Henry Grady claimed that by 1889 Flagler had 
already invested $7 million in Florida hotel properties and superb 
winter homes. "The tide of travel," Grady wrote, "is turning again, 
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and Florida is not only confirmed as the winter garden of the Re-
public, but its sanitarium."2 According to the 1890 census, Florida 
was the last frontier in the continental United States. In 1888 Flagler, 
after a short Florida retirement, bought a short-line railroad that ran 
between Jacksonville and St. Augustine. Other acquisitions fol-
lowed, leading to the creation of the Flagler System, which domi-
nated Florida railroading. In 1896 Flagler's Florida East Coast 
Railroad reached Miami, 366 miles south of Jacksonville. In 1912, 
a year before his death, Flagler finished a spectacular extension of 
his railroad south from Miami through the Florida Keys over a series 
of bridges to Key West. In conjunction with his railroad properties, 
he started land companies, newspapers, cattle ranches, and utilities. 
Of special significance was his promotion of tourism, a relatively 
new and untried concept. Large Victorian-style resort hotels that he 
erected, including the elegantly named Ponce de Leon in St. Au-
gustine, the Royal Poinciana in Palm Beach, and the Royal Palm in 
Miami, became national landmarks and symbols of vacation para-
dises. Flagler's promotional literature called St. Augustine the "Old-
est City in America" and Key West "America's Gibraltar."3 
As was to be expected, a few unreconstructed southern nation-
alists denounced Flagler as another in a long line of northern rascals 
bent on keeping the South in colonial bondage. This evaluation of 
course overlooked a fundamental postulate of the New South phi-
losophy, namely the notion that the section could best advance by 
attracting such men as Flagler. According to this assumption, out-
side capital was actually beneficial because it would create jobs and 
provide the means by which the South would eventually break away 
from northern control. 
Florida boomed in the first thirty years of the twentieth century. 
Promoters touted the eastern seaboard as the Gold Coast and the 
building of railroads down the West Coast helped to stimulate set-
tlement further. Both the citrus and the cattle industries gained 
national markets, more and more retirees found Florida suitable to 
their needs, and tourism increased at a steady rate, especially during 
the general prosperity of the 1920s. Destructive hurricanes, over-
building, environmental concerns, and recurrent land scandals failed 
to stop progress. The sudden surge was reminiscent of that in Ohio 
early in the nineteenth century. 
The population of the Sunshine State rose from 528,500 in 1900 
to 1.5 million in 1930, and the number of cities with more than 
10,000 inhabitants increased from 4 to 14, as shown by Table 7. The 
1930 census, using a 2,500 mark as the breaking point between rural 
and urban territory, showed Florida as 52 percent urban. In the South 
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Table 7. Thirty-Year Growth Percentages for Florida Cities over 
10,000 in 1930 
Population Increase 
City 1900 1930 Number Percent 
Daytona Beach 1,690 16,598 14,908 882 
Gainesville 3,633 10,465 6,832 188 
Jacksonville 28,429 129,549 101,120 556 
Key West 17,114 12,831 -4,283 -25 
Lakeland 1,180 18,554 17,374 1,472 
Miami 1,681 110,637 108,956 6,482 
Orlando 2,481 27,330 24,849 1,002 
Pensacola 17,747 31,579 13,852 78 
St. Augustine 4,272 12,111 7,839 184 
St. Petersburg 1,575 40,425 38,850 2,467 
Sanford 1,450 10,100 8,650 5,767 
Tallahassee 2,981 10,700 7,719 259 
Tampa 15,839 101,161 85,322 539 
West Palm Beach 564 26,610 26,046 4,618 
only Maryland, at 60 percent, had a larger percentage of urbanites. 
Miami, a village of 1,700 people in 1900, had 110,600 thirty years 
later. In the 1920s alone it added 81,100 inhabitants, for an increase 
of 2 7 4.1 percent. Two additional Florida cities had crossed the 
100,000 mark by 1930-Jacksonville and Tampa. Many other places 
rose in spectacular fashion. Between 1900 and 1930 eight of the 
fourteen cities added over 10,000 people, and six increased by more 
than 1,000 percent. Key West was the single significant Florida city 
that decreased in size; its population dropped from 17,100 to 12,800 
as a result of a decline in fishing and naval activities. The new urban 
centers led the way in furthering the fortunes of the Sunrise State. 
Many southerners felt uncomfortable with the rapid urbanization 
of Florida. They either ignored it, hoping that it would go away, or 
believed that the state reflected the further imposition of Yankee 
values upon Dixie. 
Some southerners preferred to regard Texas and Oklahoma as 
part of the South. Somehow these states were considered more 
southern in a philosophical way than Florida, which tended to be 
associated with northern philistines, especially those from New 
York. It made little difference that considerable northeastern money 
went into southwestern petroleum and transportation projects. This 
influx of northern capital was not as obvious as northeastern tourists 
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and migrants in Florida. Nor did it matter that most people in Texas 
and Oklahoma considered themselves westerners, with economic 
and social ties outside the South. They could not deny, however, 
that Texas had fought on the side of the Confederacy and that Okla-
homa had Confederate connections. 
The demographic result, whether intentional or not, was an ar-
bitrary but considerable increase in the size and prowess of the urban 
South. In 1930 Texas had seventeen cities with populations of more 
than 25,000, and Oklahoma had four. Seven of the cities in the two 
states had in excess of 100,000 people. 
Houston 292,400 Fort Worth 
Dallas 260,500 Tulsa 
San Antonio 231,500 El Paso 




The two biggest places in the Sooner State, Oklahoma City and 
Tulsa, grew by more than 100 percent in the 1920s. In the Lone Star 
State, which had very liberal annexation laws, so that it was fairly 
easy for larger communities to gobble up suburbs. Though the in-
clusion of El Paso and Tulsa in the South may have puzzled some 
observers, the first stirrings were occurring that would lead in the 
direction of a larger cultural, economic, and political superregion 
called the Sunbelt. Urban rather than agricultural values would 
shape new dispensations. 
As 1930 statistics indicated, the biggest cities of the Progressive 


















In all, these places accounted for eleven of the ninety-three cities in 
the United States with populations of more than 100,000. Another 
fifteen of the southern localities had more than 50,000 inhabitants. 
Metropolitan area figures for the big cities made them seem even 
more impressive, with a few places adding more than 100,000 resi-
dents in the 1920s. Observers of the urban scene many decades later 
in the South often failed to notice, however, that so-called white 
flight from central cities started very early in the century. Subur-
banization in and outside the South was part of a general fragmen-
tation of metropolitan America. In 1930 Atlanta's metropolitan 
population was 440,900 and Birmingham's 431,500. In the first thirty 
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years of the twentieth century, cities in the South represented bright 
spots in a perpetually depressed and racially divided society that felt 
oppressed and exploited by colonialism. 
Northern capital lured into Dixie by various inducements, rang-
ing from tax breaks to excellent railroad freight deferentials, helped 
create a number of medium-sized industrial towns. By 1930 industry 
had brought considerable progress in such places as Selma (18,000) 
in Alabama, Brunswick (14,000) in Georgia, and Kingsport (11,900) 
in Tennessee. Still, the largest number were in the Carolinas, where 
the "Cotton Mill Campaign" of the New South era eventually bore 
fruit. In addition, the tobacco industry expanded after the federal 
courts in 1911 ordered the breakup of the American Tobacco Com-
pany trust. Electrification and trunk railroads were additional fac-
tors. In 1929 the South had almost 64 percent of all the nation's 
textile spindles and produced 84 percent of all cigarettes.4 At the 
start of the Great Depression, the South produced about 12 percent 
of the nation's manufacturing products, but most of the profits left 
the region. Outsiders quickly learned that for small initial invest-
ments they could pay low wages, engage in exploitative labor prac-
tices, buy politicians, charge high interest rates, and realize lucrative 
profits while reinvesting little in return. For unenlightened and ruth-
less capitalists willing to tolerate lethargic laborers, corrupt politi-
cians, racial segregation, and hostility toward outsiders, the South 
was a land of opportunity. 
Prophets of industry, in the belief that a continued expansion 
of manufacturing would solve any short-term difficulties, continued 
to claim that factories would allow the section to regain the great-
ness of its past. Edmonds of the Baltimore Manufacturers' Record 
remained convinced of what he considered the region's "boundless 
potentialities." In 1929, a year before his death, he claimed the South 
was "writing an Epic of Progress and Prosperity in Letters of Gold." 
He and his fellow promoters contended that the South of the Roaring 
Twenties was on the verge on an economic renaissance. "An electric 
spark has fired the South to build anew civilization," an enthusiastic 
promoter asserted in 1928. Two years later a North Carolina econo-
mist claimed, "The new industry of the South is part and parcel of 
a larger economy ... a pecuniary society, whose economic ramifi-
cations extend over an ever widening area."5 It followed that north-
ern capital was a blessing rather than an evil. A job was a job, the 
reasoning went, and it made no difference where the investment 
capital came from. Wages were of course another matter. A 1922 
survey indicated that average hourly earnings in Massachusetts tex-
tile mills were 40.9 cents compared with 32.5 cents an hour in Vir-
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gmta and 21 cents in Alabama.6 Industrial progress, despite the 
enthusiastic claims, carried a heavy price tag. 
Northern interests had not moved South to help Dixie develop 
rival industrial components. Developments in the steel industry 
made this point abundantly clear. In the Birmingham area and else-
where in Alabama the giant Tennessee Coal and Iron Company, a 
subsidiary of U.S. Steel of Pittsburgh, after a controversial 1907 
merger, expanded its operations at a much slower rate than seemed 
warranted in the eyes of southerners. They argued that the slow rate 
of expansion was intended to protect already operating northern 
mills, a charge denied by Pittsburgh steel producers, who asserted 
that the South lacked markets. No one mentioned the fact that, since 
about the turn of the century, price fixing had prevailed under the 
patently unfair "Pittsburgh Plus" plan. Through this arrangement, 
Birmingham and other mills had to charge listed Pittsburgh prices, 
plus the freight rates from Pittsburgh. To make matters worse, agree-
ments restricted Birmingham forges to the production of less prof-
itable kinds of iron and steel. Fabricators in the South had to pay 
much more for their steel than competitors in the Pittsburgh area. 
Even after the Federal Trade Commission had outlawed Pittsburgh 
Plus in 1924, the southern mills remained at a disadvantage. A "mul-
tiple basing point" formula that lasted for the next fourteen years 
arbitrarily held Birmingham prices $3.00 to $5.00 a ton above those 
in Pittsburgh_? It was one thing for southerners to develop regional 
food processing, lumber, and paper industries but quite another to 
challenge the very heart of the northern manufacturing machine. 
Southern white mill workers received lower wages and in gen-
eral had poorer working conditions than their counterparts in the 
North. During the 1920s, southern promoters of industrial progress 
contended that the region's conservative "Anglo-Saxon" laborers 
hated unions, abhorred government interference, obeyed employers, 
and worked cheap. The Macon Chamber of Commerce claimed that 
local operatives were "thrifty, industrious, and one hundred per cent 
American." Kwanians in Marion, North Carolina, trying to lure 
northern money to their fair city, noted that "every factory or branch 
of industry is certain to be able to secure adequate, satisfactory and 
contented labor."8 Rhetoric throughout the South emphasized the 
docility of workers and their willingness to work long hours under 
the harshest of conditions. In 1925 a writer in an Atlanta business 
publication wrote, "The New England mills are forced to operate 
largely with unruly, indifferent, ignorant foreign labor. Southern 
mill hands are now in their second generation, skilled, reliable and 
intelligent. The supply of native white labor is ample for present 
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and future cotton manufacturing needs. It has been demonstrated, 
too, that the negro can be quickly trained for certain of the less 
important jobs."9 No southern state had minimum-wage legislation, 
and many states resisted attempts to curtail the use of child labor. 
What passed for a reform in North Carolina limited women em-
ployees to twelve-hour days. 
The prevailing situation helped make labor agitation inevitable. 
Prior to World War I most union activity in the South involved 
skilled workers. During hostilities union organizing resulted in bit-
ter strikes in the steel and textile industriesi in 1918 authorities 
used troops to break unpopular walkouts in Anderson and Columbus 
cotton mills. Most gains made by national unions were lost after 
the war. Nine thousand textile workers suffered defeat in 1921 North 
Carolina labor disturbances that followed massive layoffs during an 
economic downturn. In the round of prosperity that followed, unions 
lost influence. In 1927 and 1928, when textile owners, faced with 
growing competition and falling prices, introduced increased work-
loads, new organizing efforts followed. A great deal of violence oc-
curred, especially in Elizabethton, Tennessee, and Marion, North 
Carolina. A 1929 communist-led strike in Gaston failed completely 
and convinced many southerners that there was a connection be-
tween unions and radicalism.l0 As a result of the harsh disputes, 
organized labor made little progress. Many textile mills, never very 
pleasant places to work, remained unorganized, the unhappy con-
sequence of the New South philosophy. The conduct on the Pied-
mont of the erstwhile "Lords of the Loom," coupled with that of 
the hard-driving Pittsburgh steel makers, had a backlash in Dixie 
that would lead people to question the whole concept of an urban 
South. 
Control of blacks persisted as an important white preoccupation 
in the urban South. The suppression of black rights took many 
forms. A severe race riot in Atlanta in 1906, in which whites invaded 
black neighborhoods to attack innocent victims, provided a brutal 
example of direct tactics. Blacks' boycott of Jim Crow streetcars 
failed. Residential segregation became more rigid and codified by 
law. Lynchings served as another means of keeping blacks aware 
that they were in a subservient position. Gains made by blacks in 
the World War I period, when manpower shortages opened up jobs 
previously held solely by whites, only intensified efforts to segregate 
and intimidate them further. The revival of the Ku Klux Klan 
shocked many peoplei in the urban South the nationwide organi-
zation-it had powerful Klaverns in Indiana and northern Wiscon-
sin-while opposing Roman Catholicism and supporting its own 
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version of moral purity, was known as a self-proclaimed bulwark of 
white supremacy. The Robert E. Lee Klan No. l in Birmingham 
claimed 10,000 members; Klansmen arrogantly and incorrectly 
called Atlanta the "Imperial City." 11 A Memphis newspaper called 
Booker T. Washington an "Alabama coon." 12 
Blacks had little recourse, apart from moving north, except to 
adjust as best they could. Their ghettos, usually hewed out of old 
shanty towns established on the edge of cities during Reconstruc-
tion, became "Hidden Communities," with commercial and politi-
cal institutions divorced from the white world. Blacks lived a world 
apart, denied the vote and segregated by a growing body of ordinances 
that humiliated them by requiring them to use separate water foun-
tains and seats in the back of public conveyances. Even though 
blacks performed the most menial and hardest jobs in the urban 
South, they had little to say about how cities were run. In 1920 
Baltimore was 15 percent black and New Orleans 26 percent, but 
white officials determined the course of urban life. 
At least two cities had classic urban political machines, which 
handled most public welfare for both whites and blacks. In Memphis, 
Edward "Boss" Crump, who originally gained power as a reformer, 
dominated the city for several decades, using ruthless political 
methods. Popular with the voters for his low tax policies, segrega-
tionist views, and improvement of the park and boulevard system, 
Crump was strongly probusiness. "Memphis," he said, "should be 
conducted as a great business corporation." 13 Crump's counterpart 
in New Orleans, Martin Behrman, was a former Jew from New York 
who converted to Roman Catholicism. His political organization, 
the Choctaw Club, dominated the Crescent City's political scene 
for most of the first quarter of the twentieth century. Large public 
works projects that Behrman championed, even ones that generated 
huge debts, gained massive voter support. Behrman and Crump both 
understood that the delivery of popular services more than com-
pensated for the cost at election time. 
Southern urban governments, despite a conservative image, 
quickly adopted much heralded improvements in governmental 
forms, designed to promote efficiency and professionalism. Staun-
ton, Virginia, appointed the nation's first city manager in 1908. 
Chattanooga, Birmingham, Mobile, and Memphis all adopted the 
commission plan. Some observers believed the changes cosmetic. 
In 1927 William J. Robertson, a critic of southern urban govern-
ments, called the average mayor in the South "a weak vessel, subject 
to the beck and call of the unscrupulous politicians" and claimed 
that every city with a population of more than 75,000 had "a political 
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organization as formidable as Tammany Hall in its machine rule, 
and in its ability to take care of its political friends." While this may 
have been the situation in a few places, rather benevolent business 
government was the rule throughout the urban South of the Pro-
gressive era. An exception was Washington, which was governed by 
Congress and three commissioners appointed by the president. Ur-
ban reformer Frederic C. Howe praised this undemocratic arrange-
ment, claiming, "True, Washington is governed in an autocratic 
way, for in the Capital City the city is disfranchised .... Washington 
is probably as honestly governed as is any European municipality, 
and it has been for years. Its streets are clean, well lighted, and well 
protected by the police. Its school system is among the best, and its 
health, fire, and many other departments are beyond serious criti-
cism."14 
Southern city governments made the transition to larger and 
generally more efficient administrations far more readily than many 
of those in the North, where rapid economic, technological, and 
ethnic changes proved more than some leadership groups could han-
dle. In the 1890s both Kansas City and Denver came close to social 
disintegration, when their business communities lost touch with 
the flow of events. In these places and others, including New York, 
Chicago, and Boston, only powerful machine rule stabilized affairs. 
James and Thomas Pendergast in Kansas City and several Tammany 
Hall leaders in New York were able through their ties to a wide 
range of groups in society to achieve a community consensus. In the 
South such a process was unnecessary-both Crump and Behrman 
relied primarily on native white support. White supremacy provided 
a common ground for most whites; the legacy of controlling blacks 
contributed to a general concern for stability. The slackening off of 
immigration and migration made for an increasingly homogeneous 
white population. Slower growth rates in the South were other con-
tributing factors. The continuity that characterized southern urban 
development necessitated a different kind of response from that in 
the teeming northern immigrant cities. 
Many urban changes took place in America in the first thirty 
years of the twentieth century. The "great cities" that had emerged 
by 1890 continued to grow. The need for urban services fueled a 
mounting professionalism in city government. The "Horse City" 
ended and the age of the automobile started. Not only did the motor 
vehicle substitute one form of pollution for another, but it affected 
everything from police responsibilities to the spatial characteristics 
of urban areas. Of special significance was the furthering of suburban 
development. Downtown areas made what amounted to a last stand. 
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The building of great skyscrapers provided a false sense of perma-
nence, drawing attention away from the first suburban shopping 
centers. Zoning ordinances, an innovation, could potentially change 
the traditional appearance of cities. The ready availability of elec-
tricity and gas had important implications for energy use. Home 
ownership became a major goal of urban Americans. The agricultural 
nation receded into the past; in 1920 the census reported that more 
than half the people in the country lived in urban territory. The new 
urban identity did not bypass the South. Atlanta, Baltimore, and 
Washington gained networks of automobile suburbs. 15 Automobile 
dealerships became some of Dixie's fastest growing businesses. Tall 
buildings thrust toward the skies from Baltimore to New Orleans. 
To the extent that resources permitted, southern cities and urban 
dwellers embraced "modern urban America." 
An important aspect of the Progressive era was the changing 
scope of urban planning, as the City Beautiful movement of the 
Gilded Age moved beyond parks and boulevards. Two important 
projects in Chicago helped to set the stage. George Pullman built 
an entire planned industrial town; Daniel H. Burnham directed the 
construction of the "White City" at the 1893 Columbia Exposition. 
Violent strikes ruined Pullman's paternalistic experiment. Critics 
called Burnham's emphasis on Classical or Renaissance styles out-
dated and undemocratic. Pullman received praise from many Eu-
ropean experts, and 27 million people visited the White City. No 
matter what flaws were involved, both schemes tended to advance 
urban planning. An application of technology led to a new trend, 
the "City Efficient" movement, which applied the latest engineering 
principals to urban problems ranging from the construction of traffic 
intersections to the placement of water hydrants. So much structural 
reform occurred that municipal expert William Bennett Munro 
wrote in 1918, "American cities have made more progress in the 
direction of clean and efficient government within the last ten years 
than they were able to make during the preceding fifty." 16 Once 
people knew how to run modern cities, a consensus quickly devel-
oped that dictated the course of municipal administration for much 
of the twentieth century. Urban administration moved from the 
realm of experimentation to that of application, management, and 
funding levels. 
The South, with its long tradition of urban planning stretching 
back to colonial Jamestown, was receptive to the new trends. A 
government report misleadingly claimed that only 71 of 786 official 
planning commissions in the country were in the South. Civic or-
ganizations, women's clubs, chambers of commerce, and profes-
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sional groups provided the sinews of a fairly comprehensive planning 
network that augmented the efforts of official bodies. City-sanc-
tioned planning commissions in Atlanta, Memphis, Knoxville, New 
Orleans, and Nashville all evolved from unofficial planning com-
mittees. Pie-in-the-sky proposals involving the moving of railroad 
stations and the building of great civic art galleries usually went for 
nought, although there were some solid achievements in the form 
of zoning and transportation ordinances. Plans for center cores and 
environs served cities well, especially the major ones, in ensuing 
years and sometimes decades down the line. An increasingly com-
monly view held that planning was the way to cope with the prob-
lems of the modern city. 
Trying to keep pace with the need for increasingly complex lev-
els of urban services taxed the resources of southern city govern-
ments. More than half of all municipal expenditures in the 1920s 
in cities were usually dedicated to police and fire protection plus 
education. Because the black voters remained disenfranchised, white 
electorates determined their needs, much to their disadvantage. The 
maintenance of separate school systems for blacks and whites taxed 
available resources. Even though a disproportionate amount of the 
funds went to the white schools, both white and black institutions 
failed to meet national standards. Still, given the depressing nature 
of "separate but equal" education, schools enjoyed widespread sup-
port. People at the bottom saw education as a way for their children 
to get ahead; conservatives approved the teaching of patriotism and 
societal values. Appropriations for the police continued to reflect a 
traditional strong sense of law and order among white southerners. 
Between 1920 and 1930 police appropriations in Atlanta increased 
from $468,900 to $903,500. The same trend prevailed in Birmingham 
and New Orleans. In 1928law enforcement costs accounted for 14.5 
percent of the city budget in Charleston, 10.5 percent in Birming-
ham, and 9.5 percent in Memphis. Fire departments gained larger 
and larger outlays in direct proportion to increased urban congestion 
and size. In the twenties the departments in New Orleans, Bir-
mingham, Memphis, Nashville, and Knoxville sometimes received 
more money annually than the police. 17 
Other areas of concern required attention. The extension of 
sewer lines and street improvements continued to occupy city of-
ficials. Almost always, black districts got short shrift; most had in-
adequate sewerages and unpaved roadways. Charitable and health 
spending remained at low levels; the largest cost was usually a city 
medical facility, such as Henry Grady Hospital in Atlanta. By the 
1920s systematic collections had resolved the "garbage question" in 
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the South and elsewhere. The automobile reduced the amount of 
filth in the streets, and horses virtually disappeared. The Progressive 
era saw few refinements in municipal affairs beyond better-built 
machines and better-trained bureaucrats. Given the twin burdens of 
fiscal restraints and the issue of race, southern cities did quite well 
in dealing with their daily urban services-at least in regard to the 
needs of their white citizens. 
By the 1920s it seemed to some observers that southerners had 
achieved a better understanding of an urban civilization and that 
the section was experiencing an urban rebirth. The process started 
during World War I. While hostilities did not last long enough to 
have an obvious impact on southern urbanization, war orders and 
military activities had caused an unexpected round of prosperity that 
extended into peacetime. A new spirit of progress and hope seemed 
abroad in Dixie. 18 
Numerous forms of boosterism swept through the urban South. 
The enthusiasm of the New South movement lived on. "Atlanta," 
a supporter gushingly proclaimed in 1924, "stands for the New 
South, the New South with all the romance of music, beauty, poetry, 
idealism of a fading past." The same year a resident of the Crescent 
City declared, "With 206 years to its credit, New Orleans is one of 
the oldest cities in the land. But its ways are young." A fiftieth 
anniversary tract for Birmingham proclaimed, "The dream of the 
founders of Birmingham has been more than fulfilled .... there are 
those of vision who see this city four-fold in numbers, in size, in 
worth .... And, viewed in the light of what has gone before, who 
shall say their vision is idle?"19 In 1925 a reporter, trying to catch 
the spirit of the times, wrote, "The average Southern is a born 
booster, and the mood is contagious." Three thousand salesmen, 
including William Jennings Bryan for a handsome promotional fee, 
praised the virtues of Coral Gables, Florida. On the eve of the Great 
Depression the governor of Virginia said, "The South is being 
pointed to today as the West was in a former period-as the land of 
promise." A Journalist for the New York Herald-Tribune noted in 
1930, "The clamor of Chambers of Commerce, the seductive pro-
paganda of city and state industrial development boards, the rattling 
knives and forks and pepful jollities of Rotarians, Kiwanians, Lions, 
and Exchange Clubs are filling the erstwhile languorous wistaria-
scented air with such a din these days that every visitor must rec-
ognize immediately a land of business progress."20 Bobbitt, Sinclair 
Lewis's penetrating novel about city life, could just as well have 
been set in the Buckhead section of Atlanta as in a composite mid-
western city. 
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Some of the more ardent boosters were aspiring real estate op-
erators and owners of small local businesses. These people expressed 
their concerns through service clubs, such as the Elks, Kiwanis, and 
Lions, plus promotional publications. Whether they believed their 
own propaganda (a tasteless piece in the City Builder of Atlanta in 
1925 read: "Henry Woodfin Grady became the embodiment of the 
Atlanta Spirit. Indeed, Grady became the Spirit of Atlanta")21 was 
beside the point. The boosters all had economic stakes, be it a hab-
erdashery or vacant lot, in their communities, and it therefore be-
hooved them to put their best foot forward. Frequently their plans 
were small and their sell too hard. 
Just as often, boosters in the urban South actually had little to 
say about the broader contours of community direction and devel-
opment. In the big cities, including Birmingham and Atlanta, formal 
or informal groups of leading businessmen, many of whom had po-
litical leaders at their beck and call, set policies. Each business 
leader, in addition to larger concerns, frequently had his own con-
stituency to look after. The situation in medium-sized towns was 
somewhat different. In some older communities, one or maybe two 
mill or cotton press owners ran the town. They were usually unen-
thusiastic about change, fearing that it might upset a settled state 
and threaten their control. In many of the newer mill towns, local 
managers wielded considerable power, but they were merely the on-
the-scene representatives of northern owners. To them, the price of 
Japanese textiles might be of greater importance than what tran-
spired in some obscure southern mill town. 22 
Southern intellectuals criticized the booster spirit and what they 
saw as a trend toward urbanism calculated to undermine or destroy 
traditional values. "Everywhere people were pushing one another 
into the slums or the country," novelist Ellen Glasgow of Richmond 
observed in 1922. "Everywhere the past was going out with the times 
and the future was coming on in a torrent .... To add more and more 
numbers; to build higher and higher; to push harder and harder; and 
particularly to improve what had already been added or built or 
pushed-these impulses had united at last into a frenzied activity ."23 
In 1923 Thomas Wolfe, from the vantage point of his New York 
apartment, scathingly criticized the "cheap Board of Trade Boosters, 
and blatant pamphleteers" who had, in his view, hurt rather than 
helped his hometown of Asheville, North Carolina. "I will say," 
Wolfe complained, "that 'Greater Asheville' does not necessarily 
mean '100,000 by 1930/ that we are not necessarily four times as 
civilized as our grandfathers because we go four times as fast in 
automobiles, because our buildings are four times as tall." Wolfe 
118 THE URBAN SOUTH 
believed that southerners had emerged "into the kind of sunlight of 
another century."24 The materialism of urban progress disturbed 
people of letters. "Can we afford to be rich?" Mary and Stanley 
Chapman asked in the South Atlantic Quarterly. "We must look 
well into our consciences before we answer this question, for the 
loss of our spiritual grace is too high a price to pay for any material 
gain."25 Such attacks on city growth, very Jeffersonian in conception, 
placed leading southern intellectuals squarely in a national antiur-
ban tradition of long standing. Certainly urban life had its deplorable 
features and a corresponding loss of rural values. Levels of antiur-
banism increased in direct proportion to the movement of people 
from farms to cities. 
The southern retrenchment of the 1890s did not mean a cur-
tailment of progress. Rather, it served as recognition that no way 
existed for the South to regain parity with the North quickly within 
the federal Union. The sorry state of southern agriculture precluded 
the building of the kind of regional hinterlands that were needed to 
sustain rapid urban growth. The segregation system further com-
plicated and aggravated an already unfortunate situation. City build-
ing proceeded within the limits imposed on a defeated society 
restricted by a lack of capital, inadequate transportation arrange-
ments, poor proximity to major markets, and outside control. Under 
the adverse circumstances, urbanization proceeded quite well and 
usually at a steady pace in all except a few of the old Gilded Age 
cities. Atlanta and Birmingham flourished; Mobile and Charleston 
faded. In Florida another stratum of southern cities appeared. Even 
though promotional claims overreached, the Sunshine State 
achieved solid urban growth. On the western fringes of the South, 
Texas and Oklahoma gained major urban components. Throughout 
the South, manufacturing, even though hurt by outside marketing 
influences, advanced faster than ever before in the section's history. 
The poor working conditions and low wages in southern mills 
caused people to question the desirability of the trend. Heavily em-
bellished promotionalism repelled southern intellectuals, and as a 
result some southerners began to question the desirability of more 
urbanization in Dixie. By the start of the Great Depression, this 
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In 1930 a group of Vanderbilt University intellectuals collectively 
contributed to a book of essays, I'll Take My Stand: The South and 
the Agrarian Tradition. They attacked industrialism and applied 
science, deplored the trend toward urbanization in the South, and 
called for a return to agrarian values. They denigrated capitalism 
and communism as twin menaces that, given the "blind drift" of 
industrialism, would produce identical economic systems in both 
the United States and the Soviet Union. 1 
For the Vanderbilt group the choice for the future was not be-
tween communism and capitalism but between industrialism and 
agrarianism. The group's members envisioned a utopian South "in 
which agriculture is the leading vocation, whether for wealth, for 
pleasure, or for prestige." One of their number denounced mass edu-
cation; another believed "the money economy" hurt farmers. A gen-
eral suspicion of machines and a need to establish mastery over them 
permeated the book. "We can accept the machine/' an essayist 
wrote, "but create our own attitude toward it." All the Nashville 
Agrarians deplored boosterism, calling upon their fellow southerners 
'
1to look very critically at the advantages of becoming a 'new South' 
which will be only an undistinguished replica of the usual industrial 
community."2 
The deliberately provocative essays called attention to the con-
tinual drift away from Jeffersonian principles in Dixie. While many 
southerners, white and black, may have agreed in general with the 
thoughts expressed in I'll Take My Stand, a return to an idealized 
past was out of the question by 1930. Even the Nashville Agrarians 
lived in a metropolitan area. The South proceeded, as it and the rest 
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of the nation had for decades, down the road to an increasingly ur-
banized society. 
The Nashville Agrarians came in for considerable ridicule and 
disapproval. Critics called them "typewriter agrarians" and "tower-
of-ivory agrarians." H.L. Mencken, who denounced them as 
"Agrarian Habakkuks," wrote, "Left to the farmers of Tennessee, 
they would be clad in Iinsey-woolsey and fed on side-meat, and the 
only books they could read would be excessively orthodox." 
Thoughtful observers believed that the South should face reality, 
accept industrialism, and work toward controlling its excesses. Wil-
liam Best Hesseltine, a young Virginia-born U.S. historian, declared 
in a 1931 article in the Sewanee Review, "The South has the op-
portunity to regulate industry before industry gets a strangle hold 
on the section. It ... can profit from the experience of the rest of 
the nation in such matters as the relations of capital and la-
bor .... None of these results can be obtained by a policy of ob-
scurantism, or by fostering a spirit of reaction."3 
The Nashville Agrarians welcomed such commentary even 
though they did not agree with the sentiments. They envisioned a 
great popular movement to promote an agrarian America. Although 
nothing came of that sophistry-few people in a time of depression 
cared about the philosophical positions of a few Vanderbilt schol-
ars-a bitter irony was that, before the 1930s had ended, the South 
in the popular mind had come to be regarded as more agrarian than 
urban. The popular image, however, did not show the rural South 
that the agrarians had in mind. 
During the Great Depression many Americans outside the South 
received the impression through a variety of sources that the South 
was a land of dirt-poor croppers suffering from pellagra and hook-
worms. These unfortunates, blacks as well as whites, were depicted 
as classic victims of economic unrest-rural folk in bib overalls and 
worn dresses torn between old traditions and the brutality of modern 
life. Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins helped set the tone in an 
unfortunately worded 1933 statement in which she remarked, "A 
social revolution will take place if you put shoes on the people of 
the South."4 
Social programs inaugurated by Tennessee Valley Authority of-
ficials aimed at helping southern agrarians adjust to modern life. 
Sectional studies, especially Rupert Vance's Human Geography of 
the South (1932) and Howard W. Odum's Southern Regions in the 
United States ( 1936), which depicted croppers as victims of a lack 
of regional planning, furthered perceptions of a crisis in the rural 
South. Government writers, depression victims themselves, pro-
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duced These Are Our Lives, a powerful collection of case histories 
that emphasized the grim lot of tenant farmers. Erskine Caldwell's 
Tobacco Road (1932), Herbert Harrison Kroll's I Was a Sharecropper 
(1937), and John Steinbeck's Grapes of Wrath (1935) helped illustrate 
the plight of croppers. Studies that combined the written word and 
photographic documentation, including Archibald MacLeish, Land 
of the Free (1938), and James Agee and Walker Evans, Let Us Now 
Praise Famous Men (1941), movingly showed rural life unadorned. 
Photographers of the Farm Security Administration crisscrossed 
Dixie taking pictures of poor farmers. The photographs were often 
of great artistic quality. "Here," Alfred Kazin wrote, "was Ameri-
ca .... Here was the greatest creative irony the reportorial mind 
could establish-a picture of Negro farmers wandering on the road, 
eating their bread under a billboard poster furnished by the National 
Association of Manufacturers-'America Enjoys the Highest Stan-
dard of Living in the World.' "5 Here, seemingly, were useless, un-
wanted members of a society on its last legs, one that at a minimum 
still needed reconstruction. 
Assessments of the state of southern agriculture culminated 
with the issuance by the National Emergency Council of a 1938 
federal document, Report on the Economic Condition of the South, 
which reiterated that the rural South was in a sorry state. The re-
port's chief architect, Clark Howell Foreman, a southerner with a 
Ph.D. who had done graduate work at Harvard University, Columbia 
University, and the London School of Economics, had served Sec-
retary of Interior Harold Ickes as an adviser on black affairs. The 
sixty-four-page report, the draft of which took only a couple of weeks 
to write, reflected Foreman's acceptance of the assertions of Odum, 
Vance, and others that a ruthless brand of industrial paternalism 
held Dixie down. "The paradox of the South is that while it is blessed 
by Nature with immense wealth, its people as a whole are the poor-
est in the country," the Report on Economic Conditions claimed. 
"Lacking industries of its own, the South has been forced to trade 
the richness of its soil, its minerals and forests, and the labor of its 
people for goods manufactured elsewhere." The report, which fo-
cused on the states of the old Confederacy, plus Kentucky and Okla-
homa, contained the usual recitation of bleak statistics about the 
South. The section had half the nation's farmers and only one-fifth 
the agricultural implements. Illiteracy was high in underfunded 
school districts. Industrial income remained the lowest in the coun-
try. The region ranked first in child labor. More than 4 million 
families lived in substandard housing. Excessive credit costs, absen-
tee owners, high tariffs, and unfair freight rates prevented southern-
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ers from solving their own problems. "Penalized for being rural, and 
handicapped in its efforts to industrialize," the official paper stated, 
"the South, in fact, has been caught in a vise that has kept it from 
moving along with the main stream of American economic life."6 
The conclusions prompted President Franklin D. Roosevelt to 
call the South the "Nation's No. 1 economic problem," but he failed 
in his attempts to use the document as part of a strategy to defeat 
senators and congressmen he did not like and to promote liberal 
social legislation. In the North, a writer for the New York Times 
resented the suggestion that outside capital was responsible for the 
plight of southern agriculture; the Nation attacked the impact of 
"the financial imperialism of Northern big business" on the south-
ern way of life. On a different plane, many urban southerners, while 
offended by what they saw as a blatant attempt by Roosevelt to shape 
their politics, objected to the charges of backwardness in Dixie. Two 
viewpoints emerged. According to a journalist for the Miami Herald, 
the report showed that northerners were jealous of progress in the 
South. Reflecting the other viewpoint, an Atlanta Journal official 
said, "Just take off the differential freight rates and other discrimi-
natory legislation; send some of your technological and scientific 
skill down here; lend us some money at lower interest rates and 
we'll do the rest."7 Obviously, the kinds of abuses cited in the NEC 
report and enumerated by other observers did occur in the South. 
What went unsaid, even though it remained central to all discus-
sions, was the issue of black equality. So too did the extent of urban 
growth in the South. The Nashville Agrarians, the publicists of 
farmer degeneracy, and the authors of the NEC report all ignored 
the long course of city building in the South. It was almost as if 
Dixie had no urban components. 
When New Deal theorists did think of cities, they considered 
them in a national context rather than a regional one. A 1937 federal 
report by the Urbanism Committee to the National Resources Com-
mittee contended that cities had received more "widespread national 
neglect" than any other part of the "national existence." The report, 
Our Cities: Their Role in the National Economy, stated: "Whether 
this is to be attributed to the absorption of our best efforts by the 
demands of our commercial and industrial system, or by other press-
ing claims of national policy, it is evident that America must now 
set out to overcome the continual and cumulative disregard of urban 
policies and administration and to take into account the place of 
the urban community in the national economy."8 The speed of ur-
banization accentuated the problem. Between 1900 and 1920 the 
urban population of the United States grew from 30 million to 69 
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million, representing an increase of about 130 percent. The rate 
slowed to 26 percent in the 1920s and to an estimated 3 percent 
from 1930 to 1935. The report enumerated a number of urban prob-
lems: dangers to public health, pollution, inadequate recreational 
facilities, congestion, unattractive districts, lags in public improve-
ments, and the like. 
The committee recommended that Congress continue to assist 
urban welfare programs, establish permanent public works projects, 
rehouse low income groups, and promote planning at various levels 
of government. In calling for a national urban policy, the committee 
members made the uninsightful observations that urban dwellers 
were "by no means of uniform type" and that cities "must be dis-
tinguished according to the principal function they serve." A pro-
posed need to establish norms to delineate the nature of urban life 
left out the South. "The most significant industrial cities of the 
United States are concentrated in a belt extending from New England 
as far south as New Jersey and as far west as Illinois," their report 
stated. "It is in this area, therefore, that in general we may expect 
to find the most characteristic manifestations of urban life in the 
United States."9 Even New Deal planners encouraged southerners 
to regard their cities as having a different legacy. Such thinking by 
policy makers about the development of cities in Dixie was enough 
to make Henry Grady roll over in his grave. Fortunately, in a time 
of national trial, such thinking did not stop federal money from 
flowing into urban Dixie. 
Between 1933 and 1939 the national government spent more 
than $2 billion in the South. Much of the money helped cities either 
directly or indirectly. The Agricultural Adjustment Act, plus special 
legislation to help the marketing of cotton and tobacco, provided 
the basis for rejuvenating agriculture. These and other measures 
automatically helped cities by enhancing the quality of their hin-
terlands. The creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority did the 
same and more. 
Despite its controversial aspects-critics charged it represented 
an attempt to socialize America-the TVA had the potential to im-
prove the economic and social status of a whole region. In an im-
mediate sense the huge new agency's dam building and 
electrification endeavors resulted in thousands of construction jobs. 
Some of the main southern industries, textiles, tobacco, food, pulp, 
and paper, did not decline percentage-wise between 1929 and 1933 
to the extent that manufacturing did in the North. Unfortunately, 
industry in Dixie was not on as firm a ground as the statistical 
compilations could be interpreted to indicate, because southern 
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firms had been on weak ground all through the 1920s. Moreover, 
the Birmingham steel industry went into a tailspin early in the 
depression. Consequently, the downturn, in spite of a few bright 
spots, in particular the cigarette industry in Richmond, was as se-
rious in the urban South as elsewhere. Indeed, given the sorry state 
of agriculture and corresponding slumps in retail sales and com-
mercial transactions, overall conditions may actually have been 
worse in Dixie's towns. 
Early in the crisis much of the aid came from the stopgap Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration and the Civil Works Administra-
tion, but by the middle 1930s, as the New Deal became more in-
stitutionalized, a number of agencies engaged in relief endeavors. 
Certain small ones, the National Youth Administration and theRe-
settlement Administration, had only local significance. The first 
housing projects had little impact beyond setting precedents for fu-
ture large developments. The biggest expenditures came from two 
gigantic agencies, the Works Progress Administration and the Public 
Works Administration. The New Deal worked mightily to help and, 
at the same time, to keep the Solid South in the Democratic column 
at election time. 
The New Deal agencies underwrote a wide variety of projects 
in the urban South. Sometimes federal officials gave out the aid. At 
other intervals, it passed through state and local units of govern-
ments. In those instances, the risk of corrupt practices multiplied. 
Edward Crump of Tennessee, Huey Long of Louisiana, and Herman 
Talmadge of Georgia came under close scrutiny because of fear that 
they might divert relief funds for their own purposes. No major 
federal prosecutions resulted, but some excesses occurred. In Nash-
ville the state WPA administrator in Tennessee erected a $2,497 
monument in his honor and engaged in other questionable practices, 
including building a steeplechase course for a private riding club. 10 
Large sums of money were involved; expenditures in Birming-
ham, among the hardest hit of southern cities, amounted to $361 
million alone between 1933 and 1937. Big projects funded through-
out the urban South included sewerages, streets, buildings, and 
bridges. The WPA built airports in Tampa and Nashville. Richmond 
gained from a number of depression-inspired enterprises: a bridge 
over the James River, a state library, and a high school. New Deal 
funds made possible the construction in Knoxville of several Uni-
versity of Tennessee buildings. Even small communities gained 
street and curb improvements. These and other schemes involved 
the services of tens of thousands of workers. Other funding helped 
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recovery following disastrous floods in the middle 1930s along the 
Ohio and Mississippi rivers. 
Compared with conditions in the depths of the Great Depres-
sion, circumstances improved considerably as the decade progressed. 
Florida cities, helped by a national revival of tourism, actually ex-
perienced something close to a boom; in 1936 Miami Beach reported 
the construction of 47 hotels and 74 apartment houses.l 1 Although 
some groups benefited more than others-black southerners prof-
ited the least-federal largess helped tremendously and established 
important precedents for the future. 
Memphis was in the enviable position of having the necessary 
political connections to receive considerable federal funds with little 
price to pay in return. Boss Edward Crump was one of Franklin 
Roosevelt's floor managers at the 1932 Democratic National Con-
vention, and members of the Tennessee congressional delegation 
had strong New Deal ties. Crump, long an advocate of public power 
projects, enthusiastically endorsed the creation of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority. The Memphis business community, after some 
initial fears about the cotton market, supported the policies of the 
first Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Businessmen in 
Memphis, as throughout the nation, first favored the National Re-
covery Administration and then turned against it. 
Within Memphis, the Public Works Administration spent $8.5 
million and the city $14 million, mostly raised through loans, to 
erect a number of buildings, notably a hospital and several public 
schools, and to finance street and other improvement projects. The 
United States Housing Authority, a spin-off from PWA, raised up 
several segregated housing projects. By 1938, the Works Progress 
Administration had spent $5.2 million to construct Crump Stadium, 
to build a municipal zoo, and to expand the airport. The various 
New Deal public works undertakings suited the needs of the ma-
chine. Tangible examples of progress, they provided jobs and thereby 
buttressed rather than undermined the authority of Crump's orga-
nization. As in other parts of the urban South, New Deal money did 
not alter the existing power structure. 
The city showed considerable reluctance to spend local tax 
money on relief, in 1937 allocating one-tenth of 1 percent of its 
annual budget on welfare expenditures, less than that authorized for 
golf course maintenance. A WPA regional administrator observed, 
"Memphis gave the distinct feeling that a warm welcome was 
extended to government concerning itself with the plight of the 
unemployed and paying the bills-as long as it is the Federal 
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government."12 Memphis officials, claiming that 56 percent of all 
residents made it through the depression without going on welfare, 
gave only cursory attention to helping destitute blacks, rural mi-
grants, and hard core poor. Almost all blacks fared badly and were 
forced to live in ramshackle houses in undesirable parts of town. 
Any aid they received from the New Deal came through the innately 
hostile machine. Crump, while continuing strongly to support Roo-
sevelt's spending measures, including a 1937 flood control bill that 
aided Memphis, became increasingly disenchanted with social pro-
grams intended to help blacks. Because federal authorities continued 
to work through the Crump machine, he remained in charge of Mem-
phis throughout the Great Depression. 
On the surface the southern cities of the 1930s seemed much 
like those around the rest of the nation. When the average city in 
the United States contained 21,800 inhabitants, the only difference 
in the South was that it did not have as many cities in that class as 
other sections. In 1930 Alabama had four cities of between 15,000 
and 25,000 people and North Carolina two; Massachusetts had eigh-
teen and Iowa five. The same was true of the big metropolises; no 
matter that they were in Georgia or Florida rather than Wisconsin 
or California, they shared similar attributes with those throughout 
urban America. From the air, cities appeared as a sprawling mass of 
structures and characterized by irregular checkerboard street pat-
terns. City centers remained crowded, filled with buildings built 
before the depression. The areas around downtown were usually in 
decay, with transportation facilities, light industries, and ware-
houses interspersed with dilapidated residences and roominghouses. 
Here recent migrants, blacks, and the homeless found refuge. Beyond 
that, middle-class apartment houses, usually close to local business 
districts, dotted the landscape. 
These classic conditions did not mean that all cities had the 
same features. Rather they simply reflected the somewhat monoto-
nous course of city development; one that in no small way related 
to land uses and values. "Gambling in land values had contributed 
to alternate booms and depressions, raising false hopes, encouraging 
over-ambitious structures, wiping out private investors, and, all in 
all, has been one of the major tragedies of American urban life," Our 
Cities claimed. "Inflated valuations have contributed to vertical ex-
pansion and over-intensive land utilization, with the result that the 
private use of land has far outgrown public facilities and services, 
including water, sewerage, health, police and fire protection, street 
and transit facilities, and has created all sorts of congestion."13 
The very diversity that had characterized Dixie since colonial 
DEPRESSION, WAR, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 127 
days, seen in architectural images, continued to give its cities a 
distinctive flavor. The red Georgian row houses of Baltimore con-
trasted with the one-story rambling bungalows, with ample front 
porches and spacious lawns, found in cities of all sizes in the lower 
South. The trend from north to south, in keeping with the needs of 
the climate, called for fewer basements, more windows, higher ceil-
ings, thinner walls, and thicker screens. Public and commercial 
structures differed just as much. The eclectic styles of Washington 
set the tone. The older edifices combined the Georgian, Greek Re-
vival, and Moorish vogues of the antebellum period with the later 
Victorian and Gothic designs of the Gilded Age. The newer buildings 
of the Federal Triangle were of Moderne designs. 
The White House and Capitol both had some of the more at-
tractive attributes of traditional antebellum southern architecture. 
In Nashville and Richmond, the state capitols also reflected the 
glories of the Old South; the Confederacy did not last long enough 
to produce a separate style. At New Orleans, the Roman Catholic 
cathedral, built along Moorish lines long before the Civil War, re-
mained a landmark. The French Quarter, constructed in Spanish 
forms because of destructive fires in the late eighteenth century, 
featured two- and three-story buildings with ironwork balconies and 
courtyards. Mansions in Savannah, Charleston, and Mobile dis-
played varied Georgian and Greek Revival influences. Sharply dif-
ferent were the white Moderne hotels and apartments of the Florida 
Gold Coast. The downtown districts of Atlanta, Birmingham, Louis-
ville, and Nashville, with streets walled by steel frame skyscrapers, 
looked like the commercial cores of numerous other large cities all 
over the country. 
Many visitors were surprised to find that the urban South was 
not all magnolias, blossoms, camellias, and moss. Tremendous dif-
ferences prevailed between the stately homes of the Garden District 
of New Orleans and the shacks of the Washington black quarter only 
a few blocks from the Capitol. Yet such differentiations could be 
found throughout America. Winnetka, a suburb on Chicago's North 
Side, was one of the land's swankest residential developments. Less 
than fifteen miles away was the South Side of Chicago, with its large 
black district, the poverty-stricken and unloved product of a black 
migration from the rural South in World War I. Sociologists had long 
commented on the extremes of wealth and poverty in Boston, New 
York, and Philadelphia. All had their black slums, as did many cities 
in the Midwest with very small black populations, including Grand 
Rapids, Racine, and Ottumwa. 
What bothered an increasing number of observers of the South 
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was the formal segregation system. It, plus the perceived poverty of 
the section, set southern communities off in northern eyes as much 
or more so than any other attribute. An influential southern intel-
lectual blamed the situation on the section's agrarian roots. W.J. 
Cash in The Mind of the South (1941) said that city people in Dixie 
had accepted rural concepts of "violence, intolerance, aversion and 
suspicion toward new ideas ... , an exaggerated individualism and 
a too narrow concept of social responsibility, attachment to fictions 
and false values, above all too great attachment to racial values and 
a tendency to justify cruelty and injustice in the name of these val-
ues."14 Correct or not, philosophical rationales by southerners about 
the reasons for racial segregation fell on deaf ears above the Mason 
and Dixon Line. Many northerners' conception of attitudes in the 
South was conveyed by a cruel and inflammatory racist banner car-
ried in a 1930 Ku Klux Klan parade in Atlanta: "Niggers, back to 
the cotton fields-city jobs are for White Folks."15 
World War II wrought massive changes in Dixie. Unlike World 
War I, which had only limited impact because it lasted less than 
two years, mobilization and hostilities encompassed half a decade. 
The gigantic scope of the war effort directed against Germany, Japan, 
and their allies brought huge amounts of federal money into the 
South, far more than during the Great Depression, which came to 
an abrupt end. All of Dixie's ports boomed throughout the crisis. 
The movement of servicemen and materials of war taxed transpor-
tation facilities. The section by virtue of its warm climate, geo-
graphical features, and seniority of congressional members gained a 
great number of training facilities. 
In the summer of 1941 more than 500,000 servicemen engaged 
in maneuvers in central Louisiana, helping the economies of Shreve-
port and Alexandria. During the war millions of soldiers, sailors, and 
marines trained in the South. During hostilities the federal govern-
ment constructed more than $4 billion in training facilities, many 
located near cities, throughout the South. Of greater permanency 
was defense industry. Southern governors and other leaders worked 
hard to acquire a fair share of contracts-in the early stages of mo-
bilization, eleven southern states received nearly $17 billion in con-
tracts, a disproportionate number, in view of their much smaller 
share of industrial capacity. In a very competitive environment, 
Chester C. Davis, an FDR confidant who had a considerable say over 
the location of large war plants, said, "Nothing short of the most 
rigorous and most positive efforts to achieve recognition .... will 
suffice. " 16 
In the course of hostilities, southern war plants received about 
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20 percent of the hundreds of billions of dollars spent by the federal 
government. Expenditures for the construction of war workshops 
amounted to roughly $4 billion. The shipbuilding industry expanded 
at a tremendous rate; seventeen yards, including ones in Mobile, 
Jacksonville, Tampa, and Norfolk, constructed $6 billion in ships. 
In New Orleans, A.J. Higgins Industries, a prewar maker of small 
plywood boats, converted to the production of landing craft and PT 
boats, expanding its workforce from 400 in 1941 to 20,000 in 1944. 
Ordnance works grew rapidly. The Volunteer Works in Chattanooga 
and the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, reflected the huge 
requirements of the munitions industry. 
Expansion in the chemical industry resulted in the construction 
of large facilities in Virginia and Louisiana. Petroleum production 
added luster to the economy of a number of Louisiana cities, in-
cluding Shreveport and Baton Rouge. War contracts spurred great 
increases in steel production in Birmingham. A gigantic aircraft as-
sembly plant in Marietta, an Atlanta suburb, made thousands of 
heavy bombers. The Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Huntsville, Ala-
bama, works of the Manhattan District were part of one of the most 
costly activities in the history of the federal government, the con-
struction of the atomic bomb. The TV A elecric power network made 
Oak Ridge a desirable site; construction work occupied a staggering 
82,000 people. The textile industry recovered completely from the 
depression. Tobacco production boomed as never before. Less no-
ticed but equally important was the proliferation of small war plants, 
in many cases the suppliers of larger firms. Even though the bulk 
of war orders went to concerns outside the South, the influx of 
money into the region held the promise of radically changing its 
temperament and personality. 17 
Donald M. Nelson, the chairman of the War Production Board, 
believed the war would bring "the South into the vanguard of world 
industrial progress." He said, "A bird's-eye view of large-scale South-
ern industry makes you feel that the South has rubbed Aladdin's 
lamp."18 Such hyperbole not withstanding, the South was changing. 
In agriculture, mechanization accelerated; the number of croppers 
decreased in the very period that government experts discovered 
them. The trend was already under way by the start of the war. 
Many southern cities experienced population increases during the 
Great Depression as former black and white cotton farmers moved 
into urban areas. Between 1930 and 1940 Birmingham grew by 3 
percent to 267,600 people, Atlanta by 11.8 percent to 302,300, and 
Nashville by 8.8 percent to 107,400. In the same span numerous 
northern cities hardly grew at all; Milwaukee, for instance, enlarged 
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by 1.6 percent and Chicago by 0.6 percent. Throughout the urban 
South, the impact of the war, while creating some of the kind of 
opportunities for industrial advancement that Nelson talked about, 
brought dislocations. Experts argued that southerners remained so 
rural in temperament that it was harder for them than for other 
Americans to adjust to an urban environment. 
Social commentators sought to explain the significance of war-
time change in the urban South. Washington, which in the 1930s 
increased in size by 36 percent to 663,000 inhabitants, continued to 
expand rapidly. Shortly before Pearl Harbor, Donald Wilhelm, writing 
in the American Mercury, described the hectic pace of events: "There 
are 240,000 men and women on one or another public pay-
roll ... increasing at the rate of 5,000 a month .... The horde of 
government employees go to work in all kinds of places. The gov-
ernment has taken over 200-odd mansions, hotels and apartment 
houses to use as offices. It is a bit startling to find the official with 
whom you have business sitting amid the shiny tiles of what last 
week, or yesterday, was obviously a bathroom. Sometimes the fix-
tures have been decently boxed in to serve as chairs or tablesi some-
times not."19 
Mobile, one of the wartime South's fastest growing places, came 
under intense scrutiny. According to novelist John Dos Passos, Mo-
bile was "trampled and battered like a city that's been taken by 
storm. Sidewalks are crowded. Gutters are stacked with litter. ... 
Garbage cans are overflowing. Frame houses on treeshaded streets 
bulge with men in shirtsleeves .... Cues wait outside of movies and 
lunchrooms." Agnes Meyer of the Washington Post found in Mobile 
a host of "primitive, illiterate backwoods people ... hostile, defiant, 
suspicious, and terrified/' huddled in shacks, tent colonies, and 
trailer camps. Other writers discovered sin in Norfolk, where one 
expose reported "girlie" camps and free-and-easy "VD-girls."20 The 
war caused a social crisis in Washington, Mobile, Norfolk, and other 
southern metropolises. What saved the southern cities was that al-
most all of their citizens backed the war effort. They put up with 
rationing, raised victory gardens, and accepted the need for "dim-
outs" plus other restrictions. Many young men and women served 
in the armed forces. Patriotism helped southern urbanites to weather 
the crisis. 
Following the war a great round of prosperity swept across the 
nation, fueled by wartime savings, a demand for civilian goods, and 
the needs of the new Cold War. The South shared in the boom. 
Technically, its industrial base experienced what economists called 
a "takeoff." The factories built during hostilities served the region 
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well; in 1947 more than 2 million people worked in southern fac-
tories, compared with 1.3 million in 1939.21 The emphasis in Dixie 
was on adding industry; few people cared that doing so meant ac-
tively seeking outside capital. The War Assets Administration dis-
posed of many of the war plants to private interests for very low 
prices, big chemical and ammunition plants became fixtures, state 
governments established agencies to promote industrial develop-
ment, and local units of governments offered northern owners every-
thing from tax incentives to factory buildings. Despite widespread 
unionization during the New Deal and the war, the passage in several 
southern states of right-to-work legislation and generally lower wage 
scales than elsewhere made the South attractive to manufacturers. 
Several large cities had mayors with a strong business orienta-
tion, including William B. Hartsfield in Atlanta and King High in 
Miami. In New Orleans a dynamic "reformer," De Lesseps Story 
Morrison, swept to victory in 1946, defeating entrenched politicians 
with ties to the Long interests. Early in his administration Morrison 
persuaded Kaiser Aluminum to build a large factory in suburban 
New Orleans. Time magazine virtually eulogized the mayor, stating 
in November of 1947, "Chep Morrison, symbol of the bright new 
day which had come to the city of charming ruins, also symbolized 
as well as anyone the postwar energy of the nation's cities."22 Yet 
Morrison, for all his charm and ability, was a segregationist. Here, 
along with other usual political liabilities, lay a problem for him, 
New Orleans, and the rest of the South. Until the end of segrega-
tion, no matter what the hypocrisy in the North on the race issue, 
the South would remain a land apart. 
Southern blacks had not shared to a full extent in the economic 
progress of the World War II period. In 1941 Roosevelt, responding 
to pressure from black leaders, had issued an executive order for-
bidding discrimination in defense industries and establishing the 
Committee on Fair Employment Practice (FEPC). The FEPC, which 
died an unlamented death for lack of funds in 1946, had little in-
fluence. It had no power to enforce directives and refused even to 
recommend action against violators. From the first it came in for 
attack from segregationists. Congressman John Rankin of Missis-
sippi called it "the beginning of a communistic dictatorship." News-
paper editorials in the South called the members of the committee, 
chaired by the segregationist publisher of the Louisville Courier-
Journal, "Roosevelt racial experts" and "halo-wearing missionaries 
of New Deal Socialism." If anything, the FEPC strengthened the 
resolve of segregationists. Its final report lamely stated that black 
war workers performed " 'h jobs': hot, heavy, and hard."23 
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By then blacks had already identified what they wanted in return 
for backing the war effort-nothing less than their full rights as 
American citizens. Talk about ending educational inequalities and 
voting restrictions upset and alarmed white southerners. They cau-
tioned blacks that a sudden end to segregation would be a disaster 
for both races and worried about outside agitators who preached false 
doctrines. In a sign of things to come, a white extremist with Klan 
connections noted, "If there is room for a National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People, there is need of a League to 
Maintain White Supremacy."24 
Little of what happened in the civil rights field in the years 
immediately after the war had a direct impact on the urban South. 
City administrations confronted the problem with great caution. 
Token improvements involved appointing a few black police officers 
and upgrading black schools. Mayors established biracial commis-
sions to write reports and argued that promoting business would 
help all classes. The slow pace of racial progress provided little le-
verage on the national level. In 1948 President Harry S. Truman 
desegregated the armed forces and banned discrimination in federal 
agencies, but his call for comprehensive civil rights legislation, rang-
ing from anti-poll-tax to antilynching measures, was unsuccessful. 
Truman's very proposals aroused great ire among southern segre-
gationists, who were thwarted in their efforts to oppose him in the 
1948 presidential election, although Strom Thurmond's States' 
Rights party carried South Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Ala-
bama. During Truman's full term in office he continued to promote 
civil rights and made racial concerns an important part of his Fair 
Deal. 
His activities set the stage for action by the United States Su-
preme Court. A series of somewhat technical decisions that ex-
tended back into the 1930s and struck down segregation in 
institutions of higher education augured a challenge to the whole 
system of segregation in the South. Some southern leaders, seeing 
the threat coming, tried to head it off through token efforts and pious 
statements. Governor James F. Byrnes of South Carolina, an im-
portant New Deal official in the Roosevelt years, said in 1951, "It 
is our duty to provide for the races substantial equality in school 
facilities. "25 
While some changes followed, substantial inequities remained; 
Mississippi spent 75 percent more on a white student than a black 
one. In May 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, the 
Supreme Court unanimously called for the desegregation of the 
schools, striking down the "separate but equal" doctrine. The jus-
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tices, who had several school cases before them, including one from 
rural South Carolina, acted on the Topeka case for a practical reason; 
they knew that the decision could be enforced in Kansas. The fol-
lowing year the justices added that Brown v. Board should be carried 
out "with all deliberate speed," whatever that phrase meant. This 
refusal to set a date invited opposition in the South. 
A resistance movement quickly formed among white southern-
ers.26 The usual assortment of bigots railed against the prospect of 
the mongrelization of the white race, and the moribund Ku Klux 
Klan revived fitfully. Just about all the schools in Dixie remained 
segregated in an immediate sense, which helped restrain white 
southerners and provided leeway for the formation of a widely based, 
respectable antidesegregation movement. White Citizens' Councils 
garnered considerate support. In Mississippi membership grew in a 
year from only 14 people to 60,000. Soon the movement had more 
than 300,000 members. So-called moderate politicians were swept 
aside; the order of the day was "massive resistance." Federal court 
decisions and orders to desegregate individual school districts fol-
lowed a predictable pattern: mob violence, delayed action by public 
officials, reluctant local enforcement of court orders, and formation 
of private white schools. 
A notable clash in 1956 in Clinton, Tennessee, widely covered 
by the media, saw the burning of school buses. President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower, committed to building the Republican party in the 
South, avoided taking a stand on Brown v. Board, claiming he should 
not comment on a Supreme Court decision. A combination of the 
ambivalence of the judicial authorities, the vacillation of the presi-
dent, and the obstinacy of the white southern resisters guaranteed 
a confrontation of national proportions over the federal govern-
ment's readiness to enforce school desegregation. Urban progress in 
the South depended, in no small measure, on what would happen 
next. 
A great national crisis-called by some commentators the worst 
since the Civil War-occurred in the fall of 1957 after a U.S. district 
court order to desegregate Little Rock Central High School. Gov-
ernor Orval Faubus of Arkansas, supported by other segregationist 
governors, called out his state's National Guard to stop black stu-
dents escorted by federal marshals from integrating the school. 
Mayor Woodrow Wilson Mann of Little Rock accused Faubus of 
trying to "put down trouble where none existed."27 The governor, 
of course, wanted a confrontation. When the school board tried to 
comply with the court order, mobs gathered. Violence followed. Ei-
senhower, faced with an obvious threat to federal authority, after 
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learning that a mob leader was a close associate of Faubus, acted 
decisively. He deactivated the Arkansas National Guard and in a 
calculated show of force ordered a paratroop division that made up 
the most battle-ready elements of the nation's strategic reserve into 
Little Rock to enforce the court's mandate. 
Television brought the powerful and successful assertion of 
the authority of the federal government into homes throughout 
the country. When Faubus wrote Eisenhower a letter of protest, the 
president, his troops in place, did not bother to reply. Even though 
delaying actions, both peaceful and violent, continued in the South 
(Faubus closed Little Rock's four high schools in 1958-59), the federal 
government had reestablished its authority. This action did not 
lead to integrated schools. Throughout Dixie, white private schools 
had the effect of leaving public schools almost entirely black-
segregation in reverse. For one reason or another, white patrons of 
public schools continued to resist the efforts of federal authorities 
to place their children in integrated schools. Yet the Little Rock 
crisis had tremendous implications for the urban South because it 
ensured that federal authority would ultimately triumph, foreshad-
owed a renewal of federal order in the South, and made cities at-
tractive for investment capital. 
The quest for racial equality moved beyond the issue of black 
and white schools. A limited civil rights act involving voting rights, 
passed with the cooperation of both major parties and signed by 
Eisenhower during the Little Rock crisis, broke a "logjam" going 
back to Reconstruction. Another technical voting act followed in 
1960. Such actions furthered the acquiescence by Washington to 
attempts in the South designed to challenge segregation. A landmark 
boycott in 1955-56 that protested segregated seating on Montgomery 
buses brought to prominence a young minister, Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr., an organizer of the Southern Christian Leadership Con-
ference. King used an important black urban institution, the church, 
as a basis for his movement. 
The nucleus of SCLC support came from black ministers across 
the South. King and his followers believed in "nonviolent resis-
tance," and in 1960 a SCLC auxiliary, the Student Nonviolent Co-
ordinating Committee, started "sit-ins" at segregated facilities 
throughout the South. Many significant demonstrations occurred in 
cities, where regional and national television carried what happened 
far beyond local lunchrooms, swimming pools, hotels, and bus sta-
tions. Counter activities, such as the pouring of ketchup on well-
dressed demonstrators by KKK members, hurt the white cause, as 
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did the beating and jailing in Alabama of "Freedom Riders" from 
the Congress of Racial Equality. 
In the spring of 1963 violence erupted when Dr. King and his 
followers carried their equality crusade to Birmingham. They ex-
pected trouble that would be televised, and the city's hard-line public 
safety commissioner, T. Eugene "Bull" Connor, accommodated 
them. He ultimately arrested thousands of blacks and turned dogs 
and hoses on countless others. In the process he made a spectacle 
of himself nationwide and created national sympathy for the black 
movement. Violent acts against blacks and the calling out of the 
National Guard by George Wallace, Alabama's segregationist Demo-
cratic governor, failed to restore complete peace. The brutal murder 
by bombing of four young black girls attending Sunday school in a 
Birmingham church appalled Americans, including many white seg-
regationists. 
August 1963 saw the March on Washington by 200,000 Ameri-
cans that helped transform a regional movement into a national one. 
Speaking at the foot of the Washington Monument, Dr. King, who 
had become the leader of the Civil Rights movement, told a national 
television audience, "I have a dream that one day this nation will 
rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed."28 This conviction, 
shared by countless millions of American citizens in all parts of the 
country, was to have a profound impact on the South. While the 
fact was not understood at the time, the Civil Rights crusade broke 
an economic logjam and set the stage for dramatic growth in the 
South. 
In 1964 and 1965 Congress passed sweeping civil rights legis-
lation dealing with public accommodations and voting rights. Presi-
dent Lyndon B. Johnson, a southerner or westerner, depending on 
his political predilections and the expediencies of the moment, said 
that he hoped civil rights legislation would dry up "the springs of 
racial poison. "29 More violence lay ahead. During the summer of 
1964, in a squalid southern rural Mississippi backwater, white ex-
tremists brutally murdered three civil rights workers in cold blood. 
The following year, a freedom march in Alabama led by Dr. King, 
a recent recipient of a Nobel peace prize, resulted in still more vio-
lence. Other incidents occurred; in Atlanta, Lester Maddox dra-
matized his resistance to the federal legislation by issuing ax handles 
to white customers of his restaurant for use against blacks. Maddox 
parlayed his ensuing notoriety into election as governor of Georgia 
and became one of the last urban resisters to gain high office. 
On the surface the majority of southern whites accepted black 
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legal equality, but Dr. King did not do as well when he attempted 
to carry what had been a unique southern regional campaign into 
the North or when he turned to social issues. On April 4, 1968, 
while Dr. King was in Memphis to help striking garbage workers, 
an assassin gunned him down. Days of serious rioting followed in 
Baltimore, Washington, and other cities. King's death came at the 
end of a crucial period in the national experience. As for the urban 
South, the results of the civil rights revolution had the potential of 
providing the basis for bridging long-standing gaps between the sec-
tions and eradicating old boundaries. 
The civil rights struggle obscured economic progress in the urban 
South. To be sure, some cities suffered for their role in supporting 
traditional southern urban policies. Montgomery, as a direct con-
sequence of the bus boycott, supposedly lost bids for a DuPont 
plant and at least four other factories. Little Rock failed to attract 
any new factories of importance between 1958 and 1961. An official 
of the city's chamber of commerce was moved to tell southern busi-
nessmen, "Keep your public schools open. You will never regret it." 
Throughout the section, business leaders increasingly believed that 
violence, school closings, and uncompromising stands on integra-
tion questions retarded economic growth. Virginia commercial in-
terests forced their state's governor to soften his massive resistance 
plans. In Atlanta, Mayor Hartsfield claimed that his city was "too 
busy to hate/' which he tried to help prove in 1955 by successfully 
desegregating city-owned golf courses. In 1961, when Atlanta peace-
fully integrated its schools, the mayor treated the occasion as a gala 
promotional and media event and even hosted a cocktail party for 
the visiting press.30 
Throughout the racial crisis the South continued to interest 
northern business. An obvious attraction was an antiunion attitude, 
furthered among whites by support for desegregation from national 
unions. Although much of the new and, for that matter, old southern 
industry was unionized, sectional attitudes translated into less mili-
tant members and a willingness to accept lower wages than those 
paid in the north. This was especially true in North and South Caro-
lina, Georgia, and Florida, all of which attracted considerable in-
dustry throughout the 1950s. Old shibboleths about the wickedness 
of northern money and the adverse impact of colonialism no longer 
applied. Even in a period when northern interests with money and 
new managerial ideas sought to bring about fundamental changes in 
the South, the quest for outside funds seemed almost laudable. 
The postwar years saw great gains in the South's industrial out-
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put. By 1960 the South had more than 200 steel fabricators and more 
than 100 large foundries. Seven hundred apparel plants and at least 
100 shoe factories dotted the Dixie landscape. Industries were much 
more diversified than before the war, even though by 1952 some 
four-fifths of the cotton textile industry was in the South. The 
chemical industry expanded its wartime base; DuPont constructed 
ten new plants and General Electric built nineteen facilities. Food 
processing became the section's single biggest industry, followed by 
petroleum, coal, chemicals, and textiles. Very noteworthy was the 
movement into the South of large northern paper companies, at-
tracted in part by abundant water and fast-growing pine. Over sixty 
pulp, paper, and consumer product mills were already in operation 
by the early 1950s. Soon more than 600,000 people, either directly 
or indirectly, worked in the paper industry. 
New markets created all sorts of opportunities. Changes in farm-
ing, particularly the phasing out of the cropper system and the trend 
toward corporate agriculture, brought more prosperous hinterlands. 
Both farmers and city people had the money to buy new consumer 
goods. The Johnson Lawn Mower Corporation moved from Ot-
tumwa, Iowa, to Brookhaven, Mississippi, in 1952 to take advantage 
of inducements offered by the state and nonunionized cheap labor.31 
In 1956 alone the South added more than a thousand new industrial 
concerns. The establishment in the late 1950s of the Research 
Triangle Park in North Carolina contributed to a coming of age of 
southern industry, adding potentially important research and de-
velopment components. Southern manufacturers gradually acquired 
the means and technology to produce their own new product lines.32 
A continued flow of federal money further enhanced the south-
ern urban economy. Dire predictions that funds from the national 
government would dry up did not happen, despite the termination 
of depression projects during the war and the cancellation with the 
fall of Japan of billions of dollars in war orders. The Cold War, the 
Korean War, and the acceptance of the need for a large peacetime 
military establishment kept defense orders coming. Atlanta's Dob-
bins Air Force Base had more than 15,000 employees in 1959. The 
bomber plant built in Marietta in World War II employed thousands 
of people to produce B-47 bombers. Many places, including Jack-
sonville, Pensacola, Charleston, and Norfolk benefited from peace-
time naval activities. Military posts, such as Fort Benning near 
Columbus and Camp Gordon in the Augusta vicinity, added millions 
of dollars monthly to local payrolls. Oak Ridge flourished as an 
Atomic Energy Commission facility; Huntsville and Cape Canaveral 
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became centers of missile and space development. Federal dollars 
came as well from a number of other sources. 
President Eisenhower, who said he opposed "creeping Social-
ism," actually increased federal expenditures. He kept the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, he acquiesced to broader social security coverage, 
and he carried on urban renewal and housing programs started under 
Truman. Of great significance was the Interstate Highway Act of 
1956, designed to provide for the construction of a national system 
of free urban and rural expressways. An important consideration that 
requires emphasis was that the federal government did not overtly 
punish the urban South for its resistance to integration. Far from it. 
Without much notice, southern cities had derived advantage, in a 
very real sense, as a result of the actions of the federal government. 
Throughout the 1950s the urban South increased rapidly in popu-
lation, building on a base created decades earlier. How much cities 
grew and why they rose depended on the use of statistics. Moreover, 
many newcomers were displaced black and white farmers who had 
been forced off the land by mechanization and who had little choice 
except to move to town. Central city totals no longer conveyed an 
accurate idea of size. Annexation programs, as in the case of Atlanta, 
made some places seem to be growing faster than they actually were. 
Even casual observers in Atlanta could see, however, that a spirit 
of progress was in the air; a feeling that the city had all the ingre-
dients necessary to become a national metropolis. Still, between 
1950 and 1960, official census figures showed Atlanta increasing in 
population from 331,300 to 487,500, a solid but not spectacular rise. 
Equally deceptive were the compilations for Baltimore and Wash-
ington. The census indicated that both were in a state of decline, 
Baltimore falling from 949,800 to 939,000 and Washington from 
802,200 to 764,000. In fact inner-city whites and new residents were 
moving to the suburbs. Thus a new government census definition 
for Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas presented a much dif-
ferent picture. The metropolitan area statistics showed Baltimore 
moving ahead in size during the 1950s from 1.5 million to 2.1 million 
and Atlanta from 727,000 to 1 million. 
The SMSA aggregates indicated solid growth throughout the ur-
ban South: Memphis, for example, went from 529,600 to 674,600 
and Miami nearly doubled, increasing from 495,100 to 935,000. Out 
in Texas, Dallas rose from 708,800 to 1.1 million and Houston from 
806,700 to 1.4 million. Although the population rises were not as 
great as for some of the big metropolitan areas in the Far West-in 
the 1950s Los Angeles surged ahead from 4.2 million to 6 million 
and San Francisco from 2.1 million to 2.6 million-there was no 
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question that unprecedented urban growth was under way in the 
South. Without much fanfare, even as the media focused its atten-
tion on racial discord, Dixie's cities began to display all the symp-
toms associated with sustained long-term progress. 
The relationship between the urban South and the federal gov-
ernment underwent tremendous changes between 1930 and 1960. 
The Great Depression in the South, as in the rest of the country, 
set significant precedents. City fathers began to take influxes of 
federal funds for granted; in many ways urbanization and the larger 
domestic concerns of the United States became one and the same. 
The extent to which spending in Washington pulled the United 
States out of the depression is open to question, but certainly it did 
not hurt the urban South. World War II saw a continuation and 
intensification of the flow of federal monies. Southern cities bene-
fited from their desirable climates, from low labor rates, and from 
local congressmen with a great deal of seniority. In a general way, 
the federal government had promised blacks that in exchange for 
supporting the war effort they would receive civil rights. Postwar 
efforts to promote racial equality in the South, furthered by President 
Truman, helped lead to the civil rights revolution. 
The civil disobedience campaigns of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 
played a great role in gaining attention and generating a consensus 
for national legislation. Violence directed against integrationists 
shocked Americans. The Civil Rights acts of 1964 and 1965 ended 
the segregation system. Through it all, federal money for defense 
and civilian purposes continued to be pumped into the South. Money 
from various "Great Society" projects, many financed through the 
huge and bureaucratic Office of Economic Opportunity, proved an 
unexpected bonus, sort of a throwback to the WP A and PW A, but 
in a time of relative prosperity rather than depression. Northern 
investors found the South fertile ground. A general introduction of 
air conditioning changed working conditions. Agricultural change 
transformed rural Dixie, with cotton picking becoming increasingly 
mechanized. By the 1960s the region was well on the way to re-
gaining the modern equivalent of its antebellum position in the 
Union. For many reasons, the urban South played a major role in 




The trends that characterized southern urban progress continued 
following the changes wrought by the civil rights revolution. The 
long period of retrenchment came to an end. Industry steadily in-
creased in importance and threatened to make the South more and 
more like the rest of the nation. A goal of state governments, in the 
wake of unsuccessful attempts to stop integration, was to fight de-
laying actions against unionization. Concern about air pollution, 
exhaustion of resources, and depletion of water supplies were, in the 
main, considerations that took second place to material progress. Nor 
did it seem to matter that certain expected growth industries, in 
particular chemicals and petroleums, involved serious environmen-
tal risks. In much the same way, the social consequences of the 
move toward corporate agriculture, although deplored by some ob-
servers, was submerged in a flood of statistics showing growing 
farming prosperity. The procurement of more and more federal and 
outside money became almost an end in itself. The Vietnamese War, 
which public opinion polls showed received considerable support in 
the South, saw huge military and arms expenditures. This condition 
continued under President Ronald Reagan's program to "rearm 
America." 
Of even greater importance was the continued general improve-
ment in the southern economy, which manifested itself in the mas-
sive advance of the country's gross national product. Consumer 
industries multiplied throughout the region. Increasingly, market 
prospects rather than other incentives loomed important in the de-
cisions of northern corporations to move into Dixie. The building 
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of a huge new General Motors plant in Tennessee served as a symbol 
of changed dispensations. Southern promoters claimed that the na-
tional financial recessions of the 1970s and early 1980s hardly hurt 
the section's cities. Even though this statement was open toques-
tion, little doubt remained that the South had gradually reemerged 
as a full partner in the life of the nation. 
The formal end of segregation did not usher in an era of racial 
harmony. During the 1980s riots in the Liberty City and Overhill 
districts of Miami and disturbances in the streets of Tampa provided 
ample evidence that black urban southerners continued to hold 
grievances toward authorities. Racial hatred involving blacks, His-
panics, and the police appeared to be the immediate sources of the 
trouble, with poverty and a lack of opportunity as underlying causes. 
Still, Liberty City appeared a special case, given the racial mix in 
the Miami area that resulted from influxes of refugees from Cuba. 
The Tampa outbreaks seemed to be isolated events. 
Throughout Dixie a general racial accommodation signaled the 
advent of cooperation between whites and blacks. In 1989 several 
large southern cities-including Atlanta, Baltimore, Birmingham, 
New Orleans, and Washington-had black mayors. Southerners 
tended to gloss over "white flight" to the suburbs and an exodus to 
predominantly white private schools; it was argued that much the 
same thing had happened in the North. The 1980 census indicated 
that some of the largest central cities in the South were more than 
50 percent black. Although a great many of the millions of blacks 
who left the land in the post-World War II period went North to the 
mean streets of such places as Chicago and Philadelphia, enough 
moved to southern cities to affect their racial profiles in dramatic 
fashion. In 1980 blacks outnumbered whites 283,200 to 138,200 in 
Atlanta, 158,200 to 124,700 in Birmingham, and 308,000 to 238,200 
in New Orleans. 
As cities' racial characteristics changed, their tax bases deteri-
orated. The loss of whites, especially those from the middle class, 
hurt. Another negative factor involved cutbacks in federal spending 
for social programs. The New Deal era ended. While both major 
parties agreed that the poor needed help, arguments centered on the 
quality of programs and levels of funding. Some authorities believed 
that southern cities would soon experience fiscal emergencies of the 
same kind as those which in the 1970s and 1980s had afflicted Cleve-
land, New York, and other northern cities. During much of southern 
urban history money problems had of course been a thorn, but few 
leaders seemed outwardly distressed. By 1988 a significant issue 
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facing administrators revolved around neither race nor money. 
Rather, the urban sites of the South had to contend with the stresses 
and strains associated with progress. 
Census returns indicated that the South had achieved metro-
politan dimensions in line with the rest of the country. American 
cities grew so rapidly in the 1960s that by the end of the decade 
more than 70 percent of the nation's inhabitants lived in Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas. Some demographers predicted that 
the percentage would rise significantly in the twenty-first century, 
but in the 1970s metropolitan growth slowed. Several of the coun-
try's largest SMSAs either lost population or grew very slowly. Most 
of the losses came in the northeastern and the north-central census 
divisions. Thirty of thirty-two SMSAs that lost population were in 
those parts of the United States. 
Much of the 9.1 percent growth in the metropolitan populations 
occurred in newer parts of the country, but the South registered 
impressive increases. All of the twenty-five fastest growing SMSAs 
were in either southern or western census regions. Equally note-
worthy was the growth of central cities. In sharp contrast to the 
severe losses in older parts of the nation, forty-six of sixty southern 
cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants gained in population. While 
black and Hispanic minorities made up the largest number of the 
new inner city residents-not to the liking of some whites-growth 
attested to striking economic differentials that favored the South as 
opposed to the "old industrial heartland." 1 
A new census designation, Consolidated Metropolitan Statisti-
cal Areas, applied to urbanized areas of more than a million people. 
Estimates made by the census in 1984 indicated that the United 
States had thirty-seven CMSAs. The three largest were New York 
(17.8 million), Los Angeles (12.4 million), and Chicago (8 million). 
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Other big southern metropolises, which the census now called Met-
ropolitan Statistical Areas, included Louisville (962,600), Memphis 
(934,600), and Birmingham (895,200). Some of the CMSAs grew very 
rapidly between 1980 and 1984-Houston by 15 percent, Dallas-Fort 
Worth by 14.2 percent, and Atlanta by 11.3 percent. These increases 
came despite a recession in the early 1980s. By the last half of the 
decade, downturns in the petrochemical and petroleum industries 
had put the brakes, at least temporarily, on rapid progress in Loui-
siana, Texas, and Oklahoma. The situation's effect on the South as 
a whole would be an important measure of the economic condition 
and continued potential of the section's rising urban components. 
State and local southern development boards continued to work 
hard to encourage manufacturing. Some states, all the time in com-
petition with each other and development agencies in other parts of 
the country, did better than their counterparts. North Carolina, 
which had much to offer in way of resources, became the leading 
industrial state in the South. Mississippi, which started its regional 
pioneering "Balance Agriculture with Industry" program of indus-
trial subsidization back in 1936, continued to rank at the bottom of 
all national indexes fifty years later. In a sense, development boards 
were a throwback to colonial times when government authorities 
tried to designate town sites. Development boards gave hope and 
sometimes actually obtained factories for out-of-the-way commu-
nities with small prospects under the best of circumstances. 
The pursuit of progress continued, as it had for more than a 
hundred years, to take precedence over antebellum intellectual 
agrarian traditions. By the late 1980s it was unclear whether or not 
the South had completed the basic stages of industrialism, passing 
from the takeoff stage to a settled manufacturing economy. In short, 
was it time to calculate the human cost of industrialization and 
close the books? Many of the workers in the expanding industries 
of the modern South were men and women forced off the land by 
the transformation of southern agriculture. They were, although 
many were older, the twentieth-century equivalent of the immigrant 
and native American peasants and farm workers who staffed the 
northern foundries and machine shops of the Gilded Age. 
A young southern historian, James C. Cobb, wrote movingly 
about what the transition from an unprofitable farm to a factory job 
had meant to his father in the early 1960s: 
His move into industry produced the largest and steadiest 
income my family had ever enjoyed. My father's new job 
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was not by any means an unmixed blessing, however. As a 
farmer he had often worked a dawn-to-sunset day during the 
planting and harvesting periods. Yet eight hours at an indoor, 
sit-down job left him drained and listless, and he so ob-
viously dreaded his daily toil that his morning "goodbyes" 
to us were protracted and almost pathetic .... On his tractor 
he had been the master of his domain .... In the factory, 
however, he fought a losing battle with machines that mys-
tified and humiliated him, often to the delight of some of 
his younger and crueler co-workers .... Certainly as a family 
we felt we were experiencing progress. Yet for my father 
there was an important sacrifice of both status and, unfor-
tunately, self-respect. 
Such a response was a little hard for many northerners to understand 
because their families had made the transition much earlier. It was, 
though, a very real and human consideration in the modern South. 
"The sacrifices that accompanied industrial development," Cobb 
concluded, "became all too apparent in the Sunbelt era as south-
erners and northerners alike acknowledged that there had been more 
to the southern way of life than racism and demagoguery, and asked 
whether the South, which they had once hoped would be saved by 
industrialism, could now be saved from it."2 
Governmental services were increasingly significant in the 
building of the metropolitan South. New Orleans had a number of 
federal facilities, including the Eighth Naval District and the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture Marketing Servicei Atlanta had more 
than 30,000 federal employees. No place was as directly tied to "Big 
Government" as Washingtoni by the late 1970s more than 411,000 
persons, both civilian and military personnel, in the District of Co-
lumbia area worked for the national government. Another million 
individuals engaged in a wide variety of related efforts-lobbying, 
legal services, trade associations, and so on. The gigantic role played 
by the government required a massive concentration of people and 
resources. From a strictly financial standpoint, the cutting of the 
political deal in the early days of the Republic that placed the na-
tion's capital at a southern site worked ultimately to the advantage 
of Dixie. Here was the kind of urban advance that could not be 
accessed in the short run. The building of Washington back in the 
Early National period had initially hurt Baltimore and had resulted 
in a real estate debacle. It reflected the sometimes unpredictable 
factors associated with city building. 
Tourism had become big business in many parts of the metro-
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politan South. Long important, furthered by the warm climate and 
geographical features, the southern vacation industry expanded be-
yond the expectations of all except the most ardent boosters in the 
1970s and 1980s. The growing affluence of many Americans, coupled 
with better security and increased vacation benefits, contributed to 
the trend. Vacations became accepted annual endeavors, not some-
thing planned and saved for years in advance. Indeed, in an age of 
deregulation and relatively low airline fares, people thought little of 
flying halfway across the country and back over a couple days. The 
availability of decent motels and hotels, standardized restaurants 
and fast-food establishments, and toll-free reservation services elim-
inated some of the uncertainty associated with travel. 
Interstate limited-access highways made it fairly easy for au-
tomobile travelers to cover several hundred miles a day. When people 
arrived by air, all the major southern cities could be reached in only 
a few hours from any place in the continental United States. A higher 
quality of attractions helped in luring tourists; while some snake 
farms and seashell shops remained, many had given way to lavish 
amusement parks and gardens, some run by religious organizations. 
As in the nineteenth century, promotional activities were important 
in luring tourists. Advertisements, as expected, accentuated the 
positive, emphasizing good times and playing down high prices, 
crowded facilities, poor service, insects in season, and unreasonable 
weather. As a governor of Louisiana proclaimed, "Let the good times 
roll." And so they did, for millions of visitors to the South. 
Some large southern cities reaped great rewards from tourism. 
Washington became, as the Republic grew in power and importance, 
almost a mandatory tourist stop-the Capitol Building, the White 
House, the Washington Monument, the Jefferson and Lincoln me-
morials, the Supreme Court, and the Arlington National Cemetery 
were the great shrines and working symbols of the nation. The Dis-
trict of Columbia's many museums, especially those for air and 
space, art, history and technology, and natural history, were open 
to the public free of charge and drew more than 20 million visitors 
a year from the United States and around the world. The National 
Air and Space Museum, located a short distance from the Capitol, 
averaged more than 6 million visitors a year. 
The large number of visitors to Washington artificially forced 
up prices for entertainment and hotel rooms, especially for accom-
modations. Much the same was true in New Orleans. Always a great 
attraction, more people than ever before had the means to visit the 
French Quarter to sample its supposedly excellent food and other 
allures. The Mardi Gras celebration was one of the greatest events 
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of its kind in America. The building of the Super Dome and the 
renovation of New Orleans's center core-an old brewery adjacent 
to the French Quarter became a trendy arcade-helped the Crescent 
City, according to the Greater New Orleans Tourist and Convention 
Commission, to attain the position of the country's second greatest 
tourist mecca. 
Other places gained from special entertainment features. Grace-
land, the horne of the late entertainer Elvis Presley, brought thou-
sands of people to Memphis. In Nashville, the Grand Ole Opry, 
Opryland U.S.A., and Andrew Jackson's horne, the Hermitage, an-
nually drew hundreds of thousands of visitors. Through aggressive 
marketing, Atlanta became a convention center. In 1988 the Demo-
crats held their national convention in Atlanta, and the Republicans 
met in New Orleans. The Kentucky Derby in Louisville and the 
Preakness in Baltimore, two of the nation's premier horse racing 
events, attracted vast numbers of spectators. According to pro-
moters, major league professional sports, especially baseball, foot-
ball, and basketball, brought considerable numbers of visitors to 
Baltimore, Washington, Atlanta, Miami, New Orleans, and Tampa. 
In 1984 a Super Bowl football game in Tampa attracted tremen-
dous crowds and gave the city excellent free national publicity. The 
contest was said to have brought $70 million into the city; the 
amount was open to question. Even more difficult to ascertain was 
the tourist value of late-season major league baseball games between 
noncontenders. In a larger sense, the quest for tourist and convention 
dollars placed the urban South in direct competition with itself and 
with centers throughout the country and, indeed, in other countries. 
Changes in Ontario nonresidence fishing licenses, discount air fares 
between New York and London, unsettled political conditions in 
Fiji, and convention rates in Reno all had an impact on the South. 
Competition in the tourist, sport, and convention businesses rekin-
dled the spirit of urban rivalry in America. For the urban South this 
presented an excellent opportunity to see how well the section could 
do competing against outside interests for business, unfettered by 
colonial restraints. It could be argued that, for the first time since 
antebellum days, the South had started with an advantage over New 
York. 
Tourism helped build twentieth-century urban Florida. Natu-
rally, in the 1980s almost all the promotional literature emphasized 
the increasing significance of other activities: aircraft parts factories 
in West Palm Beach, 5,000 light manufacturing plants in Miami, 
and breweries in Tampa. Still, few people claimed that Florida had 
achieved the status of a manufacturing giant; even aerospace money 
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had failed to launch Titusville, which had an 1980 population of 
31,900, into the upper levels among cities of the Sunshine State. 
Miami had been among the first areas in the state to boom as a 
tourist center. By 1940 more than 2 million vacationers were arriving 
every year. The number grew after the war to more than 5.5 million 
in 1960 and to a claimed 12.6 million in 1980.3 
Undeniably, the drying up of mass tourism in Fidel Castro's 
Cuba and the failure of the Bahamas to attract as much vacation 
business as expected helped the Florida tourist business. Fort Lau-
derdale-Hollywood gained attention as the gathering place during 
the spring of hundreds of thousands of college students; Palm Beach, 
a suburb of West Palm Beach, was one of the country's richest resorts. 
High-rise hotels and condominiums stretched for miles along the 
shore from West Palm Beach through Miami Beach. On the west 
coast, Tampa-St. Petersburg was at the northern end of a vacation 
district that extended South for 150 miles through Sarasota, Fort 
Myers, and Naples. In central Florida, Walt Disney World, near Or-
lando, every year drew crowds of more than 13 million. The massive 
facility was a logical extension of earlier pleasure grounds, such as 
Busch Gardens in Tampa and Marineland of Florida near St. Au-
gustine. Despite much social comment about the tackiness and su-
perficiality of Florida's "Vacation Land," millions of visitors 
continued to pour money into the state's coffers. 
Florida continued to improve its position as a prime retirement 
center and winter home. The idea of retiring to the Sunshine State 
had begun to take hold in the nineteenth century but had initially 
been a dream that few Americans could ever hope to realize. Florida 
had many qualities, including flora and vegetation unlike that in 
the rest of the country, that continued to attract people in the twen-
tieth century. Particularly appealing was the warm climate despite 
its humidity except during the winter months. From the very first, 
Florida publicists conjured up pleasing visions of sand, sun, and surf. 
The construction of railroad lines connected towns throughout the 
state with the big metropolises in the North. By the 1930s St. 
Petersburg had a large retirement community, and Daytona Beach 
had many winter residents. 
Following World War II, the southeast coast attracted millions 
of retirees and seasonable residents, touching off a huge boom in 
condominium construction. The move of large numbers of older 
permanent residents into the state changed the state's congressional 
politics and forced leaders to place a greater emphasis on social se-
curity and issues related to old age. Miami Beach and St. Petersburg 
had much older populations than almost all places of similar size 
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in the United States. Although winter residents did not vote in 
Florida, they added to the state's cosmopolitan image. 
One community lured at least 10,000 Canadian 11Snow Birds11 
every season. Canadian social commentator Richard Gwyn noted 
in his 1985 book The Forty-Ninth Paradox, "On any day in January 
or February, there are about one million Canadians, or 4 percent of 
the total population in Florida." Canadian political leader Jean Chre-
tien, commenting on the pull of Florida on his countrymen, observed, 
11Canadians love Canada, but not for fifty-two weeks of the year."4 
Like tourism, the attracting of retirement and seasonable residents 
was a business. It placed Florida in direct competition with Arizona, 
California, and Hawaii for affluent elderly citizens. 
Pundits and media experts alike observed that a new spirit of 
progress seemed abroad in the urban South. Even the term South 
was passe, replaced by one that had broader connotations, Sunbelt 
or Sun Belt. The expression, attributed to political consultant Kevin 
Philips in his 1969 book The Emerging Republican Majority, was 
worthy of Madison Avenue. It implied that the sun did not shine in 
the North or Frostbelt, although South Dakota claimed to have more 
sunny days on average than any other state. At the same time the 
term "Sunbelt," denoting by implication a region that cut across 
traditional sectional lines, blurred racial questions by linking the 
fortunes of southern cities with those in the Southwest and the Far 
West. The concept of a Sunbelt represented a public relations 
triumph, generally bought uncritically by the national weekly news 
magazines and by the television networks. The phraseology sounded 
good, and maybe it was true. Much of the message, however, had 
been heard before. It was nothing new to equate the South with the 
golden West or to gloss over racial disharmony. Another problem 
was very fundamental: no one seemed to agree on how to define the 
Sun belt. 
The Sunbelt idea had-depending on the observer-certain eco-
nomic, political, geographic, demographic, and lifestyle character-
istics. Some analysts associated the Sunbelt with a probusiness 
climate. The title of an article in Fortune gushed, "Business Loves 
the Sunbelt (and vice versa)." According to a Georgia trade official, 
11The Sunbelt is not sunshine. Its an attitude ... conducive to busi-
ness. The North has lost that attitude." Oklahomans, quick to see 
the possibilities, placed a rising sun logo on their automobile license 
plates. Some political definitions were mean spirited. One New York 
writer saw the Sunbelt in terms of military spending, or in terms 
of areas that received more defense dollars than the Northeast. In 
1976 journalist Kirkpatrick Sale equated the 11Southern Rim" with 
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right-wing politics, which he regarded as a threat to the nation's 
progressive traditions. Sale wrote, "It hardly seems an accident that 
there is indeed a cartographic line that sets off this area almost 
precisely: the boundary line which runs along the northern edges 
of North Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, 
Arizona, or generally the 37th parallel." Demographers appeared as 
confused as anyone else. One included St. Louis and Kansas City. 
Another, in separate essays in the same book, placed Memphis 
in both the Sunbelt and Frostbelt. Quality-of-life studies provided 
still another measurement. An article entitled, "The Sunning 
of America," claimed, "The Sunbelt offers both more 'sun' and 
more 'fun.' Outdoor living, informal entertaining, and golf the year 
round-all afford the new lifestyles which Americans have 
adopted.'15 
Virtually the only statement with which everyone agreed was 
that a Sunbelt existed. The extent of the boundaries-if there were 
any; some people considered it a state of mind-were entirely an-
other matter. Richard M. Bernard and Bradley R. Rice summed mat-
ters up, noting, "The very concept of a Sunbelt is a novel and 
somewhat controversial notion in American geography .... General 
usage, however, has not led to a common definition of the American 
Sun belt. "6 Further complicating affairs was that some experts dis-
counted the region's very existence. Census bureaucrats ignored the 
Sunbelt. Under their definitions, the South consisted of the Old 
Confederacy, plus Oklahoma, Kentucky, West Virginia, Maryland, 
Delaware, and the District of Columbia. The West included all the 
intermountain states and those on the Pacific slope. At the same 
time Department of Commerce officials delineated a "Sunbelt-
South" as the census South minus Maryland, Delaware, and the 
District of Columbia. Joel Garreau, the author of a 1981 book en-
titled The Nine Nations of North America, argued that the very idea 
of the Sunbelt was "spurious" and "misleading."7 No matter how 
proper Garreau's sentiments, the term had gained common coinage 
by the 1980s and was used by the media in reference to cities with 
warmer climes or conservative politics. 
Carl Abbott, a professor of urban studies at Portland State Uni-
versity, produced a grandiose and controversial definition of Sunbelt 
that was based on census and other data. Abbott's Sunbelt was a 
phenomenon of the decades after 1940. Applying historical analysis 
to his statistical evidence, he concluded that "real shifts" of popu-
lation, wealth, and industrial capacity created a new regional pat-
tern.8 In his view, the South had overcome racism and poverty; the 
West faced new problems of maturity and continuing growth. "The 
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overall result of economic growth in the last generation has thus 
been the convergence of South and West," he stressed. "They are 
no longer exceptions to the American standard-a charmed golden 
West, a South of massive resistance and rural starvation."9 
Per capita income figures, business location indicators, com-
parative social and socioeconomic characteristics, and population 
ratios allowed Abbott to define the limits of his version of the Sun-
belt in terms of fast-growing metropolitan areas. Under his defini-
tion the new region included a great rim of states running from 
Delaware through Florida, omitted Alabama, Mississippi, and Lou-
isiana, and swept through Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona and on 
to California, Oregon, and Washington. Excluded as well from his 
arbitrary definition were Arkansas, Tennessee, and Kentucky; Ne-
vada, Utah, and Colorado were included. "Overall, it has been the 
warm coasts of the Pacific, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Atlantic 
Ocean southward from Chesapeake Bay that have exerted the strong-
est pull on the American population," Abbott explained. "The Sun-
belt-Southeast can be considered as the South Atlantic slope, for all 
its fast-growing metropolitan areas lie southeastward of a line drawn 
parallel to the Appalachian front from the Mason-Dixon Line to the 
Gulf of Mexico. Indeed, this line recognizes growth differences 
within Alabama by splitting Mobile from the less prosperous cities 
upstate." 10 
However flawed Abbott's statistically based conclusions, his vi-
sion of the Sunbelt's potential magnificence was new in discussions 
of the urban South's future. He showed that several decades of ur-
banization had helped to change the nature and shape of the region. 
Then too, his attempt to exclude integral parts of the Old Confed-
eracy from a definition of the Sunbelt indicated in dramatic fashion 
the need to think about the South in new terms. He demonstrated 
that modern urban metropolitan trends had started prior to World 
War II and long before the end of the segregation system. If nothing 
else, his statistics indicated the consistency of southern urban 
growth. Furthermore, they provided the basis for the bold conclu-
sions that linked the fortunes of Los Angeles, San Francisco, and 
Denver with those of Norfolk, Miami, and Atlanta. DeBow or Grady, 
even in their most visionary moments, never went so far. In one fell 
swoop, Abbott gave the South great commercial centers and then 
some. His urban Sunbelt united forces that reduced New York and 
its northeastern and midwestern hinterlands to subordinate posi-
tions. 
Abbott's use of statistical data and his sweeping interpretations 
harked back to the mid-nineteenth-century studies of William Gil-
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pin and Jesup W. Scott. Gilpin had combined theories of geographical 
and gravitational determinism to "prove" in 1855 that by 1955 the 
West would contain a monster "Centropolis" of 50 million people 
and various preeminent cities. Scott was able to demonstrate to his 
satisfaction using demography that railroads would lead to dramatic 
population and commercial shifts from the Northeast to Midwest, 
especially to Toledo, where he owned considerable property. Abbott 
went even further; he envisioned a whole new super region. Such 
visionary conceptual thinking was needed as a starting point in dis-
cussions about the probable course of twenty-first-century southern 
urbanization. It showed in vivid terms that the identity of Ameri-
can's regions would continue to change. 
The leaders in southern cities continued to think along tradi-
tional developmental lines. Politicians had to worry about reelec-
tion; businessmen needed to consider their annual bottom lines. All 
dire predictions by white supremacists to the contrary, it made little 
difference who was in charge of city hall-whites, blacks, or His-
panics. Nor did the form of government-be it commission, city 
manager, mayor and council, or metro-seem to have an appreciable 
impact. The emphasis fell on immediate progress and urban boost-
erism. Politicians had to consider the consequences of alienating 
major local concerns because they usually had the option of leaving 
town. William B. Hartsfield of Atlanta had admitted as much on 
one occasion when he told a friend that in every act as mayor he 
kept in mind that Atlanta was the headquarters of Coca-Cola. 11 He 
set forth another basic function of office, declaring, "We roll out the 
red carpet for every damn Yankee who comes in here with two strong 
hands and some money. We break our necks to sell him."12 
A later Atlanta mayor, Andrew Young, a national black leader 
who had served as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, reacted 
with appropriate civic rage when he decided that a television mini-
series had unfairly represented the police and judicial procedures 
in his city which had preceded the conviction of a young and talented 
black man for murder. Young won elections fought along racial lines, 
but his victories did not translate into a purely black administration. 
In the modern South, black mayors, beset by the forces afflicting 
urban leaders throughout the nation's history, had little choice ex-
cept to support traditional progrowth policies. 
Even though the old white dominant groups, by virtue of their 
economic holdings, continued to have a say in shaping the direction 
of urban policy throughout the South, blacks received better urban 
services than they had in segregation days. On the surface their 
public schools, despite enforced busing and virtual resegregation, 
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seemed better. Both white and black political organizations courted 
black voters, and increasing numbers of blacks served in elected and 
nonelected positions. For the first time since Reconstruction, blacks 
held positions of authority in police and fire departments. As always 
in the South, money for services remained a serious problem. What 
happened in New Orleans in the 1960s was typical. According to 
the mayor, the city "lost 125,000 people-most white and affluent-
moving out to the suburbs, and in their place, 90,000, mostly poor 
and black, moved in."13 Miami faced a more complicated situation. 
In 1980 its total population of 346,900 included 87,100 blacks plus 
another 194,100 citizens of Spanish origin; many were Cuban im-
migrants and their children. 
The ethnic mix taxed the capabilities of the Miami metro gov-
ernment, as did the growing role of the area as an organized crime 
and drug center. National magazines called it "Mob City" and com-
pared the situation with that in Chicago during Prohibition. Concern 
about law and order continued to mount in the urban South, with 
the major change that crime fighting in most parts no longer served 
as an excuse to keep black populations in line. As cities struggled 
to increase the efficiency of police departments and generally to 
improve services in the face of diminishing revenues, annexation 
seemed a logical panacea. With some justification, central city resi-
dents argued that they paid for parks, cultural centers, sport facili-
ties, and airports used by everyone in their metropolitan areas. 14 If, 
as many experts predicted, Sunbelt central cities started to experi-
ence more and more of the development problems associated with 
those in the Frostbelt, annexation promised to become a burning 
issue of the 1990s. 
In the meantime, a cautious optimism prevailed, generating a 
belief that the southern metropolis of the 1980s would prevail, over-
coming the challenge of economic, social, and political fragmenta-
tion. Promotional prognostications smacked of a throwback to the 
nineteenth century. The Miami Herald claimed: "Nowhere in 
America is the cutting edge of 20th century change more evident 
than in Miami."15 The historian Gary R. Mormino, who lived in 
Tampa, felt that growth was the "manifest challenge" facing the 
city, even though he admitted blacks had not fared very well inas-
much as they had elected their first member of the city council only 
in 1983. "Tampa Bay is a collection of dynamic and recklessly grow-
ing communities, held together by vigorous and administrative cli-
mate-business and natural-and brought together by the 
fortunes-cathartic and athletic-of its football team," Mormino 
enthusiastically declared. "For a city that was once known as the 
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'Hell Hole of the Gulf Coast/ the journey to metropolitan status 
has been dizzying. Demographers predict that Tampa should reach 
a population of 400,000 by the year 2000, and the metropolitan re-
gion should spiral to three and a half million persons."16 
Arnold R. Hirsch, a historian and regional planner at the Uni-
versity of New Orleans, while noting that economic growth in the 
Gulf region brought "a growing number of increasingly dangerous 
industrial accidents and more pollution to the already carcinogen-
laden Mississippi River," saw hope for the future. "Regional, na-
tional, and international currents," he said, "regularly lap at the 
Crescent City and there is tangible evidence of a new worldliness."17 
Even intellectuals accepted the premise that the urban South con-
tinued to be on the move. 
Perhaps as never before, a spirit of optimism pervaded thinking 
throughout much of urban Dixie. The cities of the South seemed 
alive to change, ready to seize upon the latest technological inno-
vations to advance their interests, while places in the Northeast and 
the Midwest appeared old and tired by comparison. In the nineteenth 
century, a great technological innovation, the railroad, had welded 
the two sections together and had created the basis for a hundred 
years of northern domination. During the 1980s, at the end of the 
railroad era, and at the advent of what many popular writers pro-
claimed the "new technological age," the South gave signs of en-
joying certain advantages in air transportation. 
At Kitty Hawk in North Carolina in 1903, the Wright brothers 
flew a plane heavier than air, and the United States first launched 
manned space flights in the 1960s from the beaches of eastern 
Florida. During World War II, hundreds of thousands of airmen 
trained at southern bases. Many of these facilities came under local 
control following hostilities. During much of the year southern skies 
provided superior flying conditions. Most important was the early 
establishment of air freight and passenger airlines in the South. By 
the time jet travel began, the more important southern carriers were 
in a position to play major national and international roles. They 
extended their services into other parts of the country and competed 
on equal terms or better with airlines outside the South. 
By the 1980s the urban South had excellent commercial aviation 
components. Delta Air Lines, Inc., one of the nation's most suc-
cessful major carriers, was an Atlanta corporation. Eastern Airlines, 
among the largest passenger lines in the country, was a Miami com-
pany until its ownership changed in 1987. Pan American, the first 
large American carrier to fly overseas routes, started in Miami. 
Southern congressmen had helped Pan American acquire Latin 
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American connections. Another pioneer overseas airline, Mackey, 
until its demise in the 1970s, flew out of Fort Lauderdale to the 
Bahamas. A larger Atlanta-based regional line, Southern, merged 
with several others across the United States and eventually became 
part of Republic, a Minneapolis-St. Paul concern, which in turn 
merged with Northwest in 1986. On the one hand, some southern 
airlines failed, ranging from the small Flamingo, a commuter line 
that served Florida and the Bahamas, to the larger Air Florida, a 
Miami regional carrier that in the early 1980s expanded its routes 
too fast. On the other hand, Federal Express, a rapidly expanding 
mail and freight line founded by northern interests, used Memphis 
as its main collection and distribution point. 
Deregulation of routes and a general increase in the number of 
travelers between large cities helped the South. The adoption of the 
hub concept by large passenger airlines resulted in a tremendous 
increase in Atlanta's volume of traffic. By the mid-1980s Atlanta's 
Hartsfield International Airport and Dallas/Fort Worth Interna-
tional Airport rivaled O'Hare in Chicago and Los Angeles Interna-
tional as America's busiest airports. Miami International, with more 
than 13 million air travelers annually, handled great numbers of 
Latin American visitors and northern vacationers. Fort Lauderdale 
and West Palm Beach were two other important South Florida air-
ports much favored by tourists. TheW ashington and Baltimore areas 
had three passenger jet airports, including the venerable and busy 
National Airport, near downtown Washington. Memphis served as 
a regional hub for major carriers and benefited from its central lo-
cation. 
The air industry, despite numerous problems-Eastern habitu-
ally hovered on the brink of financial disaster and had continual 
labor-management problems-was very big business. More than 
160,000 employees in Miami and 30,000 in Atlanta directly or in-
directly worked in the aviation industry as a whole. Both cities had 
large air maintenance and repair facilities; the annual payroll alone 
in Atlanta approached the billion dollar mark. The broader impli-
cations of the business remained imperfectly understood. Although 
no one had as yet formulated a generally accepted theory about 
aviation developments in geopolitical terms, there appeared a grow-
ing realization that more was involved than simply carrying people 
and moving goods. Air transportation had the power to alter the face 
of urban America radically and fundamentally. 
Large southern centers of the late twentieth century had already 
assumed many of the attributes of their counterparts throughout the 
country. Suburbanization trends that started following World War 
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II continued over the next forty years. Architectural designs in 
southern suburbs were much the same as those elsewhere, with 
ranch-style dwellings predominating. Some larger homes featured 
fake white columns, plantation house imitations that could be found 
all the way from Maine to California. In short, the form was no 
longer distinctively associated with the South; no true regional ar-
chitecture flourished in Dixie. If anything, air conditioning, which 
in the years after 1960 became a common feature, worked against 
sectional designs. 18 High ceilings, verandas, and porches were no 
longer necessary. Accompanying suburbanization was a trend to-
ward shopping centers. Those in Atlanta, New Orleans, and Balti-
more looked the same as ones in Denver, Milwaukee, and Hartford. 
The shopping centers-the largest in North America was purport-
edly one in Edmonton, Alberta-had a fundamental impact on 
downtowns, altering their traditional roles as merchandising cen-
ters. City people no longer felt a need to go downtown as often as 
they had in the past. 
Downtowns increasingly became centers for business and en-
tertainment and lost most of their traditional merchandising func-
tions. Specialty shops and convenience stores rather than 
department stores appeared the wave of the future; from a retail 
standpoint, this development seemed to be a curious throwback to 
the era that preceded the ascendancy of department and chain stores. 
Some downtowns became places to leave at night; that of Wash-
ington was a classic example. All sorts of schemes emerged, designed 
to attract everything from convention delegates to suburban shop-
pers. The tangible results accomplished by what seemed a countless 
number of downtown development boards were usually confined to 
never enacted plans and rhetorical predictions of impending great-
ness. Wails came down, replaced by parking lots and terraced parks. 
Some places did accomplish significant changes. Baltimore tore 
down and rebuilt portions of its central core, with the previously 
decrepit waterfront district becoming the site of a magnificent na-
tional aquarium. Atlanta business interests constructed a huge ur-
ban extravaganza called Peachtree Center, an area of more than 
twenty acres that attempted to blend rural and urban forms, with 
large hotels and office buildings thrusting toward the sky in the 
middle of parklike splendor that reminded enthusiastic residents of 
the Tivoli Gardens in Copenhagen. 19 Peachtree Center, which was 
located near Atlanta's convention and sports arenas, supposedly con-
tained the tallest hotel in the United States. Even so, Peachtree 
Center failed to become an attraction on the same level as the his-
toric French Quarter in New Orleans. The redevelopment and pres-
156 THE URBAN SOUTH 
ervation of whole old central districts, including those in Savannah 
and Charleston, represented the better side of southern urban ar-
chitecture. A key fact was that a combination of urban renewal, 
public housing, and expressways had destroyed much of the urban 
South's architectural heritage. Anonymous architecture, in which 
"form follows function" prevailed over aesthetic considerations, pre-
dominated almost everywhere. 
The southern cities, which had a special attraction as the late 
twentieth century advanced, became the the kind of places in which 
many Americans wanted to live. The climate, always a winter in-
ducement, became even more attractive as air conditioning became 
more widespread in offices, factories, stores, homes, and automo-
biles. Urban expressways greatly increased commuter ranges. String 
cities of a new sort emerged in some parts of the South. Conrad 
Treuber, a population expert, noted in 1974 after flying over North 
Carolina, "You fly over that section of the country at night and look 
down and it looks like one big long urban area," he said. "But it's 
really nothing like the sort of tight clustering that you see in the 
Northeast. I think we'll see a lot more of that sort of thing. People 
there can live in uncrowded conditions but still have a reasonable 
choice of jobs to choose from."20 
By 1988 the emergence of what the media called "megacoun-
ties," for example Fairfax County in the Washington area and Gwin-
nett County just northeast of Atlanta, tended to confirm the trend. 
For those who could afford it, southern suburban living represented 
a relaxed and congenial way of life, complete with barbecue grills, 
two or more cars, above-average schools, carpools, volunteer activi-
ties, and all sorts of opportunities for outdoor recreation. 
A wide range of cultural activities characterized late twentieth-
century Dixie. In many places symphony orchestras and art galleries 
were gaining prominence. Although the most publicized institutions 
were in the rising national metropolises of Houston, Dallas, and 
Atlanta, a life of refinement and polish was increasingly available 
in medium-sized cities such as Corpus Christi and Alexandria, Loui-
siana. Television, videocassettes, movies, radio, and regional news-
papers gave southerners much the same worldview as Americans 
elsewhere in the nation. The sexual revolution, feminism, AIDS, teen-
age rebellion, abortion and the drug culture all affected the South as 
well as other regions of the country. Isolation was no longer a feature 
of the southern condition. Even though prophets of doom feared 
that Dixie would lose its identity, the prospect seemed remote. 
Southern mores appeared too strong to fall before "Yankee Culture." 
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A black Chicagoan from Tuskegee said it best: "Chicago ain't where 
I live. It's where I stay. Chicago's existin.' Tuskegee is livin.' "21 
Southern intellectuals and social commentators worried about 
the impact of urbanization on agrarian institutions that they re-
garded as traditional. In 1973 John Egerton expressed concern that 
"the South and the nation are not exchanging strengths as much as 
they are exchanging sins,. more often than not, they are sharing and 
spreading the worst in each other, while the best languishes and 
withers." Marshall Frady, a leading southern journalist and writer, 
feared that the "tinfoil-twinkly simulation" of southern California 
threatened to engulf the South. "Faulkner's Flem Snopes has evolved 
into a relentlessly bouncy and glitter-eyed neo-Babbitt with an al-
most touching lust for new chemical plants, glassy-maized office 
parks and instant subdivisions," he wrote. "The mischief is that, in 
its transfiguration into What-a-Burger drive-ins and apartment 
wastelands, the South is being etherized, subtly rendered pastless, 
memoryless and vague of identity."22 While this trend was not ex-
actly new, it represented a variation on the familiar theme that 
undesirable outside forces would eventually overwhelm Dixie and, 
although they might fail to destroy it, would corrupt and compro-
mise its identity. 
Implicit in the analysis of Egerton, Frady, and others was a call 
for a review of agrarian values, a restudy of the fundamental prin-
ciples of Jeffersonianism or of the sentiments expressed in I'll Take 
My Stand. Yet these observers did not want a return to segregation-
far from it. They feared a loss of something nebulous but at the same 
time associated with traditional values; they sought to reaffirm the 
South's religious heritage, the uniqueness of the landscape, and the 
heroism of Confederate leaders. It was as if the South had remained 
a rural bastion until cities suddenly overwhelmed it. Living in a 
period of tremendous sectional change, the thoughtful southerners 
sought to preserve old values even as they acquiesced to the new. 
Surely, as long as such sentiments as those expressed by Jefferson 
and the authors of I'll Take My Stand were abroad, the South would 
endure, both in fact and in mind. 
Although the southern boundaries might change or be open to 
dispute, the concept of regionalism refused to die in America. In the 
aftermath of the civil rights revolution, northerners, as at the end 
of Reconstruction, showed little inclination to tell southerners how 
to conduct their affairs. Moreover, as a new era dawned in the South 
of the 1980s, they no longer had the power to do so. Colonialism in 
Dixie was not even an issue. Once it became clear that northern 
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money, mills, and media would not destroy the best of southern 
culture, the section's nationalists turned to other questions. 
Through the use of outside capital the South, at considerable cost 
and just as the men of the New South creed had predicted, achieved 
equality in the Union. At long last the region put behind it the defeat 
of 1865. Southern per capita income levels, to be sure, remained 
lower than in the North. In the 1880s the difference was significant; 
in the 1980s it was increasingly irrelevant, given variations in prices, 
changing land values, and cost-of-living adjustments. 
Racial relations in the modern South, as widely noted, remained 
strained. Busing to achieve school desegregation was generally un-
popular, blacks and whites attended their own churches, and resi-
dential districts remained almost totally segregated. Much the same 
situation existed outside the South. With regard to race relations, 
sentiments in urban America, North and South, increasingly dove-
tailed. That was to beg the question. Throughout southern history, 
cities in the South had been more like those in the North than had 
the section's agrarian components. Perhaps it would have been more 
accurate to put things the other way around, to say that northern 
cities gradually became more similar to their southern neighbors. 
Urbanization in the United States, from the earliest days to the 
present, always crossed sectional lines. 
Southern urban development had traditionally moved ahead at 
a pace that seemed appropriate in view of sectional needs. Of great 
import was that cities in the South had never grown in isolation 
from the rest of America. It has been argued that southern urbanites 
retained rural values. "But the southern city is different because the 
South is different," regional southern historian David R. Goldfield, 
a transplanted New Yorker teaching in North Carolina, has written. 
"In that region, the city is much closer to the plantation than it is 
to Chicago and New York."23 This viewpoint may have had some 
validity, but it did not take southern cities outside the mainstream. 
Exactly the same thing could be said about cities in the North. After 
all, Central Park in New York helped spawn the City Beautiful 
movement, and Chicago authorities had deliberately set aside huge 
tracts of land on the city's outskirts as forest preserves. A dedication 
to rural values united city people, as did what an older generation 
called urbanity: a commonality of values associated with the urban 
condition. 
The history of the urban South progressed within a sectional 
framework, all the while making a significant contribution to the 
southern way of life. After more than 350 years of city building, two 
decades stood out as more important than all the others. Of special 
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significance were the 1880s and the 1950s, give or take a few years 
on either side. The two periods encompassed the great leaps forward 
in southern urbanization. In colonial days leaders built the first 
foundations (which probably seem more important in retrospect 
than they did at the time), established basic levels of urban services, 
pioneered a planning tradition, and built necessary economic insti-
tutions. The antebellum years featured the careful construction of 
regional strata of cities concurrent with a reckless and relentless 
expansion in the North. 
The South could not compete in building boom towns, as mem-
bers of the ill-fated commercial convention movement concluded. 
The twin agonies of Civil War and Reconstruction impeded progress 
in the defeated communities and in those outside the Confederate 
States of America that escaped the direct ravages of war. The goal 
of all concerned was hardly to advance but rather to get back to the 
situation before the start of hostilities. In the early metropolitan 
period, southern urban leaders held the line, presided over steady 
but generally unspectacular growth, promoted growing profession-
alism in city administration, and entertained a high degree of un-
warranted optimism. During the Great Depression the South's cities 
hung on, helped immeasurably by federal relief funds. In World War 
II, with the depression past, the urban centers overcame the threat 
of a grave social crisis and advanced rapidly as war-related ventures 
brought a large measure of prosperity. The decades after the postwar 
era led to so much economic progress that in the 1980s the cities 
of the South had achieved a common ground or better with their 
counterparts around the nation. 
Both the 1880s and 1950s were activist decades that set courses 
for the future. I mean to imply not that all developments were posi-
tive but rather that both key decades were watersheds in the south-
ern experience in America. The 1880s saw basic decisions in regard 
to levels of services, relationships between towns, and the estab-
lishment of segregation systems. The South was tentatively moving 
in the direction of urban maturity and was seeing the beginnings of 
industrialization. In effect, the "modernization" of southern cities 
started during the 1880s. In the 1950s Brown v. Board brought tre-
mendous changes in race relations in the South as a whole. The 
postwar period saw an upswing in the economy and especially the 
start of a major new industrial thrust. Everything from real estate 
divisions to suburban shopping centers helped to make southern 
cities more and more like those in other regions. Many things-air 
conditioning, interstate highways, urban renewal, public housing, 
tax breaks for home owners, and air transportation-changed the 
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face of Dixie. As in the 1880s, a "modernization" process was under 
way. 
Trends that began in the 1880s gave every indication of con-
tinuing into the twenty-first century. In the years ahead southern 
cities would confront a future at once regional and national in its 
implications. I do not mean that Jefferson or the writers of I'll Take 
My Stand were wrong and that the men of the New South creed 
were right. The South's response to future challenges, however, 
would reflect the influence of the city in determining the course of 
modern civilization. 
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ESSAY ON SOURCES 
This essay is designed to acquaint readers with sources that have proved 
useful in studying southern urban history. In it I also hope to provide ideas 
for further research projects and to help those readers who wish to extend 
their general knowledge of the history of the South. I have listed here only 
a representative portion of the materials that I consulted in preparing this 
book, primarily those upon which I drew extensively. The rich materials 
pertaining to the history of the urban South encompass a variety of primary 
and secondary sources. 
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Isaac Copeland, ed., Democracy in the Old South and Other Essays by 
Fletcher Melvin Green (Nashville, 1969); Grady McWhiney, Southerners 
and Other Americans (New York, 1973); Benjamin Burks Kendrick and Alex 
Mathews Arnett, The South Looks at Its Past (Chapel Hill, 1955); William 
H. Nichols, Southern Tradition and Regional Progress (Chapel Hill, 1960); 
Harriet Chappell Owsley, ed., The South: Old and New Frontiers: Selected 
Essays of Frank Lawrence Owsley (Athens, Ga., 1969); Henry Savage, Jr., 
Seeds of Time: The Background of Southern Thinking (New York, 1959); 
Donald Davidson, ed., Selected Essays and Other Writings of John Donald 
Wade (Athens, Ga., 1966); T. Harry Williams, Romance and Realism in 
Southern Politics (Athens, Ga., 1961 ); Frank E. Vandiver, ed., The Idea of 
the South: Pursuit of a Central Theme (Chicago, 1964); Dewey W. Gran-
tham, Jr., ed., The South and the Sectional Theme since Reconstruction 
(New York, 1967); William Best Hesseltine, "Regions, Classes, and Sections 
in American History," Joumal of Land and Public Utilities Economics 1 
(Feb. 1944):35-44; W.T. Couch, ed., Cult me in the South (Chapel Hill, 1934); 
Clement Eaton, The Waning of the Old South Civilization, 1860-1880's, 
Lamar Memorial Lectures, No. 10 (Athens, Ga., 1968 ); Albert Bushnell Hart, 
The Southem South (New York, 1910); Howard W. Odum, Southern Regions 
of the United States (Chapel Hill, 1936); Arthur S. Link and Rembert W. 
Patrick, eds., Writing Southern History: Essays in Historiography in Honor 
of Fletcher M. Green ( 1965; repr. Baton Rouge, 1967); Louis D. Rubin, Jr., 
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South: Portrait of a Culture (Baton Rouge, 1980); Richard H. King, A South-
ern Renaissance: The Cultural Awakening of the American South (New 
York, 1980); John B. Boles and Evelyn Nolan, Interpreting Southern History: 
Historiographical Essays in Honor of Sanford W. Higginbotham (Baton 
Rouge, 1987). 
Students of southern urbanization have not made sufficient use of con-
temporary printed federal documents. A primary source of special impor-
tance is a remarkable survey, George E. Waring, Jr., comp., "The Southern 
and the Western States" and "The New England and the Middle States," 
Report on the Social Statistics of Cities, Tenth Census of the United States, 
1880, vols. 9 and 10, pts. 1 and 2 (Washington, D.C., 1886-87). Thousands 
of individuals from all across the country, mostly public officials, provided 
the primary information collected in the Social Statistics of Cities. Material 
is included on 222 of the 227 cities in the United States with populations 
of 10,000 or more in 1880. The Tenth Census of the United States, 1880, 
was the most comprehensive American census taken to date and represented 
a response to congressional desires for a survey of the progress of the nation 
at the end of its first hundred years. The Report on Statistics of Churches 
in the United States, Eleventh Census of the United States, vol. 9 (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1894), has the best available nineteenth-century religious tabu-
lations. (Attempts to take a religious census in 1880 failed because of faulty 
methodology.) These tables, which were set in small type, with the statistics 
spread across two pages, are difficult to use. Much easier to read are manu-
facturing statistics, such as those contained in Report on Manufacturing 
Industries in the United States at the Eleventh Census: 1890, Eleventh 
Census of the United States, 1890, pts. l and 2 (Washington, D.C., 1895), 
which summarizes the progress of American manufacturing to that point 
in time. Later statistics on industrial development can be obtained from the 
census or from a wide variety of secondary sources. The general data largely 
suffer from differing definitions of the southern region. 
A variety of other federal documents contain helpful information. A 
detailed source for educational statistics in the Gilded Age is the report of 
the secretary of the interior, Report of the Commissioner of Education, 1880, 
vol. 3 (Washington, D.C., 1882). Basic to understanding the grain trade is 
Bureau of Statistics, Department of the Treasury, "The Grain Trade of the 
United States and Tables on the World's Wheat Supply and Trade," Monthly 
Summary of Commerce and Finances, January 1900, n.s., no. 7 (Washing-
ton, D.C., 1900). Despite the limited scope of the title, this long report has 
historical tables and a lengthy economic analysis. Information on water-
works appears in Report on the Water-Power of the United States, Tenth 
Census of the United States, 1880, vol. 17, pt. 2 (Washington, D.C., 1887). 
For late nineteenth-century urban financial data, see Report on Valuation, 
Taxation, and Public Indebtedness, Tenth Census of the United States, 
1880, vol. 7 (Washington, D.C., 1884). The problems of modern cities are 
discussed in a report of the Urbanism Committee to the National Resources 
Committee, Our Cities: Their Role in the National Economy (Washington, 
D.C., 1937). Florida is examined as a last continental frontier in Robert P. 
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Porter et al., "Progress of the Nation," in Total Population, Eleventh Census 
of the United States: 1890, vol. 1, pL 1 (Washington, D.C, 1895). A mag-
nificent survey of the American railroad net is Andrew M. Modelski, Rail-
road Maps of North America: The First Hundred Years (Washington, D.C, 
1984). 
Numerous local histories, many of which are not analytical in structure 
and are confusing in organization, provide valuable background information 
and contribute to a better understanding of larger themes. Representative 
older works, some of them primary sources in their own right, include De 
Saussure and J.L. Dawson, Census of the City of Charleston, for the Year 
1848: Exhibiting the Condition and Prospects of the City, Illustrated by 
Many Statistical Details, Prepared Under the Authority of the City Council 
(Charleston, 1849); Charles Fraser, Reminiscences of Charleston: Lately 
Published in the Charleston Courier and Now Revised and Enlarged by the 
Author (Charleston, 1854); Jacob Cardozo, Reminiscences of Charleston 
(Charleston, 1866); Baltimore: Past and Present, with Biographical Sketches 
of Its Representative Men ... (Philadelphia, 1881); J. Thomas Scharf, His-
tory of Baltimore City and County ... (Philadelphia, 1881); John Porter, 
The City of Washington: Its Origin and Administration (Washington, D.C., 
1885); Charles Todd, The Story of Washington: The National Capital (New 
York, 1889); Richard Jackson, The Chronicles of Georgetown, from 1751 to 
1878 (Washington, D.C, 1878); H.W. Burton, History of Norfolk, Virginia: 
A Review of Important Events and Incidents Which Occurred from 1736 
to 1877 . .. (Norfolk, 1874); Samuel Mordecai, Virginia, Especially Rich-
mond in By-gone Days, with a Glance at the Present, Being Reminiscences 
and Last Words of an Old Citizen, 2d ed. (Richmond, 1860); Benjamin 
Casseday, The History of Louisville from Its Earliest Settlement till the 
Year 1852 (Louisville, 1852); George Ranck, History of Lexington, Kentucky: 
Its Early Annals and Recent Progress, Including Biographical Sketches and 
Personal Reminiscences of the Pioneer Settlers, Notices of Prominent 
Citizens, etc., etc. (Cincinnati, 1872); John Martin, Columbus, Ceo. from 
its Selection as a "Trading Town" in 1827, to its Partial Destruction by 
Wilson's Raid in 1865: History-Incident-Personality (Columbus, 1874); 
James Davis, The History of Memphis (Memphis, 1873); John Keating, His-
tory of the City of Memphis and Shelby County, Tennessee, with Illustra-
tions and Biographical Sketches of Some of Its Prominent Citizens 
(Syracuse, 1888); Edward Clarke, Illustrated History of Atlanta, Containing 
Glances at its Population, Business, Manufactures, Industries, Institu-
tions ... and Advantages Generally, with Nearly One Hundred Illustra-
tions, and a Lithographic Map of the City (Atlanta, 1878); Past, Present, 
and Future of Chattanooga, Tennessee . .. (Chattanooga, 1885); and H.G. 
McCall, A Sketch, Historical and Statistical of the City of Montgomery, 
Outlining Its History, Location, Climate, Health . .. (Montgomery, 1885). 
Among local histories of more recent vintage are Robert Rhett, Charles-
ton: An Epic of Carolina (Richmond, 1940); Hamilton Owens, Baltimore 
and Chesapeake (New York, 1941); Francis F. Beirne, The Amiable Balti-
moreans (1951; repr. Hatboro, Pa., 1968); Charles Hirschfield, Baltimore, 
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1870-1900: Studies in Social History (Baltimore, 1941); Sherry Olson, Bal-
timore: The Building of an American City (Baltimore, 1980); William How-
ard Taft and James Bryce, Washington: The Nation's Capital (Washington, 
D.C., 1915); William Stevens, Washington: The Cinderella City ... (New 
York, 1943); Marshall Butt, Portsmouth under Four Flags, 1752-1961 (Ports-
mouth, 1961); Henry Bacon McKoy, Wilmington, N.C.-Do You Rem ember 
When~ (Greenville, S.C., 1957); Nettie Voges, Old Alexandria: Where 
America's Past Is Present (McLean, Va., 1975); George Holbert Tucker, Nor-
folk Highlights, 1854-1881 (Norfolk, 1940); William Harden, A History of 
Savannah and South Georgia, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1913); Mills Lane, Savannah 
Revisited: A Pictorial History (Savannah, 1973); Besty Fancher, Savannah: 
A Renaissance of the Heart (Garden City, 1976); William Christian, Rich-
mond: Its People and Its Story (Philadelphia, 1923); John P. Little, History 
of Richmond (Richmond, 1933); James G. Scott anJ Edward A. Wyatt IV, 
Petersburg's Story: A History (Petersburg, 1960); Rosa Faulkner Yancey, 
Lynchburg and Its Neighbors (Richmond, 1935); Dorothy T. Potter and Clif-
ton W. Potter, Jr., Lynchburg: "The Most Interesting Spot" (Lynchburg, 
1976); Helen Kohn Hennig, ed., Columbia: Capital City of South Carolina, 
1786-1936 (Columbia, 1936); Charles Nash, The History of Augusta, First 
Settlements and Early Days as a Town, Including the Diary of Mrs. Martha 
Moore Ballard (1785-1812) (Augusta, 1904); Isabella McMeekin, Louisville: 
The Gateway City (New York, 1946); John D. Wright, Lexington: Heart of 
the Bluegrass (Lexington, Ky., 1982); William McRaven, Nashville: "Athens 
of the South" (Chapel Hill, 1949); Alfred Crabbe, Nashville: Personality of 
a City (Indianapolis, 1960); Wilbur Creighton, Building of Nashville (Nash-
ville, 1969); Henry Rightor, Standard History of New Orleans, 3 vols. (New 
York, 1952); Lyle Saxon, Fabulous New Orleans (Chicago, 1928); Harriet 
Kane, Queen New Orleans: City by the River (New York, 1949); Peter 
Hamilton, Mobile of the Five Flags: The Story of the River Basin and Coast 
about Mobile from the Earliest Times to the Present (Mobile, 1913); Cald-
well Delaney, The Story of Mobile (Mobile, 1953); Nancy Telfair, A History 
of Columbus, Georgia, 1828-1928 (Columbus, 1929); Etta Blanchard Wor-
sley, Columbus on the Chattahoochee (Columbus, 1951); Ida Young, His-
tory of Macon, Georgia (Macon, 1950); Dallas Herndon, Why Little Rock 
Was Born (Little Rock, 1933); Ira Richards, Story of a Rivertown: Little 
Rock in the Nineteenth Century (Benton, Ark., 1969); Thomas Martin, At-
lanta and Its Builders: A Comprehensive History of the Gate City of the 
South (New York, 1902); Walter Cooper, Official History of Fulton County 
(Atlanta, 1934); and Zelia Armstrong, The History of Chattanooga County 
and Chattanooga, Tennessee, 2 vols. (Chattannoga, 1931-40). 
Also sec Thomas J. Wertcnbaker, Norfolk: Historical Southern Port, 
edited by Marvin Schlegel (1931; repr. Durham, 1962); Gerald Capers, The 
Biography of a Rivertown: Memphis: Its Heroic Age (Chapel Hill, 1939); 
David M. Tucker, Memphis since Crump: Bossism, Blacks, and Civic Re-
formers, 1948-1968 (Knoxville, 1980); Constance McLaughlin Green, Wash-
ington, vol. 1, Village and Capital, 1800-1878 (Princeton, 1962), and 
Washington, vol. 2, Capital City, 1879-1950 (Princeton, 1963); James M. 
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Russell, Atlanta, 1847-1890: City Building in the Old South and the New 
(Baton Rouge, 1988); James Neal Primm, Lion of the Valley: A History of 
St. Louis (Boulder, 1981); Don H. Doyle, Nashville in the New South, 1880-
1930 (Knoxville, 1988); Don H. Doyle, Nashville since the 1920s (Knoxville, 
1985); D. Clayton James, Antebellum Natchez (Baton Rouge, 1968); William 
D. Miller, Memphis during the Progressive Era, 1900-1917 (Memphis, 1957); 
Joy L. Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age: Politics and Urban Progress, 
1880-1896 (Baton Rouge, 1969); Robert C. Reinders, End of an Era: New 
Orleans, 1850-1860 (New Orleans, 1964); Christopher Silver, Twentieth-
Century Richmond: Planning, Politics, and Race (Knox-ville, 1982); Michael 
J. McDonald and William Bruce Wheeler, Knoxville, Tennessee: Continuity 
and Change in an Appalachian City (Knoxville, 1983). 
Books and articles concerning the Civil War and Reconstruction ex-
periences of southern cities include Noah Brooks, Washington in Lincoln's 
Time (New York, 1895); James Whyte, The Uncivil War: Washington during 
the Reconstruction, 1865-1878 (New York, 1958); Catherine Copeland, 
Bravest Surrender: A Petersburg Patchwork (Richmond, 1961 ); Marvin Lu-
cas, Sherman and the Burning of Columbia (College Station, 1976); Earl 
Schenck Miers, ed., When the World Ended: The Diary of Emma LeConte 
(New York, 1957); Florence Corley, Confederate City: Augusta, Georgia, 
1860-1865 (Columbia, 1960); Barry Fleming, Autobiography of a City in 
Arms: Augusta, Georgia, 1861-1865 (Augusta, 1938); John Coleman, Lex-
ington during the Civil War, rev. ed. (Lexington, Ky., 1939); Gerald M. 
Capers, Occupied City: New Orleans under the Federals, 1862-1865 (Lex-
ington, Ky., 1965); Mary Loughborough, My Cave Life in Vicksburg: With 
Letters of Trial and Travail (Little Rock, 1882); Osborn Oldroyd, A Soldier's 
Story of the Siege of Vicksburg (Springfield, Ill., 1885); Peter Walker, Vicks-
burg: A People at War, 1860-1865 (Chapel Hill, 1960); Adolph Hoehing and 
the editors of the Army Times Publishing Company, Vicksburg: Forty-seven 
Days of Siege (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969); Samuel Carter III, The Siege 
of Atlanta, 1864 (New York, 1973); Emory M. Davis, The Confederate State 
of Richmond: A Biography of the Capital (Austin, 1971); Dale A. Somers, 
"New Orleans at War: A Merchants's View/' Louisiana History 14 (Winter 
1973):49-68; Dale A. Somers, "War and Play: The Civil War in New Or-
leans/' Mississippi Quarterly 26 (Winter 1972-73):3-28; Perry A. Snyder, 
"Shreveport, Louisiana, 1861-1865: From Secession to Surrender," Louisi-
ana Studies 11 (Spring 1972):50-70; Joseph H. Parks, "A Confederate Trade 
Center under Federal Occupation: Memphis, 1862-1865," fournal of South-
ern History 7 (Aug. 1941):289-314; C. Van Woodward, Mary Chesnut's Civil 
War (New Haven, 1981). 
The role of blacks in southern cities has naturally attracted a great deal 
of attention. Of special importance for antebellum times are Richard Wade, 
Slavery in the Cities: The South, 1820-1860 (New York, 1964); Claudia Dale 
Golden, Urban Slavery in the American South, 1820-1860: A Quantitative 
History (Chicago, 1976); Leonard P. Curry, The Free Black in Urban 
America, 1800-1850: The Shadow of the Dream (Chicago, 1981); RobertS. 
Starobin, Industrial Slavery in the Old South (New York, 1970); L.P. Jack-
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son, "Free Negroes of Petersburg, Virginia," Journal of Negro History 12 
(July 1927):365-88; E. Horace Fitchett, "The Origin and Growth of the Free 
Negro Population of Charleston, South Carolina," Journal of Negro History 
26 (Oct. 1941):421-37; Dorothy Provine, "The Economic Position of Free 
Blacks in the District of Columbia," Journal of Negro History 58 (Jan. 
1973):61-72; Ira Berlin, Slaves without Masters: The Negro in the Antebel-
lum South (New York, 1974); Clement Eaton, "Slave-Hiring in the Upper 
South: A Step toward Freedom," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 55 
(March 1960):663-73; John T. O'Brien, "Factory, Church, and Community: 
Blacks in Antebellum Richmond," Journal of Southern History 44 (Nov. 
1978):509-36; Marianne Buroff Sheldon, "Black-White Relations in Rich-
mond, Virginia, 1782-1820," Journal of Southern History 45 (Feb. 1979):27-
44; Clement Eaton, Slave-Hiring in the Upper South (New York, 1974). 
Items for the Gilded Age include John W. Blassingame, Black New 
Orleans, 1860-1880 (Chicago, 1973); Constance McLaughlin Green, The 
Secret City: A History of Race Relations in the Nation's Capital (Princeton, 
1967); Robert E. Perdue, The Negro in Savannah, 1865-1900 (New York, 
1973); Dale A. Somers, "Black and White in New Orleans: A Survey of 
Urban Race Relations, 1865-1900," Journal of Southern History 40 (Feb. 
1974):19-42; Howard N. Rabinowitz, Race Relations in the Urban South, 
1865-1890, History of Urban America Series (New York, 1978); Lawrence J. 
Friedman, The White Savage: Racial Fantasies in the Postbellum South 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970); Howard N. Rabinowitz, "The Conflict be-
tween Blacks and the Police in the Urban South," Historian 39 (Nov. 
1976):62-76; C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New 
York, 1955); Terry L. Seip, "Municipal Politics and the Negro: Baton Rouge, 
1865-1900," in Mark T. Carleton, Peter H. Howard, and Joseph B. Parker, 
eds., Readings in Louisiana Politics (Baton Rouge, 1975):242-66; David C. 
Rankin, "The Origins of Black Leadership in New Orleans during Recon-
struction," Journal of Southern History 40 (Aug. 1974):417-40; John P. Kel-
logg, "The Formation of Black Residential Areas in Lexington, Kentucky, 
1865-1887," Journal of Southern History 48 (Feb. 1982):21-52; Pete Daniel, 
"The Metamorphosis of Slavery, 1865-1900," Journal of American History 
66 (June 1979):88-99; Bobby L. Lovett, "Memphis Riots: White Reaction to 
Blacks in Memphis, May 1865-July 1868," Tennessee Historical Quarterly 
38 (Spring 1979):9-33; George C. Wright, Life behind a Veil: Blacks in Louis-
ville, Kentucky (Baton Rouge, 1985). 
Many twentieth-century materials deal with the struggle for racial 
equality. Of special importance is Michael R. Belknap, Federal Law and 
Southern Order: Racial Violence and Constitutional Conflict in the Post-
Brown South (Athens, Ga., 1987). See also Roger L. Rice, "Residential Seg-
regation by Law, 1910-1917," Journal of Southern History 34 (May 
1968): 179-99; August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, "The Boycott Movement 
against Jim Crow Streetcars in the South, 1900-1906," Journal of American 
History 55 (March 1969):756-75; James W. Silver, Mississippi: The Closed 
Society, 3d ed. (New York, 1966); Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: 
The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, 2d ed. (New York, 1962); Don-
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ald R. McCoy and RichardT. Ruetten, Quest and Response: Minority Rights 
and the Truman Administration (Lawrence, 1973); Numan V. Bartley, The 
Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South during the 1950s 
(Baton Rouge, 1969); Neil R. McMillen, The Citizens' Council: Organized 
Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954-1964 (Urbana, 1971); Philip 
B. Kurlarl, "'Brown v. Board of Education was the Beginning': The School 
Desegregation Cases in the United States Supreme Court: 1954-1979," 
Washington University Law Quarterly 1979 (Spring 1979):309-405; J.W. 
Peltason, Fifty-eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School De-
segregation (New York, 1961); David Alan Horowitz, "White Southerners' 
Alienation and Civil Rights: The Response to Corporate Liberalism, 1956-
1965," Journal of Southern History 54 (May 1988): 173-200; Richard A. Pride 
and J. David Woodward, The Burden of Burning: The Politics of Desegre-
gation in Nashville, Tennessee (Knoxville, 1985); Carl V. Harris, "Stability 
and Change in Discriminating against Black Public Schools: Birmingham, 
Alabama, 1871-1931," Journal of Southern History 51 (Aug. 1985):375-416; 
Ronald H. Bayer, "Roads to Racial Segregation: Atlanta in the Twentieth 
Century," Journal of Urban History 15 (Nov. 1988):3-21. 
Most immigration studies are quite general. Some of the general ma-
terials that contain data on the urban South are Stephen Byrne, Irish Emi-
gration to the United States: What It Has Been, and What It Is (New York, 
1873); Albert Faust, The German Element in the United States, 2 vols. (New 
York, 1912); Carl Wittke, We Who Built America: The Saga of the Immi-
grant (Cleveland, 1939); Stanley C. Johnson, History of Emigration from the 
United Kingdom to North America, 1763-1912 (London, 1913). Excellent 
surveys of ethnic groups can be found in Stephen Thernstrom, ed., Harvard 
Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups (Cambridge, Mass., 1980). Of a 
more specific nature on the urban South are Dieter Cunz, The Maryland 
Germans: A History (1948; repr. Port Washington, N.Y., 1972); Robert T. 
Clark, "Reconstruction and the New Orleans German Colony," Louisiana 
Historical Quarterly 23 (April1940):501-24; Bob Cyrus Rauchle, "The Po-
litical Life of the Germans in Memphis, 1848-1900," Louisiana Historical 
Quarterly 51 (Summer 1968):165-75; Earl Niehaus, The Irish in New Or-
leans, 1800-1860 (Baton Rouge, 1965); Darrell Overdyke, The Know-Nothing 
Party in the South (Baton Rouge, 1950); Fredrick Marcel Spletstoser, "Back 
Door to the Land of Plenty: New Orleans as an Immigrant Port, 1820-1860," 
2 vols. (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, 1978). 
Religion is a difficult subject with which to deal in a scholarly setting 
under any circumstances. Most studies make little distinction between rural 
and urban situations, further complicating any assessment of the impact of 
religious institutions on the southern city. In terms of both background and 
specific situations, works of value include Ray Allen Billington, The Prot-
estant Crusade, 1800-1860: A Study of the Origins of American Nativism 
(New York, 1938); Hunter D. Farish, The Circuit Rider Dismounts: A Social 
History of Southern Methodism, 1865-1900 (Richmond, 1938); Rufus B. 
Spain, At Ease in Zion: Social History of the Southern Baptists, 1865-1900 
(Nashville, 1967); Kenneth K. Bailey, "Southern White Protestantism at the 
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Turn of the Century," American Historical Review 68 (April1963):618-35; 
Charles Reagan Wilson, "The Religion of the Lost Cause: Ritual and Or-
ganization of the Southern Civil Religion, 1865-1920," Journal of Southern 
History 46 (May 1980):219-38; W.W. Barnes, The Southern Baptist Con-
vention, 1845-1953 (Nashville, 1954); Paul N. Garber, The Methodists Are 
One People (Nashville, 1939); Carter Woodson, The History of the Negro 
Church (1921; repr. Washington, D.C., 1945); John M. Cromwell, "First 
Negro Churches in the District of Columbia," Journal of Negro History 7 
(Jan. 1922):64-106; Kenneth K. Bailey, Southern White Protestantism in the 
Twentieth Century (New York, 1964); Wayne Flynt, "Religion in the Urban 
South: The Divided Mind of Birmingham, 1900-1930," AlabamaReview 
30 (April1977): 108-34; Kenneth T. Jackson, The Ku Klux Klan and the City, 
1915-1930 (New York, 1967). Studies pertaining to the Jewish community 
include Isaac Fein, The Making of an American Jewish Community: The 
History of Baltimore Jewry from 1773 to 1920 (Philadelphia, 1971 ); Leonard 
Dinnerstein and Mawy Dale Palsson, Jews in the South (Baton Rouge, 1973); 
Eli N. Evans, The Provincials: A Personal History of Jews in the South (New 
York, 1973); Myron Berman, Richmond's Jewry: Shabbat to Shookoe, 1796-
1976 (Charlottesville, 1979); Steven Hertzberg, Strangers within the Gate 
City: The Jews of Atlanta, 1845-1915 (Philadelphia, 1978). 
Transportation development strategies, crucial to city building, are cov-
ered in such places as John F. Stover, The Railroads of the South, 1805-
1900: A Study in Finance and Control (Chapel Hill, 1955); Eugene Alvarez, 
Travel on Southern Antebellum Railroads, 1828-1866 (University, Ala., 
1974); Edward Hungerford, The Story of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 
1827-1927, 2 vols. (New York, 1928); Maury Klein, The Great Richmond 
Terminal: A Study in Businessmen and Railroad Strategy (Charlottesville, 
1970); Maury Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad (New 
York, 1972); John L. Kcrs, The Louisville and Nashville: An Outline History 
(New York, 1933); Kincaid Herr, The Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 
1850-1963 (Louisville, 1963); Leonard P. Curry, Rail Routes South: Louis-
ville's Fight for the Southern Market, 1865-1872 (Lexington, Ky., 1969); 
Ulrich P. Phillips, A History of Transportation in the Eastern Cotton Belt 
to 1860 (New York, 1913); Jesse C. Burt, Jr., "Four Decades of the Nashville, 
Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway, 1873-1916," Tennessee Historical Quar-
terly 9 (June 1950):99-130; Samuel Derrick, Centennial History of South 
Carolina Railroads (Columbia, 1930); Richard Price, Georgia Railroads and 
the West Point Route (Salt Lake City, 1962); John G. Clark, "New Orleans 
and the River: A Study in Attitudes and Responses," Louisiana History 8 
(Spring 1967):117-36; R.B. Way, "The Commerce of the Lower Mississippi 
in the Period 1830-1860/' Mississippi Valley Historical Review Extra Num-
ber (July 1920):57-68; Frank H. Dixon, A Traffic History of the Mississippi 
River System. National Waterways Commission, Doc. ll (Washington, 
D.C., 1909); Merl E. Reed, New Orleans and the Railroads: The Struggle 
for Commercial Empire, 1830-1860 (Baton Rouge, 1966); Lawrence H. Lar-
sen, "New Orleans and the River Trade: Reinterpreting the Role of the 
Business Community/' Wisconsin Magazine of History 61 (Winter 1977-
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78): 112-24; Allan Pred, Urban Growth and City-Systems in the United 
States, 1840-1860 (Cambridge, Mass., 1980). 
A number of scholarly accounts concern the rise of industry in Dixie. 
They include Broadus Mitchell, William Gregg: Factory Master of the Old 
South (Chapel Hill, 1928); Fletcher M. Green, "Duff Green: Industrial Pro-
moter," Tournai of Southern History 2 (Feb. 1936):29-42; Herbert Collins, 
"The Idea of a Cotton Textile Industry in Ante-Bellum North Carolina, 
1870-1900," North Carolina Historical Quarterly 34 (July 1927):358-92; 
Herbert Collins, "The Southern Industrial Gospel before 1860," Tournai of 
Southern History 12 (Aug. 1946):383-402; Robert S. Cotterill, "The Old 
South to the New," Journal of Southern History 15 (Feb. 1949):3-8; Diffee 
W. Standard and Richard Griffin, "The Cotton Textile Industry in Ante-
Bellum North Carolina," North Carolina Historical Review 34 (Jan. 
1951):15-37; 34 (April 1957):131-66; Richard W. Griffin, "The Origins of 
the Industrial Revolution in Georgia: Cotton Textiles, 1810-1865," Georgia 
Historical Quarterly 42 (Dec. 1958):355-75. Weymouth T. Jordan, Ante-
bellum Alabama: Town and Country, Florida State University Studies 27 
(Tallahassee, 1957); Ernest M. Lander, Jr., "The Iron Industry in Ante-Bellum 
South Carolina," Journal of Southern History 20 (Aug. 1954):337-55; Carrol 
H. Quenzel, "The Manufacture of Locomotives and Cars in Alexandria in 
the 1850s," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 62 (April1954): 181-
89; Thomas S. Berry, "The Rise of Flour Milling in Richmond," Virginia 
Magazine of History and Biography 78 (Oct. 1970):388-408. Norris W. 
Preyer, "Why Did Industrialism Lag in the Old South?" Georgia Historical 
Quarterly 55 (Fall1971):378-96; Raymond L. Cohn, "Local Manufacturing 
in the Ante-bellum South and Midwest," Business History Review 54 
(Spring 1980):80-91; Charles D. Dew, Iron maker for the Confederacy: Toseph 
R. Anderson and the Tredegar Iron Works (New York, 1966); Broadus Mitch-
ell, The Rise of Cotton Mills in the South, Studies in Historical and Political 
Science, ser. 39, no. 2 (Baltimore, 1921); N.M. Tilley, The Bright-Tobacco 
Industry, 1860-1929 (Chapel Hill, 1948); Jack Blicksilver, Cotton Manufac-
turing in the Southeast: An Historical Analysis (Atlanta, 1959); Ronald D. 
Eller, Miners, Millhands, and Mountaineers: Industrialization of the Ap-
palachian South, 1880-1920 (Knoxville, 1982); Mary J. Oates, The Role of 
Cotton Textile Industry in the Economic Development of the Southeast, 
1900-1940 (New York, 1975); Jonathan M. Wiener, Social Origins of the 
New South: Alabama, 1860-1885 (Baton Rouge, 1978); Dwight B. Billings, 
Jr., Planters and the Making of a "New South": Class, Politics, and De-
velopment in North Carolina, 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill, 1979); Bess Beatly, 
"Lowells of the South: Northern Influences on the Nineteenth-Century 
North Carolina Textile Industry," Tournai of Southern History 53 (Feb. 
1987):27-62; Roger L. Ransom and Richard Sutch, One Kind of Freedom: 
The Economic Consequences of Emancipation (Cambridge, England, 1977); 
Broadus Mitchell and George Mitchell, The Industrial Revolution in the 
South (Baltimore, 1930); Ethel M. Ames, The Story of Coal and Iron in 
Alabama (Birmingham, 1910); James C. Cobb, Industrialization and South-
ern Society, 1877-1984 (Lexington, Ky., 1984); David L. Carlton, Mill and 
186 ESSAY ON SOURCES 
Town in South Carolina, 1880-1920 (Baton Rouge, 1982); Ernest J. Hopkins, 
Mississippi's BA WI Plan, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (Atlanta, 1944); 
James C. Cobb, "Beyond Planters and Industrialists: A New Perspective on 
the New South," Journal of Southern History 54 (Feb. 1988):45-68. 
There are important works dealing with planning and architectural con-
cerns. Those on national phases that relate to the South include John W. 
Reps, The Making of Urban America (Princeton, 1965); John W. Reps, Town 
Planning in Frontier America (Princeton, 1969); John W. Reps, Monumental 
Washington: The Planning and Development of the Capital Center (Prince-
ton, 1967); Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transfor-
mations, and Its Prospects (New York, 1961); James Marston Fitch, 
American Building: The Forces That Shape It (1948; repr. New York, 1977); 
Christopher Tunnard and Henry Hope Reed, American Skyline: The Growth 
and Form of Our Cities and Towns (New York, 1955); Vincent Scully, 
American Architecture and Urbanism (New York, 1969); Thomas A. Tall-
madge, The Story of Architecture in America (New York, 1936); Talbert F. 
Hamlin, Greek Revival Architecture in America (New York, 1944). For 
trends in the South, see such studies as John W. Reps, Tidewater Towns: 
City Planning in Colonial Virginia and Maryland (Charlottesville, 1972); 
William Casey, An Architectural Monograph: Charleston Doorways, En-
trance Motives from a South Carolina City, White Pine Series, vol. 14, 
monograph 81 (New York, 1928); Franklin Garrett, Yesterday's Atlanta, 
Seeman's Historic Cities Series, no. 8 (Miami, 1974); Everett B. Wilson, Early 
Southern Towns (South Brunswick, N.J., 1967); James Bonner, "Plantation 
Architecture of the Lower South on the Eve of the Civil War," Journal of 
Southern History 11 (Aug. 1945):370-88; Henry Forman, Architecture of the 
Old South: The Medieval Style, 1585-1880 (Cambridge, Mass., 1948); David 
R. Goldfield, "Planning for Urban Growth in the Old South," South Atlantic 
Urban Studies 4 (1979):234-57; An Omnibus of the Capitol, House of Rep-
resentatives, Doc. 412, 2d ed., 86th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C., 1959); 
Clayton B. Dekle, "The Tennessee State Capitol," Tennessee Historical 
Quarterly 25 (Fall1966):213-38; Gilbert E. Govan, "The Chattanooga Union 
Station," Tennessee Historical Quarterly 29 (Winter 1970-71) :3 72-78; Keith 
L. Bryant, "Cathedrals, Castles, and Roman Baths: Railroad Station Archi-
tecture in the Urban South," Journal of Urban History 2 (Feb. 1976):195-
230; Frederick Gutheim, Worthy of the Nation: The History of Planning 
for the National Capital (Washington, D.C., 1979); Albert Fein, Frederick 
Law Olmsted and the American Environmental Tradition (New York, 
1972). See also Margaret Ripley Wolfe, Kingsport, Tennessee: A Planned 
American City (Lexington, Ky., 1986). 
The small body of literature on municipal affairs includes J. David Grif-
fin, "Savannah's City Income Tax," Georgia Historical Quarterly 50 (Sept. 
1969):173-76; John H. Ellis, "Memphis Sanitary Revolution, 1880-1890," 
Tennessee Historical Quarterly 23 (March 1964):59-72; Eugene J. Watts, 
Social Bases of City Politics in Atlanta, 1865-1903 (Westport, Conn., 1978); 
E. Merton Coulter, "The Great Savannah Fire of 1820," Georgia Historical 
Quarterly 23 (March 1939):1-27; John B. Clark, Jr., "The Fire Problem in 
ESSAY ON SOURCES 187 
Kentucky, 1778-1865: A Case History of the Ante-Bellum South," Register 
of the Kentucky Historical Society 51 (Aprill953 ):92-122; Richard H. Haun-
ton, "Law and Order in Savannah, 1850-1860," Georgia Historical Quarterly 
56 (Spring 1972): 1-24; Richard J. Hopkins, "Public Health in Atlanta: The 
Formative Years, 1865-1879," Georgia Historical Quarterly 3 (Sept. 
1969):287-304; John H. Ellis, "Business and Public Health in the Urban 
South during the Nineteenth Century: New Orleans, Memphis, and At-
lanta," Bulletin of the History of Medicine 44 (May-June 1970):197-212; 
David R. Goldfield, "The Business of Health Planning: Disease Prevention 
in the Old South," Journal of Southern History 42 (Nov. 1976):557-70; Jo-
seph Ioor Waring, "The Yellow Fever Epidemic of Savannah in 1820, With 
a Sketch of William Coffee Daniell," Georgia Historical Quarterly 53 (Dec. 
1968):398-404; John H. Ellis, "Memphis' Sanitary Revolution, 1880-1890," 
Tennessee Historical Quarterly 23 (March 1964):59-74; Donald Everett, 
"The New Orleans Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1853," Louisiana Historical 
Quarterly 33 (Oct. 1950):380-405; JoAnn Carrigan, "Yellow Fever in New 
Orleans: Abstractions and Realities," Journal of Southern History 25 (Aug. 
15)59):339-55; JoAnn Carrigan, "Privilege, Prejudice, and Strangers Disease 
in Nineteenth-Century New Orleans," Journal of Southern History 36 (Nov. 
1970):568-78; John Duffy, "Nineteenth Century Public Health in New 
York and New Orleans: A Comparison," Louisiana History 15 (Fall 1974): 
325-37; John Duffy, Sword of Pestilence: The New Orleans Yellow Fever 
Epidemic of 1853 (Baton Rouge, 1966); M. Foster Farley, "The Mighty Mon-
arch of the South: Yellow Fever in Charleston and Savannah," Georgia 
Review 27 (Spring 1973):56-70; Margaret Warner, "Local Control versus 
National Interest: The Debate over Southern Public Health, 1878-1884," 
Journal of Southern History 50 (Aug. 1984):407-28; Eugene Watts, "The Po-
lice in Atlanta, 1890-1905," Journal of Southern History 39 (May 1973): 
165-82. 
Few studies have been done on southern urban leaders. The subject is 
not an easy one to pursue, as indicated in David C. Hammack, "Problems 
in the Historical Study of Power in the Cities and Towns of the United 
States, 1800-1960," American Historical Review 83 (April 1978):323-49. 
Representative selections include Michael P. Johnson, "Planters and Pa-
triarchy: Charleston, 1800-1860," Journal of Southern History 46 (Feb. 
1980):45-72; John Radford, "The Charleston Planters in 1860," South Caro-
lina Historical Magazine 77 (Oct. 1976):227-35; William Best Hesseltine, 
Confederate Leaders in the New South ( 1950; repr. Westport, Conn., 1970); 
Eugene J. Watts, The Social Bases of City Politics: Atlanta, 1865-1903 (West-
port, Conn., 1978); Carl V. Harris, Political Power in Birmingham, 1871-
1921 (Knoxville, 1977); Paul D. Escott, Many Excellent People: Power and 
Privilege in North Carolina, 1850-1900 (Chapel Hill, 1985 ); Laurence Snare, 
Southern Capitalists: The Ideological Leadership of an Elite, 1832-1885 
(Chapel Hill, 1986); Robert J. Hopkins, "Status, Mobility, and Dimensions 
of Change in a Southern City: Atlanta, 1870-1910," in Kenneth T. Jackson 
and Stanley K. Schultz, eds., Cities in American History (New York, 1972); 
L. Tuffly Ellis, "The New Orleans Cotton Exchange: The Formative Years, 
188 ESSAY ON SOURCES 
1871-1880," Journal of Southern History38 (Nov. 1973):545-64; J.R. Killick, 
"The Transformation of Cotton Marketing in the Late Nineteenth Century: 
Alexander Sprunt and Son of Wilmington, N.C., 1866-1956," Business His-
tory Review 55 (Summer 1981):143-69; Otis C. Skipper, f.D.B. De Bow: 
Magazinist of the Old South (Athens, Ga., 1958); Samuel M. Kipp III, "Old 
Notables and Newcomers: The Economic and Political Elite of Greensboro, 
N.C., 1880-1920," Journal of Southern History 43 (Aug. 1977):373-94; Wil-
liam D. Miller, Mr. Crump of Memphis (Baton Rouge, 1964); Harold H. 
Martin, William Berry Hartsfield,: Mayor of Atlanta (Athens, Ga., 1978); 
Edward F. Haas, DeLesseps S. Morrison and the Image of Reform: New 
Orleans Politics, 1946-1961 (Baton Rouge, 1974); Elizabeth Jacoway and 
David R. Colburn, eds., Southern Businessmen and Desegregation (Baton 
Rouge, 1982); J.K. Winkler, Tobacco Tycoon: The Story of fames Buchanan 
Duke (New York, 1942). 
Much froth has been written about the Sunbelt concept. Of special 
importance, in terms of providing both a historical perspective and a sweep-
ing interpretation, is Carl Abbott, The New Urban America: Growth and 
Politics in Sunbelt Cities (Chapel Hill, 1981). For other representative ac-
counts, see Kevin Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New Ro-
chelle, N.Y., 1969); Kirkpatrick Sale, Power Shift: The Rise of the Southern 
Rim and Its Challenge to the Eastern Establishment (New York, 1975); 
Richard M. Bernard and Bradley R. Rice, eds., Stmbelt Cities: Politics and 
Growth since World War II (Austin, 1983); Bernard L. Weinstein and Robert 
E. Firestine, Regional Growth and Decline in the United States: The Rise 
of the Sunbelt and the Decline of the Northeast (New York, 1978); Joel 
Garreau, The Nine Nations of North America (Boston, 1981); David C. Perry 
and Alfred J. Watkins, The Rise of Sunbelt Cities (Beverly Hills, 1977); 
Charles Pierce Roland, "The South, America's Will-0-the-Wisp Eden," Loui-
siana History ll (Spring 1970):101-19. Atlanta is glorified in Erla Zwingle, 
"Atlanta: Energy and Optimism in the New South," National Geographic 
174 (July 1988):2-29. 
A number of other works, some old and some new, touch on aspects 
of the southern urban experience from the colonial period through the end 
of Reconstruction. Indispensable for the colonial period are Carl Briden-
baugh's Cities in the Wilderness: The First Century of Urban Life in 
America, 1625-1742 (1938; repr. New York, 1970), and Cities in Revolt: 
Urban Life in America, 1743-1776 ( 1955; repr. New York, 1955). Important 
agricultural change is discussed in Paul G.E. Clemens, The Atlantic 
Economy and Colonial Maryland's Eastern Shore: From Tobacco to Grain 
(Ithaca, 1980). See also John G. Clark, New Orleans, 1718-1812: An Eco-
nomic Study (Baton Rouge, 1970), plus John P. Moore, Revolt in Louisiana: 
The Spanish Occupation, 1776-1780 (Baton Rouge, 1976). Of help in study-
ing the antebellum period are Leonard P. Curry, Urban Life in the Old South 
(St. Louis, 1976); Richard C. Wade, The Urban Frontier: Pioneer Life in 
Early Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Lexington, Louisville, and St. Louis (Chicago, 
1959); Julius Rubin, Canal or Railroad! Imitation and Innovation in the 
Response to the Erie Canal in Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Boston, Trans-
ESSAY ON SOURCES 189 
actions of the American Philosophical Society, n.s., vol. 51, pt. 3 (Phila-
delphia, 1961); David R. Goldfield, Urban Growth in the Age of 
Sectionalism: Virginia, 1847-1861 (Baton Rouge, 1977). Valuable travel ac-
counts include Basil Hall, Travels in North America, in the Years 1827 and 
1828, 3 vols. (Edinburgh, 1829); Anne Royall, Sketches of History, Life and 
Manners in the United States (New Haven, 1826), and Joseph H. Ingraham, 
The South-West. By a Yankee, 2 vols. (1835; repr. New York, 1966). Useful 
studies for the middle period include Herbert Wender, Southern Commer-
cial Conventions, 1837-1859, Studies in Historical and Political Science, 
series 48, no. 4 (Baltimore, 1930); Hinton Rowan Helper, The Impending 
Crisis in the South: How To Meet It (New York, 1857); Philip S. Foner, 
Business and Slavery: The New York Merchants and the Irrepressible Con-
flict (Chapel Hill, 1941); J.G. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction, 
(1937; repr. Boston, 1953); E. Merton Coulter, The South during Reconstruc-
tion, 1865-1877, A History of the South, vol. 8 (Baton Rouge, 1947); Frederick 
E. Siegel, The Roots of Southern Distinctiveness: Tobacco and Society in 
Danville, Virginia, 1780-1865 (Chapel Hill, 1987). A very valuable urban 
biography is Harriet E. Amos, Cotton City: Urban Development in Ante-
bellum Mobile (University, Ala., 1985). 
Several books have material on the New South that extends to the 
present day. The New South section in this study is based on Lawrence H. 
Larsen, The Rise of the Urban South (Lexington, Ky., 1985). Valuable data 
can be found in Paul M. Gaston, The New South Creed: A Study in Southern 
Mythmaking (New York, 1970); Henry W. Grady, The New South (New 
York, 1890); C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913, A 
History of the South, vol. 9 (Baton Rouge, 1951 ); Edgar Knight, The Influence 
of Reconstruction on Education in the South (1913; repr. New York, 1969); 
George A. Soper, Modern Methods of Street Cleaning (New York, 1909); 
Albert Bushnell Hart, The Southern South (New York, 1910); Gavin Wright, 
Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy since the 
Civil War (New York, 1986); Gilbert C. Fite, Cotton Fields No More: South-
ern Agriculture, 1865-1980 (Lexington, Ky., 1984). An important study on 
the early twentieth century is Blaine A. Brownell, The Urban Ethos in the 
South, 1920-1930 (Baton Rouge, 1975). For suburban trends see Howard L. 
Preston, Automobile Age Atlanta: The Making of a Southern Metropolis, 
1900-1935 (Athens, Ga., 1979). Roger Biles, Memphis in the Great Depres-
sion (Knoxville, 1986), covers developments during the 1930s in a major 
city. See also Douglas L. Smith, The New Deal in the Urban South (Baton 
Rouge, 1988). Jo Anne E. Argesinger, Toward a New Deal in Baltimore: 
People and Government in the Great Depression (Chapel Hill, 1988). An 
extremely important and insightful study that contains valuable informa-
tion on the urban South through World War II is George Brown Tindall, The 
Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945, A History of the South, vol. 10 
(Baton Rouge, 1967). Basic for an understanding of the postwar period are 
Charles P. Roland, The Improbable Era: The South since World War II 
(Lexington, Ky., 1975); David R. Goldfield, Promised Land: The South since 
1945, The American History Series (Arlington Heights, Ill., 1987); Pete Dan-
190 ESSAY ON SOURCES 
iel, Standing at the Crossroads: Southern Life since 1900, American Cen-
tury Series (New York, 1986). For promotional activities see James C. Cobb, 
The Selling of the South: The Southern Crusade for Industrial Development, 
1936-1980 (Baton Rouge, 1982). 
A number of articles have dealt with specific topics in colonial and 
antebellum times. Selections on the colonial period include Edward M. Ri-
ley, "The Town Acts of Colonial Virginia/' Journal of Southern History 16 
(Aug. 1950):307-23; and John C. Rainbolt, "The Absence of Towns in Sev-
enteenth-Century Virginia/' Journal of Southern History 35 (Aug. 
1969):343-60; John A. Ernst and H. Roy Merrens, "'Camden's turrets pierce 
the Skies!': The Urban Process in the Southern Colonies during the Eighteen 
Century/' William and Mary Quarterly 30 (Oct. 1973):549-74. Articles on 
the antebellum period include Lawrence H. Larsen, "Nineteenth-Century 
Street Sanitation: A Study of Filth and Frustration/' Wisconsin Magazine 
of History 52 (Spring 1969):239-47. 
The cities of the Civil War, Reconstruction, and New South eras have 
received some attention. Selections on the Civil War and Reconstruction 
include Jered W. Roberson, "The Memphis Commercial Convention of 
1853: Southern Dreams and 'Young America/" Tennessee Historical 
Quarterly 33 (Fall 1974):279-96. Some valuable articles on the New South 
are Howard N. Rabinowitz, "Half a Loaf: The Shift from White to Black 
Teachers in the Negro Schools of the Urban South, 1865-1890/' Journal of 
Southern History40 (Nov. 1974):565-94; Clay McShane, "Transforming the 
Use of Urban Space: A Look at the Revolution in Street Pavements, 1880-
1924/' Journal of Urban History 5 (May 1979):279-307; and Howard N. 
Rabinowitz, "The Conflict between Blacks and the Police in the Urban 
South/' Historian 39 (Nov. 1976):62-76. 
Helpful articles on the twentieth-century urban South include Blaine 
A. Brownell, "The Commercial-Civic Elite and City Planning in Atlanta, 
Memphis, and New Orleans in the 1920s/' Journal of Southern History 16 
(Aug. 1975):339-68; Steve Davis, "The South as 'The Nation's No. 1 Eco-
nomic Problem': The NEC Report of 1938/' Georgia Historical Quarterly 
62 (Summer 1978):119-32; and James A. Burron, "The WPA in Nashville, 
1935-1943/' Tennessee Historical Quarterly 34 (Fall1975):293-306; Charles 
Paul Garofalo, "The Sons of Henry Grady: Atlanta Boosters in the 1920s," 
Journal of Southern History 42 (May 1976):187-204; Raymond Arsenault, 
"The End of the Long Hot Summer: The Air Conditioner and Southern 
Culture/' Journal of Southern History 50 (Nov. 1984):597-628. These and 
other accounts enrich the available sources for study of the urban South. 
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The material cited above should be considered only a starting point for 
further investigation. 
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Ingraham, Joseph, 37 
Interstate Highway Act, 138 
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Kaiser Aluminum, 131 
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Key West, Fla., 35, 106; population, 
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Kitty Hawk, N.C., 153 
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Ku Klux Klan, 67, 111-12, 128, 133, 134 
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92, 138, 142 
Los Angeles International Airport, 154 
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Louisville, Ky., 58, 61, 72, 81; founding, 
30; boosterism, 38; education, 40; po-
lice, 41; epidemics, 42; fire depart-
ment, 42, 89; violence, 42; 
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143; railroads, 55; religion, 77; manu-
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MacLeish, Archibald, 121 
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146, 147; aviation, 154 
Miami Beach, Fla., 124 
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Miami International Airport, 154 
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Mississippi River, 35, 36, 59 
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tion, 40; gas, 40; violence, 42; popula-
tion, 47, 59, 130; railroads, 55;, cotton 
trade, 61; religion, 77; schools, 78; 
dead animals, 85; government, 112; 
architecture, 127; shipyards, 129 
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Mobile and Ohio Railroad, 55 
Mobile Port Society, 41 
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conventions, 51-52; population, 59; 
sewage, 86; waterworks, 86; health, 
88; police, 89; desegregation, 134; 
Civil Rights, 136 
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Morrison, De Lesseps Story, 131 
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Naples, Fla., 14 7 
Nashville, Tenn., 30, 61, 72; water-
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National Board of Health, 65, 66 
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National Recovery Administration, 125 
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Nelson, Donald M., 129, 130 
New Amsterdam, 13 
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New Deal, 122-26 
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education, 40; gas, 40; health, 41; po-
lice, 41, 89, 115; violence, 42; epi-
demics, 42, 56, 57; population, 47, 59, 
75, 76, 99, 104, 108, 141, 142, 152; 
commercial convention, 50; railroads, 
51, 54; Civil War, 60, 62; desegrega-
tion, 63; sanitation, 66; religion, 71; 
blacks, 75, 112, 141; immigrants, 76; 
manufacturing, 79, 80, 94, 129; debt, 
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86; waterworks, 86; horse railroads, 
87; bosses, 112; city planning, 115; 
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New Orleans, Opelousas and Great 
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Newport, Ky., 58, 72, 75, 88 
Newport, R.I., 13 
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New York, N.Y., 13, 73, 113; economic 
power, 31, 74; population, 47, l04, 
142; blacks, 75; immigrants, 75, 76; 
manufacturing, 94; slums, 127 
New York Herald-Tribune, 116 
New York Times, 122 
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Norfolk, Va., lO, 71; trade, 23, 60, 61; 
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84; horse railroad, 87; police, 90; 
shipyards, 129 
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O'Hare Airport, 154 
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Oklahoma City, Okla., 95 
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Omaha, Neb., 73 
omnibuses, 8 7 
Opryland U.S.A., 146 
Orlando, Fla., 147 
Oshkosh, Wis., 89 
Ottumwa, Iowa, 127, 137 
Owensboro, Ky., 103 
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Pan American Airlines, 153 
Panic of 1837, 33, 53 
Panic of 185 7, 58 
Panic of 1873, 65, 70, 74 
Panic of 1893, 103 
paper mills, 137 
parks, 81-82, 158 
Patrons of Husbandry, 97 
Peachtree Center, 155 
Pendergast, James, 113 
Pendergast, Thomas, 113 
Penn, William, 13 
Pennsylvania, 14 
Pennsylvania Railroad, 64 
Pensacola, Fla., 35, 102 
Peoria, Ill., 89, 94 
Petersburg, Va., 10, 71; fires, 42; popu-
lation, 47, 59; fire department, 88 
Philadelphia, Penn., 13, 21, 24, 75, 127 
Philips, Kevin, 148 
Pimlico race track, 79 
Pine Bluff, Ark., 103 
Pittsburgh, Penn., 94, 105, 110 
Plessy v Ferguson, 96 
police, 41, 89-91, 115 
population statistics, 14, 24, 46, 47, 48; 
blacks, 74, 75, 141; demographic pro-
file, 75-76; immigrants, 75; 1860, 59; 
1880, 70-71, 74, 100-l01; 1890, 93, 
99-102; 1900, 103-5; 1930, 108; 1980s, 
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race relations, 158 
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Redstone Arsenal, 129 
religion, 77 
Republic Airlines, 154 
Republican Party, 98 
Research Triangle Park, 137 
Resettlement Administration, 124 
rice, 9 
Rice, Bradley R., 149 
Richmond, Va., 10, 23, 26, 36, 71; popu-
lation, 24, 47, 59, 76, 99, 108; urban 
services, 40; fire department, 42; 
waterworks, 42; slave labor, 45; Civil 
War, 60, 61; manufacturing, 79, 94; 
streets, 84; omnibuses, 87; New Deal, 
124; architecture, 127 
riots, 42, 136, 141 
Roanoke, Va., 102 
Roanoke Colony, 3-4 
Robb, James, 51, 54 
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Roman Catholics, 77 
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 122 
Royall, Anne, 3 7 
St. Augustine, Fla., 106, 147 
St. Louis, Mo., 34, 58, 75 
St. Mary's, Md., 6 
St. Petersburg, Fla., 142, 147 
Sale, Kirkpatrick, 148-49 
San Antonio, Tex., 59, 108 
San Diego, Cal., 72, 92 
Sanford, Thaddeus, 38 
San Francisco, Cal., 73, 138 
Sarasota, Fla., 147 
Savannah (steamship), 000 
Savannah, Ga., 20, 23, 32, 71; popula-
tion, 24, 47, 59, 99; railroads, 33; 
waterworks, 42; epidemics, 43; Civil 
War, 59, 60, 61; schools, 78; parks, 
81; omnibuses, 87; police, 89; archi-
tecture, 127, 156 
Scott, Jesup W., 151 
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Seattle, Wash., 72, 73, 92 
segregation, 96-97, 112, 128 
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Shreveport, La., 128, 129 
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smallpox, 65 
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Smoky Mountains, 36 
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South Carolina, 8, 78 
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Southern Railway Security Co., 000 
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States' Rights party, 132 
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steel industry, 110, 111, 124, 137 
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Stevenson, John, 11 
streets, 83-84 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating com-
mittee, 134 
suburbs, 108, 114, 155, 156 
Summers, E.H., 80 
sunbelt, 148-50 
Tacoma, Wash., 73, 92 
Talmadge, Herman, 124 
Tammany Hall, 133 
Tampa, Fla., 35; population, 103, 107, 
142; shipyards, 129; race problems, 
141; New Deal, 124; tourism, 146, 
147 
Tampa-St. Petersburg, Fla., 142 
Tennessee Coal and Iron Co., 110 
Tennessee Valley Authority, 120, 123, 
125, 129, 138 
Texas, 107 
textile industry, ll1, 129 
Thurmond, Strom, 132 
Tidewater, 10 
Time, 131 
tobacco, 4, 5, 6, 10, 109, 129 
tourism, 144-48 
town planning, 18-21, 33 
trade regulations, 15 
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Treuber, Conrad, 156 
Truman, Harry S., 132, 139 
Tulsa, Okla., 108 
United States Housing Authority, 125 
United States Steel, 110 
United States Supreme Court, 132 
University of New Orleans, 153 
urban planning, 18-21, 25, ll4-15 
Vance, Rupert, 120 
Vanderbilt University, 119 
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Vicksburg, Miss., 59, 60, 72; shipping, 
35-36 
Vicksburg Daily Whig, 58 
Vietnamese War, 140 
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of, 37; health, 41; population, 47, 71, 
75, 76, 99, 104, 108, 130, 138, 142; 
blacks, 75, 141; scandal, 81; parks, 
82; streets, 83; dead animals, 85; gar-
bage, 85; horse railroad, 87; police, 89, 
90; manufacturing, 94; government, 
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waterworks, 42, 86 
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